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Introduction
Few news organizations can match the setting of the Miami Herald. The paper’s 
headquarters is perched on the edge of Biscayne Bay, offering sweeping views of 
the islands that buffer the city of Miami from the Atlantic Ocean. Pelicans and 
gulls float near the building; colorful cruise ships ply the waters a few miles away.
And Miami Herald executives long held some of the best views in the city, 
from the fifth floor of the company’s headquarters.
Not any longer.
The Herald, like most U.S. daily newspapers, has faced severe financial troubles 
in recent years, suffering deep cuts in the newsroom and other departments. So, 
in one of many efforts to raise revenue, executives attached a billboard to the east 
side of the Herald building, completely obscuring the bay views of many news-
paper employees, including the publisher.
The benefits of the billboard are obvious: the low six figures in annual rev-
enue, according to a Herald executive, or enough to pay the salaries of a few 
junior reporters.
The irony is obvious as well, for the advertiser buying the space is Apple—the 
company that now controls a commerce and publishing system crucial to the 
future of the news business. And the product being advertised on the Herald’s 
wall is the iPad, a device that is both disruptive and helpful to media economics.
Indeed, the two companies provide a way to see the destruction and creation 
in the media business over the past decade. At the end of March 2001, the stock 
market valued the Herald’s parent company, Knight-Ridder, at almost precisely 
the same amount as Apple: $3.8 billion.
Ten years later, Apple’s valuation is more than $300 billion. And Knight-Ridder 
no longer exists as an independent company.1
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* * *
The difficult financial state of the U.S. news industry is no longer new. Most 
big newsrooms have faced severe cutbacks, and even though online-only outlets 
have sprung up in communities throughout the country, they haven’t fully taken 
the place of what has been lost.
These issues were explored in a precursor report2 to this one, sponsored by 
Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism and written by Leonard 
Downie Jr., former executive editor of the Washington Post, and Michael Schud-
son, a professor at Columbia. At the end of that report, which was published in 
late 2009, the authors provided a number of recommendations to stanch the 
losses in independent reporting.
Most of the recommendations were based in policy, including changes in the 
tax code to provide news organizations easier access to nonprofit status and 
encouraging philanthropists to support news gathering. Most controversially, 
Miami Herald building, with Herald logo on right and Apple iPad billboard on left, April 2011 (Jeff Binion photo)
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Downie and Schudson recommended the creation of a national “Fund for Local 
News” supported with fees the Federal Communications Commission would 
collect from telecom users, broadcast licensees or Internet service providers.
That suggestion drew praise from some, as well as criticism from those who 
saw it as an intrusion by the government in a free and robust press. In the words 
of Seth Lipsky,3 editor of the New York Sun, “The best strategy to strengthen the 
press would be to maximize protection of the right to private property—and the 
right to competition. Subsidies are the enemy of competition.”
This report stands on the shoulders of the first one, but takes a different ap-
proach. Without addressing the merits of philanthropists or governments sup-
porting news gathering,4 we wanted to address another question: What kinds of 
digitally based journalism in the U.S. is the commercial market likely to support, 
and how?
While this report will examine some traditional, or “legacy,” business models 
for media, our focus is on the economic issues that news organizations—large 
and small, old and new—face with their digital ventures.
This report focuses on news organizations that do original journalism, defined 
for our purposes as independent fact-finding undertaken for the benefit of com-
munities of citizens. Those communities can be defined in the traditional way, 
by geography, but can also be brought together by topics or commonalities of 
interest. We also look into media companies that aggregate content and generate 
traffic in the process.
We confine our report mostly to for-profit news enterprises. We recognize 
the outstanding work done by such national organizations as ProPublica and the 
Center for Investigative Reporting, as well as local sites like Voice of San Diego 
and MinnPost. But for the purposes of this study, we felt it was more valuable 
to spend our time examining organizations that rely as much as possible on the 
commercial market.
We do have a bias: We think the world needs journalism and journalists. We 
welcome the tremendous access people now have to data and information, but 
much of what Americans need to know will go unreported and unexposed 
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without skilled, independent journalists doing their work. That work can in-
clude reporting and editing in the traditional way, as well as aggregating infor-
mation from other sources, or sorting and presenting data to make it accessible 
and understandable.
We decided to restrict our studies mostly to the U.S. market. We found the 
domestic news scene to be a rich and textured one, with plenty of complexity 
of its own, though we appreciate that a great deal of innovation is taking place 
beyond U.S. borders.
We define digital journalism broadly. While many publishers still see it as an 
online phenomenon—that is, displaying content on a PC screen via the Inter-
net—we have included other platforms, including mobile phones and tablets.
We found several challenges in preparing this study. First, while a great deal of 
data about digital ventures is available, much of it is unverifiable. Small startups 
and other private companies have no legal reporting requirements, so some of 
the figures we cite here are taken with appreciation and on good faith. Further, 
digital revenue is still such a small sliver of the total for publicly traded companies 
that, when it is broken out at all, it is rarely displayed in such a way that reveals 
how much comes from a particular station or publication. And, it often isn’t clear 
how much of a company’s stated digital revenue represents genuinely new in-
come as opposed to legacy dollars reapportioned to online businesses.
We sought to make this report accessible to newcomers and useful to those 
who have spent years in this field. We have tried to explain such terms as “CPM” 
(cost per thousand of views) and “impressions” (advertising spaces that appear 
on a digital page) in the text. And we have tried to be as rigorous as possible in 
examining numbers that media companies provide when describing their digital 
results. We also consulted a number of secondary sources to provide background 
and data unavailable elsewhere. These included important texts from the dawn 
of the digital age, such as Stewart Brand’s “The Media Lab,”5 and more recent 
books, such as James Hamilton’s “All The News that’s Fit to Sell”6 and “Infor-
mation Rules”7 by Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian. Of course, we also relied on 
more current sources, particularly such sites as paidcontent.org, niemanlab.org 
and cjr.org.
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But the bulk of the research in this report is based on a series of interviews we 
did in late 2010 and early 2011. We visited mainstream print and broadcast orga-
nizations with rich histories and Pulitzers and duPonts lining the walls; we also 
interviewed the founders and editors of innovative new journalistic enterprises. 
In most cases, publishers and editors were open, candid and willing to be quoted 
on the record. In a few instances, we decided to trade confidentiality for access to 
internal numbers or insights that would not otherwise be available.
We recognize, finally, that digital journalism is such a dynamic field that some 
of the findings and conclusions we reach in May 2011 will be outdated within 
months. That is what makes this subject so fertile for researchers and so humbling 
for seers. And we conclude our study not with predictions but with recommen-
dations for how news businesses large and small, new and old, can more effec-
tively meet the challenges brought on by the digital transformation.
1  Apple’s split-adjusted stock price was about $10 (from Yahoo Finance, http://yhoo.it/
ecaGAO), while Knight-Ridder’s was around $60 (Grain Market Research, http://bit.ly/
dGf5F5). Apple had far more shares outstanding, leading to valuations that are within 1 percent 
of each other. 
2  Entire contents of “The Reconstruction of American Journalism” can be found on CJR.org, 
http://bit.ly/eP6Fjl 
3  “All the News That’s Fit to Subsidize,” op-ed from WSJ.com, Oct. 21, 2009.  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704597704574486242417039358.html 
4  Media commentator Alan Mutter addressed this in a post, “Non-profits can’t possibly save the 
news,” Reflections of a Newsosaur, March 30, 2010, http://bit.ly/dMp86C. He calculated the 
news media would need an endowment of $88 billion to produce enough revenue to support 
current models. 
5  Stewart Brand, The Media Lab (Penguin, 1988).
6  James Hamilton, All the News that’s Fit to Sell (Princeton University Press, 2003).
7  Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules (Harvard Business School Press, 1999).
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Chapter One
News from Everywhere: The Economics of Digital Journalism
In early 2005, a researcher at the Poynter Institute published a column that was 
instantaneously read and—by many—misunderstood.1
Rick Edmonds, who studies the financial side of the news business for Poyn-
ter’s website, speculated about how long it would take for online newspaper rev-
enue to match the dollars brought in by the print side. He estimated that digital 
ads accounted for around 3 percent of the total revenue for an average U.S. paper. 
Edmonds assumed an optimistic online growth rate, around 33 percent a year, 
and what seemed then to be a reasonably sober estimate of print growth, around 
4 percent.
High hopes
In 2005, an analyst projected how long it might take for a typical 
newspaper’s online revenue to match its print revenue. 
Even assuming optimistic annual growth of 33.3% online and 4% print, 
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Given how low online sales were at the time, Edmonds noted it would take 14 
years for digital revenue to catch up to that of print. As he wrote, these calcula-
tions provided “little cause for cheer.” He also noted “there isn’t any reason to 
believe any of these numbers will remain steady state over time.”
His disclaimers were lost on many readers. At several conferences later that 
year, participants pointed to the study and cheered one of the presumptions in 
the column—that digital revenue would grow by a third every year, as far as the 
eye could see.
For a few years, it seemed as if this scenario might be realistic. Newspapers’ 
online revenue grew by more than 30 percent in both 2005 and 2006.2 But 
growth slowed the next year, came to a halt during the recession and still hasn’t 
fully returned to what it was in 2007. Meanwhile, print revenue hasn’t grown at 
4 percent a year since 2005; indeed, newspapers’ print revenue in 2010 was less 
than half what it was in 2005.
Fifteen years after most news organizations went online, it is clear that old me-
dia business models have been irrevocably disrupted and that the new models are 
fundamentally different from what they once were. What made traditional media 
so vulnerable to the Web? Or perhaps the better question is this: Why has digital 
technology, which has been such a powerful force for transmitting news, not yet 
provided the same energy for companies to maintain and increase profits?
Mainstream news organizations had already started losing audience before 
the Internet became popular. Broadcast network news programs have been 
sliding steadily since 1980 and now reach slightly over 20 million viewers a 
night, down more than half in three decades. Newspapers began to experience 
significant circulation declines decades ago. Total daily newspaper circulation 
has fallen by 30 percent in 20 years, from 62.3 million in 1990 to 43.4 million 
in 2010, as people found other sources, particularly local television news, to be 
an adequate substitute.3
Revenue, however, held steady or increased for mainstream news outlets, even 
as audiences shrank. This was true in the early days of the Web, too, thanks in part 
to an advertising bubble spawned by the Internet boom.
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To begin to understand the disruptions of the digital transformation, it is im-
portant to appreciate the circumstances that made the news business—wheth-
er in broadcast, cable, magazines or newspapers—so profitable for so long. The 
commercial heyday that buoyed the fortunes of American newsrooms in the last 
half-century had its roots in changes that began much earlier.
Through the 19th Century, newspapers benefited from economic and demo-
graphic shifts that accompanied industrialization—in particular, rapid urbaniza-
tion and the attendant rise of the big-city retail economy. The growing advertis-
ing market encouraged urban publishers, who had begun to loosen their ties to 
political parties and to think of themselves as independent businesspeople. In the 
process, they realized they could make most of their money from local retailers, 
rather than from people in the street paying a few pennies to buy their papers.
Historians of journalism argue that these economic and political shifts under-
pinned an increasingly professionalized and objective journalism that became the 
norm in the 1920s and 1930s. The move toward general-interest, advertising-
supported newspapers aimed at broad audiences also drove a cycle of concentra-
tion and consolidation that would continue for decades.
With audiences and ad revenue growing even as competitors disappeared, 
newsrooms and newspapers swelled in size. An analysis of major metropolitan 
dailies by the American Journalism Review found that between 1965 and 1999, 
eight of the 10 newspapers studied saw at least one competitor disappear.4 Dur-
ing the same period, on average, each of the surviving newspapers doubled the 
amount of news it produced. Even as new or expanded sections—sports, busi-
ness, lifestyle—claimed a larger share of each edition, the total coverage of local, 
national and international news continued to increase.
The trend of increasing consolidation in a growing advertising market helped 
to compensate for declining readership. By the early 1980s, most U.S. cities had 
just one daily newspaper. Or, in markets with two papers, one was clearly domi-
nant and the other was kept afloat by favorable terms negotiated in joint oper-
ating agreements that Congress had created to preserve local journalistic com-
petition. Radio and television newsrooms enjoyed similar access to a lucrative 
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market. The advertising business in broadcast was so strong that even television 
and radio stations with small market shares were profitable; those with a strong 
command of the audience were cash machines.
The monopoly or oligopoly that most metropolitan news organizations 
enjoyed by the last quarter of the 20th Century meant they could charge 
high rates to advertisers, even if their audiences had shrunk. If a local business 
needed to reach a community to promote a sale or announce a new store, the 
newspaper and TV station were usually the best way to do it. Even if the station 
or newspaper could deliver only 30 percent of the local market, down from 
50 percent a decade earlier, that was still a greater share than any other single 
medium could provide.
That changed after 2001. The recession that followed the September 11 attacks 
forced many companies to cut spending, reducing media companies’ advertising 
stream. More importantly, the digital transformation accelerated, and more us-
ers began to get their news, for free, on personal computers. The link between 
a consumer’s getting the news and a provider’s expensive investment in publish-
ing, broadcast and delivery was broken; this brought a flood of new competitors. 
Craigslist helped devastate classified ads, newspapers’ most lucrative source of rev-
enue, and in 2008, the deep recession fueled by the financial crisis undermined 
real estate and employment advertising.
As we get further into the digital age, we can more plainly see how the trans-
formation has affected news organizations and the citizens who depend on them. 
Consumers certainly have benefited—they have more choices, speedier delivery 
of news and more platforms. But as legacy companies shrink, these advantages 
have often been accompanied by a loss of original news coverage. New entrants 
have achieved impressive editorial results, but not many of them have achieved 
financial stability without some philanthropic or other non-market support.
The move to digital delivery has transformed not just the business of news, but 
also the way news is reported, aggregated, distributed and shared. Each of those 
changes has an underlying economic rationale, and the media industry has some-
times been slow to recognize the changes or has been paralyzed by their impact. 
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Below, we list some of the most consequential changes brought on by the digital 
era and offer thoughts on how they will affect the way journalism is supported 
in the years to come.
I. A Different Business
	 •	  Digital requires a new way of thinking about your audience, one that 
now feasts on an abundance of information. In the words of Syracuse 
University Professor Vin Crosbie, “Within the span of a single human gen-
eration, people’s access to information has shifted from relative scarcity to 
surplus.”5 As Crosbie notes, it isn’t enough simply to transfer content from 
a legacy platform to a new one. Digital journalism requires an entirely dif-
ferent mind-set, one that recognizes the plethora of new options available 
to consumers. Tom Woerner, a senior vice president at freelance-generated 
site Examiner.com, notes that “the old distribution model allowed for only 
so much content. There are only so many pages you can print, only so many 
minutes you can sell in a broadcast. … Now the limits are gone, for both 
good and bad.”
   Impact: Readers have access to far more information than they used to, 
almost always for free. But for publishers, the competition is nearly infinite, 
meaning much of the news has become a commodity, with pricing to match.
	 •	  Digital is where the users are heading. In the most recent study by the 
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 65 percent of people ages 
18 to 29 get their news from the Internet—outpacing television for the first 
time and far exceeding the 21 percent in that age group who rely primar-
ily on newspapers.6 Among people ages 50 to 64, the Internet (34 percent) 
and newspapers (38 percent) are almost tied. The Web’s growing popularity 
means the “network effect” can kick in. That is, as more people use news 
sites, those sites become more valuable to their users, especially as readers and 
viewers comment on—and contribute to—stories. Meanwhile, more usage 
is gravitating from computer screens to smartphones, tablets and other mo-
bile devices. According to a January 2011 Pew study, 47 percent of American 
adults say they get at least some local news and information on their cell-
phone or tablet computer.7
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   Impact: Digital platforms provide ways for audiences to build quickly with 
lower marketing costs than in traditional media. And the shift to mobile pro-
vides news organizations with more opportunities for targeted content and 
advertising. But increased audiences don’t always lead to proportional gains; 
in other words, more people may be viewing a site, but that doesn’t mean 
revenue increases to the same or greater degree. Witness a recent report by 
McClatchy Co., the third-largest newspaper firm in the U.S. The company 
said the number of local daily unique visitors to its websites grew by 17.3 
percent in 2010, yet digital revenue rose only 2.4 percent for the year.8 And 
mobile ad sales have so far been less lucrative than those on Internet plat-
forms. Chris Hendricks, vice president of interactive media for McClatchy, 
says that “seven percent of our traffic comes from mobile. The traffic is sig-
nificant, the revenue is not.”
	 •	  Digital provides a means to innovate rapidly, determine audience size 
quickly and wind down unsuccessful businesses with minimal ex-
pense. The substantial capital expenditures that used to be involved in 
starting a new media company are largely gone. A video service need not 
build tall antennae atop the highest hills in town, and print publishers can 
avoid capital-intensive investments in printing presses. The large staffs asso-
ciated with getting information to readers—whether they’re camera crews 
or printing staffs—aren’t as necessary. It took Sports Illustrated at least 10 
years to get its formula right and become profitable9; it took Huffington 
Post less than six years to go from an idea to a valuation of $315 million in 
its 2011 sale to AOL.
   Impact: The development time from idea to market is shortened, greatly 
increasing efficient use of a firm’s resources. But because competitors can 
imitate or adapt more quickly, it is difficult to cash in on innovations. The 
shorter cycles can lessen the length of time that innovations remain unique, 
relevant and valuable.
	 •	  Digital platforms extend the lifespan of journalism. In the analog era, news 
stories were as ephemeral as fruit flies. An article was prominent for a day, then 
available only on a library’s microfiche; a video would be broadcast to millions 
Columbia Journalism School | Tow Center for Digital Journalism
 News from Everywhere: The Economics of Digital Journalism 13
on the nightly news, then it would be sent to a network’s vault. Journalism 
now can be freely accessible for as long as a publisher wills it to be. In the words 
of one programmer, “There is no such thing as ‘yesterday’s news.’ ”
   Impact: News organizations can make money from their archives as part 
of a subscription or pay-per-view service, or as part of a scheme to provide 
more content and build traffic and ad revenue. But as increasing amounts of 
content stream into archives, consumers may have greater difficulty finding 
what they want.
II. Content and Distribution: A Fundamental Change
	 •	  Digital disrupts the aggregation model that was so profitable for so 
long. Almost no one used to read the entire newspaper every morning, 
and audiences frequently tuned in and out of the network news at night. 
Yet, news organizations sold their advertising as if every page was turned 
and every moment was viewed. Indeed, print publications applied a mul-
tiplier—often up to 2.5 readers—to account for the audience for each 
edition they sold. But in the online world, content has become atomized, 
with each article existing independently of the next. It is as seamless for a 
reader to go from a tallahasseedemocrat.com story to a video on msnbc.
com as it is to read back-to-back stories in Esquire magazine. The eco-
nomic consequences of this fickle information-gathering are devastating 
for legacy news organizations, especially because they have ceded many 
of the benefits of aggregation to sources like Drudge Report, Huffington 
Post and Google News. Says Michael Golden, vice chairman and president 
of the New York Times Co.: “We’ve lost the power of the package.”10
   Impact: News relevant to a particular audience can be assembled cheaply 
and easily, with significant benefit for readers seeking divergent and even 
competing points of view. But low-cost aggregators compete with content 
creators for page views, and often win. In the words of Aaron Kushner, an 
investor trying to buy the Boston Globe, “The definition of a competitor 
now is someone who gives away your story for free.”
	 •	  Journalists today can find readers wherever there is access to the In-
ternet. This is an enormous transformation after a century in which the 
reach of print journalism was limited by a company’s printing plants and 
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trucks, and most broadcast news was tied to narrow geographic areas. Even 
when local newspapers expanded their circulation far beyond their metro-
politan areas, the results were usually disappointing—the more geographi-
cally distant the reader, the less loyalty and interest in the content. (Three 
national newspapers—USA Today, the New York Times and the Wall Street 
Journal—avoided most of those constraints by delivering national rather 
than local news in authoritative, attractive packages.) By contrast, publishing 
online means that any article or video will become immediately available 
around the world, at no added cost. Meanwhile, broadcast outlets’ reach, 
once defined largely by geographic and bandwidth constraints and enforced 
by regulatory agencies, is expanding. Their content is no longer limited to 
local markets and thus is less restricted by federal regulations.
   Impact: Journalists and media companies can go where the audience is, ex-
panding markets at low costs. But the advantages that went along with distri-
bution limits—such as protection against new competitors—are disappearing.
	 •	  Digital platforms enable publishers to deploy their readers and view-
ers in publicizing and distributing their content. Print publishers used 
to tout the “pass-along audience”—people who didn’t buy a magazine or 
newspaper but picked it up in, say, a dentist’s office, and could therefore be 
counted as readers. Advertisers were often skeptical of the numbers, which 
depended on surveys of readers trying to remember if they read a publica-
tion they didn’t pay for. But digital news organizations can track precisely 
how people share content—a few years ago mainly by email, and now also 
by social media like Facebook and Twitter. For journalists, such distribution 
helps validate and publicize their work.
   Impact: Publishers get free distribution with excellent, real-time information. 
At the same time, they are losing control of the distribution platform that 
generated such healthy profits. And they have less say over how their content 
is portrayed; sometimes users post links and add a dollop of nasty criticism.
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III. What’s Happening To Consumers?
	 •	  News organizations can more easily build new audiences centered on 
specialized topics or interests. Because everything online is instantaneously 
and ubiquitously available, it’s far easier to create offerings of more focused 
content and find users no matter where they live. Fans of a city’s football 
team may be spread around the world, but a news organization can build a 
site that will draw a substantial audience.
   Impact: Highly focused audiences can provide more value to advertisers. But 
separating audiences into too many niches can bring on a new set of prob-
lems. Consumers may find that dealing with multiple content providers—
with few guideposts to judge the quality or authority of the source—isn’t 
worth the bother.
	 •	 	Publishers have more information about their readers, in real time. 
Whether a citizen is using free Google Analytics on a blog, or a mainstream 
organization is deploying more sophisticated usage-tracking services like 
Omniture or Chartbeat, journalists know much more about who’s view-
ing their content, where the audience is coming from and how it is en-
gaged. Unfortunately, many of these numbers are unreliable, misconstrued 
and prone to exaggeration. Usage estimates often vary by 200 percent or 
more. This issue was explored in detail in a report last year by Columbia 
University’s Tow Center for Digital Journalism.11 Metrics have always been 
challenging for advertisers, especially in the broadcast world. But as the Tow 
report notes, digital media have failed to come up with common standards; 
they have not yet settled on metrics, whatever their flaws, as broadcast media 
did generations ago. “It is a long-appreciated irony of media measurement 
that accuracy matters less than consensus,” the report said. “Doubts don’t 
matter much as long as no competitor is seen to benefit.”
   Impact: Media companies can measure the popularity of articles, videos or 
sections and adjust their strategy to maximize revenue and audience. But un-
certainty around metrics inhibits advertisers from investing fully in the digital 
marketplace and depresses advertising rates for those who do take part.
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	 •	 	Digital platforms fundamentally change the customer experience, in 
ways that are both advantageous and harmful for news organizations’ 
economics. Publishers can now capture highly valuable bits of user infor-
mation, ranging from areas of interest to credit-card numbers. But new me-
dia rarely provide the immersive experience found in traditional platforms. 
Many users keep numerous sites open on tabs in their Internet browsers and 
don’t focus on any one for very long; they often come to a news site through 
a search and quickly leave for another. Links to other sites provide value to 
readers but also send them elsewhere, sometimes never to return.
   Impact: By tailoring content and advertising, publishers can charge higher 
rates to advertisers and win greater loyalty from users. But privacy concerns 
may lead to regulations that will limit the information publishers can glean 
about their users. And most readers spend far less time on digital sites than 
they did on legacy platforms, so news organizations have less opportunity to 
attract advertising dollars. In the words of Steve Harbula, an editor at Exam-
iner.com: “Readers have a large appetite but a short attention span.”
IV. Cutting Costs And Seeking Revenue
	 •	 	Digital upsets media’s typical pattern of high fixed costs and low vari-
able costs. It costs a lot—and often requires companies to take on a great 
deal of debt—to produce the first copy of a newspaper or magazine. But the 
second copy, and the thousands or millions that follow, are relatively cheap. 
In the digital realm, many of those initial costs are eliminated, and in some 
instances—such as starting a blog—they decline to zero.
   Impact: This is a particular challenge for companies that have sunk mounds 
of cash or taken on debt to make acquisitions that have high fixed costs; 
those publishers now find such investments to be drags on profitability. Their 
digital competitors aren’t saddled with the same disadvantages.
	 •	 	Digital enables news organizations to trim the cost of doing journalism, 
particularly if they can get citizens to provide content by bringing them into 
news production or encouraging them to participate on comment boards.
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   Impact: Since news and content supplied by paid professionals begets free 
content by readers/users, the average cost to produce a page view is driven 
lower. But the quality, accuracy and authority of this content are highly vari-
able and susceptible to manipulation.
	 •	 	On digital platforms, it is often hard to make sure that advertising sup-
ply matches demand. Online editors frequently have a difficult time gener-
ating enough page views when advertisers demand them—or filling up that 
advertising space when reader traffic soars and ad demand is light. So news 
sites often need to run cheap ads, called “remnants,” that may get a tenth of 
the revenue their usual ads draw. Michael Barrett, the CEO of Admeld, a 
company that tries to increase advertising rates on sites with traffic prone to 
peaks and valleys, says that some of his clients view the situation “like seats 
on an airplane. They don’t want to fly the plane with any empty seats.”
   Impact: Because the cost of creating each additional page is close to zero, 
media companies can have a wide range of prices, charging the highest rates 
for the most desirable times, placement and audience. But all those unpre-
dictable page views exert constant downward pressure on ad prices.
	 •	  Advertising is transformed in a digital format, and not always for the 
better. Some journalists may not realize this, but many of their readers and 
viewers see advertising as useful and entertaining. Indeed, access to adver-
tising is another incentive for people to buy magazines and newspapers or 
listen to and watch broadcasts. But the appeal of online advertising is often 
diminished by its format. A small, rectangular banner ad conveys little use-
ful information—certainly less than an insert in a newspaper or a glossy ad 
in a fashion magazine. To get useful information from an online ad, a reader 
often must click and head to a new site, something people rarely do. And the 
more intrusive forms of online advertising—such as “roadblock” messages 
that take over the entire screen for a few seconds—upset the user experience. 
Some digital companies are bringing content value to ads, but they tend 
not to be news media. Google became a powerhouse by tying advertising 
directly to users’ search queries. And Groupon, which attracts readers who 
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are looking for online discount coupons, has become successful with witty 
come-ons and obvious value. Groupon has expanded rapidly into hundreds 
of markets and has turned down a $6 billion offer from Google.12
   Impact: Digital provides the ability to target advertisers’ messages and better 
metrics to determine impact. But users find that many digital ads on news 
sites convey little information and value.
	 •	 	Digital platforms provide another way for advertising departments to 
attract new clients and retain old ones. For salespeople who don’t feel 
they have enough arrows in their quiver, online and mobile can be a way to 
get a reluctant advertiser into the fold.
   Impact: Media companies can bolster more profitable legacy sales in tradi-
tional media by adding digital, and in the process, can move their clients to 
newer platforms. But deals that combine legacy and digital ad sales make it 
difficult to determine how much revenue is truly attributable to new media. 
At some companies, half of digital sales have been “bundled” with print or 
broadcast, and the way those dollars are apportioned can be largely at the 
whim of the accountants, rather than being an accurate reflection of the 
value of the ads.
	 •	  Many efforts to get readers to pay for content have been fitful, poorly 
executed and motivated more by ideology than economics. Only a few 
publications have had a successful, long-term plan to get readers to pay, and 
even fewer have done it in a way that genuinely increases online revenue 
rather than simply protects their traditional businesses. Was free content jour-
nalism’s “original sin”?13 Perhaps, for news organizations must now ask read-
ers to start paying for material that has been free for 15 years. Meanwhile, 
pay-per-article schemes, such as the one proposed in a 2009 Time cover 
story by Walter Isaacson, haven’t caught on for journalism.14 Unlike Beatles 
songs, news stories have little lasting value beyond a single use.
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   Impact: Users have unlimited access to most content, and publishers have 
unlimited access to most users. But circulation revenue, one of the mainstays 
of the traditional media business, has withered. And one of the methods that 
advertisers have used to judge audience quality—willingness to pay—has 
evaporated as well.
* * *
As one looks at this list, it becomes clear that most of the economic disadvan-
tages have been fully realized at news organizations, while many of the benefits—
such as a surge in mobile-phone advertising—are more potential than real. At the 
same time, some new models are emerging that can replace some, if not all, of the 
revenue news organizations have relied upon. Journalists and publishers, new and 
old, are responding to this new environment in a variety of ways. We’ll examine 
how they have coped, transformed and endeavored to meet the challenges of the 
digital era.
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Chapter 2
The Trouble with Traffic: Why Big Audiences Aren’t Always Profitable
At first glance, the numbers don’t seem to add up: The New York Times 
has more than 30 million online readers and weekday circulation of less than 
900,000 newspapers. Yet, the print edition still accounts for more than 80 percent 
of the Times’ revenue.1 A broader recent study revealed the same phenomenon: It 
showed that the Internet occupied 28 percent of Americans’ time spent in media 
in 2009 but generated only 13 percent of total advertising spending.2
To understand why, it’s important to realize that the prices advertisers pay 
digital news organizations depend on many factors. Some are tied to the overall 
market, especially the vast and growing amount of ad space (or inventory) that’s 
available online. Other factors have to do with a site’s own dynamics, including 
the size of the audience it reaches and that nature of that audience—its demo-
graphics, how much time its users spend with the site and so on.
So, the Web offers a lot of advantages to publishers and advertisers. But its audi-
ences are more wide than deep.
Journalists constantly feel the push and pull of these numbers. “What am I 
today?” asks Jeff Cohen, editor of the Houston Chronicle. “I’m an aggregator 
of eyeballs. … We’re doing around 79 million page views a month—almost a 
billion in a year.” Yet, for all that Web traffic, his newsroom’s 206 employees are 
about half the number employed in 2006.
Digital numbers are confusing when compared with traditional media metrics 
and are often inflated for all sorts of reasons. Users can be counted several times 
if they deploy multiple devices, such as a PC, laptop and mobile phone, to access 
a site. Also, many people delete their computers’ “cookies,” small text files that 
allow them to be identified and tracked; because of that, they appear to be new 
visitors to sites rather than returning ones.3
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For all that, digital audiences usually far outnumber those from a traditional 
outlet. As a result, the industry faces a perplexing set of questions: Why do so 
many digital users generate so little advertising revenue? Is it simply that digital 
systems are more efficient than the previous oligopolies of the print and broad-
cast world? Or is there something more fundamentally askew about the way 
media companies make money off digital customers? And, more importantly, 
what should publishers be doing to make the most of the readers and viewers 
they have?
* * *
At its most basic level, advertising is a numbers game. A news organization 
needs a certain number of readers or viewers, and the more it gets, the more ads 
it can sell and the more it can charge those advertisers. Users also spend varying 
amounts of time with the magazine, newspaper or broadcast, and the more time 
they spend, the more an advertiser values the audience.
Digital platforms, thanks to their ubiquity and ease of use, are terrific at the 
first part of the numbers game. News sites have demonstrated the ability to attract 
huge numbers of users. And in the first decade of the digital era, particularly as 
search engines became more powerful, publishers and broadcasters focused on 
building a mass audience. They poured resources into search engine optimiza-
tion—the term used to describe a way to improve the odds that headlines will be 
picked up by Google or other search sites and that topics will be timely enough 
to appear prominently on a results page. News sites initially welcomed aggrega-
tors, such as Drudge Report and Huffington Post, that linked to their material 
and increased traffic.
As a consequence, audience sizes swelled, and publishers have proclaimed that 
to be a success. So when the Los Angeles Times in March 2011 logged a record 
195 million page views, clicked on by 33 million users, the site’s managing editor 
took a moment to proudly announce those statistics on the site.4
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But within such numbers is another, less happy, story. The arithmetic shows 
that each latimes.com user clicked on an average of six pages in March—or just 
one page every fifth day of the month. That statistic demonstrates how the other 
essential part of the advertising business—the amount of time and attention that 
users pay to a site—has been undermined by some of the tactics that publishers 
have used to attract large audiences.
The phenomenon is widespread. A 2010 Pew analysis of Nielsen media sta-
tistics depicts depressingly low levels of usage, even at outstanding national sites. 
“The average visitor spends only 3 minutes, 4 seconds per session on the typi-
cal news sites,” the study says.5 “No one keeps visitors very long.” And at top-
trafficked news sites, ranging from Yahoo News to the Washington Post to Fox 
News, most people visit just a few times per month. Compare that to the media 
of past decades. A 2005 study showed that about half of U.S. newspaper readers 
spent more than 30 minutes reading their daily paper. And most of the less-
devoted readers spent at least 15 minutes with the paper.6
There are many reasons for the problems news sites have in getting reader at-
tention, also known as engagement. Consumers today have many digital options 
available. The experience of getting news on a computer or mobile device, thus 
far, is fundamentally different from the experience in TV or print; most users 
tend to flit from site to site, rarely alighting for more than a brief spell.
But there’s another way to look at these numbers, one that is more complex—
and, in some ways, more encouraging—for the journalism business.
One person studying this issue closely is Matt Shanahan, an analyst who is 
relatively new to the media world. Shanahan is, by training, an electrical engi-
neer, and he spent much of his career consulting for big businesses in the fields of 
aerospace and finance. In 2008, he joined a Seattle-area firm called Scout Analyt-
ics; the company was looking to serve industries that were failing to realize their 
potential in the digital world. “The e-commerce market was noisy and crowded,” 
he says. “Media and information, however, were mature industries facing severe 
revenue issues.” Scout figured it could find new clients among media companies 
that were trying to learn more about the real nature of their digital audiences. 
The company signed up about 70 news and information sites—some geared to 
consumers, but more of them in the business-to-business category—and started 
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looking at the activity of users. They were able to track consumers’ paths through 
sites and to figure out how often they visited and what they did on each visit. 
Shanahan was soon struck by an anomaly of the online news industry: the yawn-
ing maw that separates the size of audiences from the level of engagement those 
readers and viewers demonstrate.
Shanahan points to a website for a 90,000-circulation newspaper that serves a 
medium-sized city on the East Coast. (The name of the company is confidential 
because it’s a client.) This site gets around 450,000 unique visitors a month.7 
But those visitors differ widely, and Shanahan separates them into four types: 
The most loyal are the “fans,” who visit at least twice a week. Then there are the 
“regulars,” good for one or two visits a week. Sliding down the loyalty scale are 
“occasionals,” who stop by two or three times a month; and finally, the “fly-bys,” 
who come about once a month.
The most loyal visitors are a very small part of the overall audience: Fans make 
up about 4 percent of the total number of visitors, and regulars 3 percent. Occa-
sionals account for 17 percent and fly-bys for more than 75 percent of the total. 
In other words, more than three-fourths of the people who visit this news site 
do so about once a month.
Then Shanahan went deeper, to see how the different kinds of users behaved 
on the site. He knew the most loyal fans would generate more page views than 
the fly-bys, since fans visit the site more often. But the disparities in usage were 
far greater than one might expect.
Traffic analysis for mid-size newspaper web site
Type of Number of Visitors as % of total Page views
visitor visitors  % of total Page views page views per visitor
Fans 19,661 4.3% 2,820,000 55.8% 143.4
Regulars 13,879 3.1% 430,000 8.5% 30.9
Occasionals 78,292 17.3% 810,000 16.0% 10.3
Fly-bys 341,045 75.3% 998,000 19.7% 2.9
Total 452,877 100% 5,058,000 100%
SOURCE: Scout Analytics analysis of client’s data; name of client is withheld
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Fans, despite their small numbers, were responsible for more than 55 percent of 
the site’s traffic. Fly-bys—those people most likely to come from a search engine 
or a blog—clicked on barely three pages a month. Overall, each fan generated 
about 50 times more traffic per person than a fly-by.
“When people talk about the size of an audience, that’s a sham,” Shanahan says. 
In his view, stated numbers don’t reflect how differently the varieties of users act 
in the way they navigate a site. Publishers mistakenly focus on “page views rather 
than length of time,” he writes on his blog, Digital Equilibrium.8 Referring to ad 
“impressions,” which are appearances (not clicks) of ads, Shanahan adds, “Using 
today’s standard, there is no difference between impressions that last 1 second, 10 
seconds, or 2 minutes.”
“The digital world has changed the revenue dynamics for publishers,” he adds 
in another post. “In the print world, a publisher’s shipment of physical media was 
the basis for generating revenue. In the digital world, consumption of media is 
the basis for revenue. ... In other words, engagement is the unit of monetization.”9
Shanahan says the benefit of more engagement isn’t just in higher ad rates, 
but in relationships that publishers need to build with their most loyal readers—
something that has been lost in the drive to attract mass audiences. By chasing 
after large audiences rather than deeply engaged ones, he says, news organizations 
are sacrificing advertising revenue. Publishers who have a “direct relationship 
with fans can push better contextual advertising”—that is, ads that relate directly 
to a user’s habits and interests. “A publisher can know which fans saw which 
advertisements in which context on their site.” Sites can use that information to 
provide readers with targeted ads or offers.
And, news organizations that hope to charge for online access need to lo-
cate—and cater to—fans, since engaged users are more likely to subscribe. That 
way of thinking is at the heart of the New York Times’ decision to charge for 
access to its digital editions. The Times built its pay scheme so light users of the 
site won’t have to pay for access, while heavier users—defined as those click-
ing on at least 20 stories a month—will be charged. But the Times also sees a 
connection between engagement and advertising. Michael Golden, vice chair-
man and president of the New York Times Co., discussed the different kinds 
of online audiences during a speech at a March 2011 advertising conference, 
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shortly before the pay strategy went into effect. Speaking of less committed 
users, Golden said, “Their engagement is limited, but their numbers are impres-
sive. … We have to balance engagement and reach. The higher the engagement, 
the higher the CPM.”10
* * *
Two media outlets with very different editorial missions—Gawker Media and 
PBS—have tackled this issue of trying to differentiate more and less engaged seg-
ments of their audience when pricing advertising.
Gawker’s network of sites, started by British journalist Nick Denton in 2003, 
includes Gizmodo (for gadget lovers), Deadspin (for sports fans) and Jalopnik 
(for car buffs). In March 2010, Gawker began touting a metric it calls “branded 
traffic.” This was defined as people who have bookmarked the company’s sites 
or arrived at them by searching specifically for the site by name—by, say, typing 
“Deadspin” into a search engine.11
Gawker found that roughly 40 percent of visits come via branded routes, as 
contrasted to links from search engines. And such visitors are more devoted 
and engaged, spending 91 seconds more per visit than others. That is a mean-
ingful difference with financial impact, says Erin Pettigrew, Gawker Media’s 
marketing director.
First, the more engaged users are more likely to see highly profitable “road-
block” advertisements—ads that take over the home page of the site for several 
seconds and then fade away to reveal the editorial content of the page. That rev-
enue helps compensate when advertising rates fall at Gawker and other sites. As 
Reuters’ Felix Salmon has noted, the number of online ads has been growing so 
fast that advertisers can demand lower rates. As a result, wrote Salmon, “Denton 
says that since 2008 he has been getting only half the revenue per page that he 
used to get in 2004.”12
One way to counteract that is to try to sell more “branding” advertising on the 
Web—that is, ads designed to draw positive attention to a company’s name and 
image, rather than to trigger a direct response to an offer for a product or service. 
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Brand advertising has long been profitable for traditional media, especially televi-
sion and magazines. But because publishers have struggled to convince advertis-
ers that the Web is a good platform for branded ads, they’ve often missed out on 
this lucrative revenue stream. “We had been told ad frequency of more than two 
or three exposures is a bad thing,” said Pettigrew. “But for brand advertising, it’s 
different. Six to 12 exposures [of an ad] increased the persuasiveness. And this is 
the most useful segment to our advertisers.”
Because Gawker Media has an array of sites on different topics, it can sell en-
gagement across its network. Thus, the same readers who click on gadget stories 
at Gizmodo can be served with branded ads at Lifehacker or Gawker. And if 
Gawker Media can demonstrate to advertisers that its readers are loyal, it can 
charge higher ad rates, Pettigrew said.
At the other end of cultural spectrum, the Public Broadcasting System’s Web 
strategists are also using engagement metrics to increase revenue.
Amy Sample, director of web analytics for PBS Interactive, says she and others 
at the site modified a formula created by Web analysts Eric Peterson and Joseph 
Carrabis to get a better sense of which readers were most devoted.13 They came 
up with their own criteria to determine PBS.org’s most loyal audience, based on 
the number of pages a reader views, the amount of time a reader spends on the 
site, and how often and how recently readers have come.
As it turned out, less than 5 percent of the visits on the site came from us-
ers who met all of PBS’s engagement standards. But those people are a critical 
group, says Sample. She found that they stay on PBS.org for 13.5 minutes per 
visit (compared with a three-minute average for everyone else) and click on nine 
pages per visit (versus three for other users). PBS saw economic benefits from 
this audience. Such users were 38 percent more likely to donate money to PBS 
than less engaged users; they were also more prone to encourage others to use 
the site. And when PBS saw the usage patterns, executives decided that video, 
a favorite platform for frequent users, should be promoted more prominently. 
That translated into revenue, because the site’s video ads get healthy $30 CPMs, 
Sample said, or about three times as high as other ads on the site.
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* * *
Engagement correlates with editorial content. To see how the relationship plays 
out at a large site, we can examine some numbers for dallasnews.com, the main 
site for the Dallas Morning News. (These metrics are from the full year of 2010, 
a few months before the publisher began charging for access to much of the site.)
For the year, the site averaged around 40 million page views a month, driven 
by 5 million visitors who visit, on average, about twice a month and click on 
about four pages per visit. Those numbers are fairly typical for a site the size of 
Dallas’ and provided the publisher, James Moroney, some of the figures he used 
to calculate the rationale for instituting the pay-for-access plan (see Chapter 5).
But the broad numbers tell only part of the story. In fact, dallasnews.com, like 
many big online organizations, is many sites rolled into one. To analyze its data, 
the company sorts its traffic statistics into various categories, including by con-
tent areas: news, entertainment, sports, weather and blogs.
News gets the most traffic, in terms of total visitors and visits. News visitors 
average around two visits a month and click on an average of about 1.5 pages 
per visit. Their habits are typical of those found at many other news sites—not 
particularly engaged.
Sports does better in engagement. Users average about 2.3 visits a month, and 
about 3.4 pages per visit over the course of the year. During the fall of 2010, 
when the Texas Rangers were in the Major League Baseball playoffs and the 
Dallas Cowboys were on the football field, users clicked on four or more pages 
per visit.
And then there’s a feature on the site called High School GameTime, which 
includes rosters, schedules and results from the state where “Friday Night Lights” 
is based. Users clicked on nearly nine pages per visit in November 2010, during 
the height of the football season, and generated almost as many page views as the 
entire news section. Over the year, high school sports fans were about five times 
as engaged as the people coming to read news.
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It’s easy to see why. The site offers a dizzying array of statistics, rosters and 
standings for more than 200 high schools in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Mark 
Francescutti, senior managing online editor for sports, says the site’s engage-
ment demonstrates the power of “great local content … that is exclusive and is 
important to people.” And loyalty, not search engine optimization, is the key to 
maintaining the audience. “We might get lucky and get linked off Google, but 
we want people who will come back every single day,” he says.
The site has a small but intense crew. The News’ four full-time high school 
sports reporters file frequently, and editors also rely on clerks who take scores 
and statistics over the phone from stringers around Dallas. On Friday nights, 
scores are updated during games, not just reported when the games are over. 
There’s also a live chat where reporters 
update games—“controlled chaos,” in 
the words of Kyle Whitfield, the site’s 
editor. High School GameTime aggre-
gates heavily from other sources. “Our 
writers are not robots,” says Frances-
cutti. “We don’t have that old journal-
istic ego that says, ‘If we didn’t write it, 
it’s not important.’ ”
The News used High School Game-
Time as part of a package deal with 
Time Warner Cable that also included 
print ads, a radio show, a player-of-the-
week contest and a banquet at the end 
of the football season. High School GameTime has brought in up to $700,000, 
says Richard Alfano, a general manager. For the next season, he says, the News 
will sell a $1.99 mobile app for High School GameTime that will include play-
by-play from at least 100 games a week.
Several sites in one at 
Dallasnews.com





High School GameTime 14.07
Data shown are monthly averages for 2010.
SOURCE: Dallas Morning News internal traffic reports
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The key, says Whitfield, is focusing on something that readers care about 
deeply and that no other news provider does as well. “It’s more difficult to sell 
Cowboys coverage, because Cowboys fans are everywhere around the country,” 
Whitfield said. “We were able to organize our resources and monetize it, which 
is oh-so-rare online.”
* * *
Rapid audience growth is often accompanied by thin engagement. Such has 
been the case at Examiner.com, a freelance-driven site that has built an audience 
of more than 22 million unique users in three years.
Examiner is owned by Clarity Digital Group, which is controlled by Philip 
Anschutz, a Denver entrepreneur who has made billions in energy, railroads, 
entertainment and sports franchises. The site, which was started in April 2008, 
has brought aboard more than 72,000 freelancers who have written on topics 
ranging from roses in Rhode Island to parenting in Portland.14 There’s not a 
great deal of supervision: Writers must pass a criminal background check, and 
they get some quick training. Their first story goes through an editor, but after 
that, the writers usually post directly to the site.
Page views are a key factor in determining writers’ pay, which amounts to 
between $1 and $7.50 per thousand views, according to AdAge, or a few dollars 
per article.15 According to Mike Noe, senior director of recruiting, fewer than a 
third of the writers are currently “active,” which, in Examiner parlance, means 
they’ve posted something to the site within the last 90 days.
The content that Examiner.com produces mimics much of what has tradi-
tionally appeared in the back of newspapers or at the end of broadcasts—sub-
jects like sports, weather, hobbies or opinion. Writers are hired in large part 
based on their zeal for a topic. “In a traditional newspaper, the reporter might 
not be passionate about the [Denver] Broncos,” says Jen Nestel, Examiner’s di-
rector of community. “We do the reverse. We take someone who is already 
passionate and we teach them how to write.” The site doesn’t claim to replace 
the newsgathering functions of traditional media: “Finding out how the school 
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board works is hard,” says Rick Blair, chief executive officer of Examiner.com. 
“It takes a special kind of digger. I could see other folks using platforms like ours 
to do that. But we don’t have the tools or the accredited manpower.”
For all its success in building an audience, Examiner has quite low engagement: 
Its readers see about 65 million page views a month, or only about three pages 
per visitor. That is likely tied to the site’s dependence on search engine optimiza-
tion, or SEO.
“The problem with SEO is, the visitors are snackers,” says Blair. “If people 
come in through the front door [the home page], they read seven to eight pages. 
If they come in the side door [such as a search engine], they read maybe two,” he 
says. Suzie Austin, senior vice president for content and marketing, adds, “From 
the very beginning, we did search engine optimization right. The benefit is obvi-
ous—you get a lot of eyeballs. The downside is, there’s not a lot of engagement. 
Page views per user is growing, but at a low rate.” And as sites use SEO to boost 
traffic, advertisers take advantage of the flood of page views around the Web to 
“name their price,” says Tom Woerner, Examiner’s senior vice president for na-
tional sales. There are two ways for publishers to deal with that, he says: “Play the 
price game, or add value to what you give the advertiser.”
So Examiner is shifting from simply selling display ads to selling the value of its 
ability to project stories beyond the confines of its own site. Examiner coaches its 
writers on deploying social media to broaden the influence of their stories. In the 
marketing business, using social networks is now considered a form of “earned 
media”—that is, it’s more akin to publicity, like an appearance in a news article, 
than to an advertisement or paid product placement. “Thirty years ago, if you got 
a story into Sports Illustrated about your product, that was ‘earned’ media be-
cause you didn’t pay for it,” says Woerner. Today, earned media includes messages 
that go out via Facebook, Twitter and blogs. “Marketers have to be willing to 
give up a little control.” Woerner also said, “The key for traditional media is how 
they’re engaging with their audience. They got used to the role of the gatekeeper. 
They need to invite the audience in.”
To attract ads from Iams, Procter & Gamble’s pet-food company, for example, 
Examiner invited (but didn’t require) its writers who focus on animals to write 
about pet adoption and shelters; just as importantly, editors encouraged writers 
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to distribute their stories via social networks. Iams didn’t control the content, but 
given how innocuous the Examiner’s coverage of animals tends to be, the com-
pany was unlikely to be troubled by photo galleries of adorable homeless puppies 
and feature articles about courageous German shepherds.16 About 840 writers 
responded with more than 5,200 articles and additional posts on social-media 
sites linking back to the stories. Those extra links from Facebook and Twitter to 
Examiner stories helped drive up advertising rates. Site executives say that ads 
sold in this effort get CPMs of more than $11, as contrasted to their usual display 
ads that get CPMs of $3 to $5.
Most other online news organizations are also establishing fan pages on Face-
book, setting up Twitter feeds and encouraging readers to share links. They are 
doing this not just because the networks are where the audiences are, but because 
they think social media will bring readers who are more engaged than those 
who come through search engines. At Gawker, Google-driven traffic “is wan-
ing,” says Pettigrew, the marketing director. Facebook is now the top referrer, and 
Twitter is gaining. But it wasn’t easy for Gawker management to come to terms 
with social media. “We didn’t want to join in the ‘fan-page game,’ ” she said, lest 
readers become more accustomed to accessing its stories from Facebook than 
from Gawker’s home pages. “You want to own the distribution.” But eventually, 
Facebook’s power as a traffic-driver won out. “You can’t ignore the way people 
want to access content.”
Vadim Lavrusik, former community manager at social media site Mashable, 
says that “readers who come through social are far different in their behaviors. 
They tend to view more articles on average and stick around the site longer.” 
Facebook and Twitter visitors spent 29 percent more time on Mashable.com, he 
said, and viewed 20 percent more pages than visitors arriving via search engines.
Similarly, at The Atlantic’s website, “The percentage of referrals from social 
nets is coming in at about 15 percent. And it’s growing,” says Scott Havens, vice 
president of digital strategy and operations. There’s a wide array of social sharing 
tools on TheAtlantic.com, including Facebook, Twitter, Digg and Reddit. The 
Atlantic has also started using Tumblr, a microblogging platform that allows any-
one—from individuals to media companies—to post text, photos and videos. It 
has a distinctive visual format and is another way to drive engaged traffic. News-
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week.com also uses Tumblr, including links to a wide variety of sources. By doing 
that, the magazine can “introduce people to Newsweek who would never read 
it” on its site or in print, says Mark Coatney, who worked at Newsweek before 
joining Tumblr in 2010. And he says that while Newsweek’s Tumblr audience 
is smaller than the audience it gets through Twitter or Facebook, its readers are 
more engaged.
* * *
The argument about whether it’s more important to build large audiences 
or engaged audiences has not been settled. Two news organizations that haven’t 
jumped on the engagement bandwagon are New York Magazine and Newser. 
“The notion of engagement has been touted for a number of years, “ says Mi-
chael Silberman, general manager of nymag.com. “This is not important in driv-
ing our business. We want to grow uniques”—that is, the number of users—“so 
we’re really thinking about the scale. Secondarily, we want to drive page views.” 
He might change his mind if nymag.com decided to start charging for online 
access, but that isn’t on the table for now. “Engagement only makes sense in a 
subscription model,” he says.
At Newser, an aggregator with about 2.5 million unique visitors a month, the 
audience breaks down in ways similar to mainstream news organizations. Execu-
tive Chairman Patrick Spain says about 12,000 users are “addicted” and come 
to the site many times a day; 225,000 are “avid” users who visit Newser many 
times a week; and more than 2 million people pass by, with just a click or two. 
But Spain argues that the passers-by are useful, because they are more likely than 
addicted users to click on ads, though whether clicks on ads are a good indicator 
of value is an open question.17
* * *
For decades, many news organizations enjoyed higher profits dependent 
largely on bigger audiences. Magazines and newspapers priced their wares ar-
tificially low to boost circulation, even though that brought a group of lightly 
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affiliated readers who had to be lured again and again with cheap come-ons and 
giveaways. When this worked economically, it was because advertisers could be 
persuaded to buy access to a big audience they didn’t know much about. Today, 
advertisers have far more choices and far more information. Moreover, many of 
the firms competing for ad dollars never would have been defined as “media 
companies” years ago. Facebook now delivers almost a quarter of all digital ad-
vertising views in the U.S.18 Search advertising, dominated by Google, soaks up 
almost half the dollars spent on online ads.19
So it is much harder for media companies, new or old, to compete purely on 
audience size. They will never grow fast enough to counter the massive numbers 
accumulated by giants like Google and Facebook. News organizations have to 
offer something more.
When the New York Times announced details of its digital subscription plan 
in March 2011, Andrew Swinand, president of global operations for the Starcom 
MediaVest Group, a media-buying agency, said it wouldn’t hurt—and might 
help—the site’s advertising revenue.20 “I’m paying for an engaged audience, and 
if that audience is willing to pay, that demonstrates just how engaged they are,” 
he said. In a later interview, he added that editors need to start thinking about 
engagement in broader terms, not just the amount of time people spend on a 
site or the number of pages they click. “I want to be able to look and say, ‘Who 
are these people [using a site], and what are they spending their time doing on 
it?’ ” By doing that, Swinand says, news organizations can help companies feel 
more confident that their ad dollars are being spent wisely. The Times’ Golden 
adds that “if we all go the way of outdoor advertising [e.g., billboards] where it 
depends on who passes by, it’ll be hard to build value. Engagement is the proxy 
by which people value content.”
Audience size is still vitally important. A site with 10 million unique users will 
get more attention from advertisers and agencies than one with a fifth that many. 
Large companies want to make mass purchases of ads; they won’t deal individu-
ally with a host of small sites. But the chase for traffic has put news organiza-
tions on a sugar high of fat audiences and thin revenue. It has also devalued their 
journalism, as they have resorted to such tactics as celebrity photo slideshows to 
boost search-driven traffic. In diminishing their brands and commoditizing their 
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content, they have fallen short in the crucial goal of attracting engaged, loyal 
users. This needs to change. By producing relevant journalism, deploying data 
intelligently, and relying on social media—not just search engines—to drive traf-
fic, they can gather a more devoted and involved readership, one that advertisers 
will also prefer.
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Chapter 3
Local and Niche Sites: The Advantages of Being Small
TBD.com ran into trouble right from the start. In February 2011, just six 
months after going live, the Washington, D.C., area’s high-profile experiment in 
local online journalism announced that it would lay off half of its editorial staff, 
detach its site from its TV-station partner and reinvent itself as a culture-and-
lifestyle site. Many of those who did stay on looked for the exit as soon as they 
could line up another job.
The reshuffling—which followed the departure of Jim Brady, the former 
Washington Post online executive brought in to launch the site—marked the 
meaningful end of one of the best-funded and best-pedigreed efforts to make 
professional journalism work online. The site, whose name stands for To Be De-
termined, had drawn a great deal of attention for the quality of its editorial staff 
and for its use of social media.1 Clearly there was an important lesson here for 
other news sites, especially those plying the local or “hyperlocal” trade.
Just what that lesson was, though, is in dispute. Does TBD’s failure prove that 
“hyperlocal journalism is more hype than hope,” as media analyst Alan Mutter 
put it?2 Or did it mainly signal a failure of nerve on the part of corporate par-
ent Allbritton Communications, whose CEO, Robert Allbritton, had pledged to 
provide a three- to five-year runway to profitability?
It is clear that the site was, as expected, losing money, despite impressive traffic 
growth. According to coverage in the Washington Post, unique visitors to TBD.
com had risen from 715,000 in November 2010 to 838,000 in December and 
1.5 million in January 2011. But, as the incoming head of the site told the paper, 
“It was still not generating enough [income] to offset the hefty costs.”3 Two in-
siders interviewed for this report said the January traffic spike was not as striking 
as it looks, because much of it consisted of people looking for information on the 
region’s heavy snowstorms that month.
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Nobody involved has revealed the precise size of TBD’s losses. Saul Carlin, an 
Allbritton executive involved with TBD from the start, would say only that “traf-
fic and revenue were being closely monitored. As a result, a change in manage-
ment was necessary.”
Brady says the picture was not that grim. The site had been budgeted to earn 
revenue “in the low millions” in year one; he argues it was on track to reach per-
haps 75 percent of that goal. “The situation wasn’t great when I left, but it wasn’t 
catastrophic either,” he says.
Mutter, a former journalist and media executive, took the shortfall as a dem-
onstration of a fundamental misalignment between the expense of producing 
local reporting and the potential online revenue from it, because of the built-in 
constraints of small audiences and puny ad rates. Various hyperlocal flameouts 
support this thesis: among others, the Washington Post’s Loudoun Extra and the 
shuttered New York Times site for suburban New Jersey, whose audience was 
handed off to local start-up Baristanet.
Still, mistakes were made. Brady has said repeatedly that resistance from the 
site’s broadcast partner WJLA, the Allbritton-owned ABC affiliate in Washington, 
proved a major hurdle. Both Brady and Steve Buttry, TBD’s director of com-
munity engagement, said the TV staff was unhappy to see its website rolled into 
TBD.com—which linked out heavily to other media outlets—and that the sta-
tion failed to promote TBD wholeheartedly on the air.
“The first time we linked out to another TV site, that was a major collision,” 
says Buttry. He adds that TBD linked out more moderately after that and gave the 
TV news staff a “heads-up” when it planned to point to a story that WJLA had 
missed. “The lesson from our experience is that the legacy culture is powerful 
and ingrained,” he says. “Whenever its revenue stream might be endangered or 
disrupted, it’s going to have a big influence on decisions.”
The most important example of that influence was the decision to fold TBD’s 
ad sales staff into WJLA’s, which led to the departure of the small digital sales 
team that Brady had assembled. “Selling digital is hard. I was adamant that the 
only way to be successful was to keep the sales force separate,” he says. The ten-
sion was visible from the start, Brady adds; an example is an ambitious launch 
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sponsorship of more than $75,000 that his sales team planned to pitch to a local 
car dealership. WJLA intervened, arguing that it would damage a valuable rela-
tionship between the dealer and the TV station, Brady says.
“When I was at the Post, we were routinely doing six-figure online deals,” 
Brady says. “If the sales force itself doesn’t believe digital is worth it, how are they 
going to sell it? To just assume nobody would ever spend that much online is 
insecurity with your own inventory.”
Just as revealing as what went wrong is the list of things TBD seemed to have 
going for it, which help to clarify the intense interest local online news ventures 
have drawn for the last five years. Most important was its association with sister 
site Politico.com, another well-funded, generously staffed Allbritton venture led 
by high-profile news veterans. Like Politico, TBD promised to be not just on the 
Web but “of the Web,” in Brady’s phrase, meaning that it would link abundantly, 
deploy social media aggressively and engage closely with users. And like Politico, 
TBD promised to deliver to its advertisers a well-defined audience—not just 
generic news consumers, but people intensely interested in the particular news it 
had to offer. (Still, it is worth keeping in mind that at least through 2009, Politico 
earned more than half its revenue from its free, ad-supported print edition,4 with 
a circulation of about 32,000.5)
TBD also sought to strike a balance between focus and scale: Visitors would 
be drawn in by news about their immediate environs or interests, but behind the 
scenes the operation could reap the “efficiencies” of serving a large metropolitan 
area. (Brady insists “hyperlocal” is the wrong word for what was really a regional 
site with a neighborhood interface.) Likewise, the site would include a mix of 
aggregation and firsthand reporting. To describe the site, Robert Allbritton has 
used the analogy of a supermarket bringing together items that previously could 
not be found in one place. Before TBD, he declared when the site launched, find-
ing local news online was “like trying to buy groceries in the old country. First 
you went to the fishmonger, then to the baker, then to the grocer, and so on.”6
 Other hyperlocal ventures have tried to apply versions of that idea on a na-
tional scale. A good recent example is Main Street Connect, a “national commu-
nity news company” that went live in 2009 and consists, so far, of 10 sites serv-
ing towns in Fairfield County, Conn. The separate sites share editorial resources 
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(neighboring communities see many of the same articles), technology infrastruc-
ture and an ad sales team. “We’ll soon be bringing our vision to other groups of 
towns,” Main Street’s web site promises. “Watch for us.”7
By far the grandest of the new hyperlocal journalism ventures is the nation-
wide Patch network, which was bought by a struggling AOL in 2009. With sites 
in 700 communities and counting as of March 2011, each led by a local editor 
making $40,000 to $50,000 a year, Patch has turned AOL into one of the big-
gest sources of new journalism jobs in the country. Visitors to a local Patch site 
see news and information about a specific community, written and curated by 
people in that community, whether it’s Dublin, Calif., or Dunedin, Fla. (In March 
2011, AOL also bought Outside.in, a hyperlocal network that automatically ag-
gregates news, blog posts, police reports and other public data, and says it is in 
57,830 neighborhoods. Reports suggest AOL was interested in the underlying 
technology more than the business itself.8)
To run all of those Patch sites, AOL can count on centralized resources like 
a massive in-house ad network, a sales force with ties to national brands, and 
sophisticated search engine optimization technology for maximizing the mean-
ingful lifespan—and thus the economic return—of every piece of content it 
produces. Like McDonald’s, AOL uses sophisticated market research to assess the 
commercial potential of the communities where it is considering planting the 
Patch flag. (According to a New Yorker profile of AOL chief executive officer 
Tim Armstrong, the Patch formula considers 59 factors, from average incomes 
to voter turnout.9)
The same infrastructure supports AOL’s growing stable of niche or “vertical” 
content sites, anchored by acquisitions such as the martial-arts blog MMAFight-
ing.com, the tech-industry site TechCrunch and the sprawling Huffington Post, 
which AOL bought for $315 million in 2011. It’s no exaggeration to say that 
AOL, whose original business model (providing dial-up access to the Internet) is 
badly out of date, has staked its declining fortunes on local and niche journalism.
Why? The underlying logic is the same at AOL as it was at TBD: In a world 
where much of the daily news has become commodified, only news that people 
can’t find elsewhere will command a loyal audience. This is hardly a novel insight 
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among media analysts, who since the late 1990s have pointed to financial news 
as a rare example of the sort of information that people, and advertisers, will pay 
for online.
A 2006 report on “value creation” in journalism, from Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government, put the lesson bluntly: “specialize or localize.”10 As the 
report explained, “Because of the increasing range of information sources, greater 
abilities to access material from anyplace at anytime, and requirements to create 
tight bonds that lead to loyal consumers, news organizations will have to move 
away from the unfocused, something-for-everyone, one-size-fits-no-one news 
products characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century.”
 Of course, not every news outlet can be the Financial Times or the Wall Street 
Journal, with long-cultivated expertise in a valuable and time-sensitive brand of 
information. For most, the clearest path to “adding value” lies in paying closer at-
tention to their immediate community. The Harvard report put this drily: “To be 
competitive and create economic value, media will need to increase their differ-
entiation, and thus exclusivity. The most effective way to do so is to create value 
through local coverage that is linked to the lives, aspirations, and understanding 
of individuals in the locations in which they live. It is this kind of coverage that 
other news providers cannot do well.”
That’s the theory. But TBD, Patch, the hyperlocal sites launched by the New 
York Times and the Washington Post, and many others like them have yet to 
produce a commercially viable proof-of-concept. The list of success stories in 
local online news hasn’t changed much in recent years; it contains mainly small, 
grass-roots community sites. If nonprofit ventures with significant foundation 
funding, such as MinnPost and the Voice of San Diego, are removed from the 
list, most of what’s left are Baristanet, Alaska Dispatch, The Batavian, West Seattle 
Blog and a few others.
These ventures vary in their business models and the kind of journalism they 
produce. What they have in common is limited resources, a narrow coverage 
footprint and no claim to the corporate efficiencies of their larger peers.
* * *
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Alaska Dispatch is a statewide news site launched in 2008 by the husband-
and-wife reporting team of Tony Hopfinger and Amanda Coyne. In 2009, 
philanthropist and former U.S. News & World Report executive Alice Rogoff 
bought a majority share; the founders stayed on as editors, and the Dispatch 
was relaunched with a mandate to build up a newsroom and dedicate itself to 
serious political journalism.
Today the site has a full-time editorial and Web staff of 10, up from just two 
at launch. It also uses paid freelancers. Total staff costs run in the neighborhood 
of $650,000 per year. The Dispatch saves money by avoiding print and delivery 
costs, which is an especially serious expense for dailies in Alaska. In late 2008 the 
Dispatch’s print rival, the Anchorage Daily News, ended rural air delivery to the 
state’s remote outposts.
Rogoff says the Dispatch doesn’t stint on the costs of covering the Alaskan 
frontier. The newsroom is attached to an airplane hangar in Anchorage, and ac-
cess to Rogoff ’s airplane has made it easier to cover distant events like the Idi-
tarod sled race. (The Dispatch also drew praise for its reporting on the 2008 
Point Hope caribou massacre and subsequent trial.11) Tony Hopfinger says the 
site focuses on statewide political news and analysis—exactly what many small 
dailies have cut in favor of covering murders and car wrecks.
The site’s founders say that commercial success is integral to the mission of the 
Alaska Dispatch. Even the “About Us” page repeats the message: “Because the 
owners of the Alaska Dispatch believe that journalism must and will ultimately 
pay for itself, the site is a for-profit enterprise, relying on online advertising and 
sponsorship.” When she became publisher, Rogoff committed to backing the site 
until it turns a profit, which she expected to happen in three years. Now, about 
two years in, she won’t disclose financial details but says the Dispatch is on track 
to meet its goals.
The Dispatch does appear to have found a niche in Alaska’s news ecosystem. 
Roughly 125,000 unique visitors generate more than 1 million page views each 
month, impressive statistics in a state of just over 700,000 inhabitants. According 
to Hopfinger, the site has about 30 to 40 advertisers at a time; its ad rates run 
from $150 to $1,550 per month, with a guaranteed minimum of 75,000 impres-
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sions. Though pricing is by the month, the site will oblige advertisers who would 
rather buy by the amount of traffic—hence the guarantee. And the Dispatch’s 
modest entry-level rates compare favorably with print alternatives.
One of the Dispatch’s biggest challenges has been to forecast the amount of 
ad space, or inventory, it will have each month, because this fluctuates greatly 
depending on how much traffic the site gets. On occasion, the site has had to 
turn advertisers away. To deepen and diversify its inventory without taking on 
too much risk in increased editorial costs, Hopfinger plans to bring established 
Alaskan blogs into the Dispatch under a revenue-sharing agreement.
At first glance, the statewide profile of the Dispatch seems to set it apart from 
smaller local sites. But Rogoff and Hopfinger stress that Alaska’s agenda-setters 
constitute a kind of village, one spread among Anchorage, Juneau, Washington 
and Houston. They share a narrow and well-defined set of interests: federal fund-
ing, government regulation, the oil industry (hence the Houston link), transpor-
tation, Sarah Palin and so on. One of the site’s most successful features is its “Bush 
Pilot” blog, focused on the small-scale aviation so critical to Alaskan life.
“It’s like a small town,” Hopfinger says. “The flipside of that is there are fewer 
people and fewer businesses.” But he adds that the Dispatch has benefited from 
the kind of boosterism that smaller community sites enjoy. “You get an opportu-
nity as an underdog. People want to see us succeed,” he says.
An emphasis on a small and well-defined community sets apart most of the 
online-only local news outlets that began to dot the Web about five years ago. 
These run, generally, from professionally staffed hard-news outlets such as the 
Dispatch to news-oriented community blogs like Baristanet and West Seattle 
Blog. Wherever each site falls along that spectrum, none of these grass-roots 
ventures has either the assets or the built-in costs of local sites backed by es-
tablished newspapers or television stations. (For a detailed discussion of costs, 
see Chapter 7.)
The grass-roots sites also face a different set of problems than do large-scale, 
networked hyperlocal ventures such as Patch, and, to a lesser extent, the origi-
nal TBD. Patch is hardly a legacy newsroom. But it does have to succeed on a 
scale that justifies AOL’s vast editorial, infrastructural and ad-sales investments 
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(and that compensates for the company’s declining income as an Internet service 
provider.) If only a few of the 700-plus Patch sites take root and thrive in their 
communities, that won’t be enough for the enterprise to succeed; for the business 
to make sense, the bulk of them have to work.
These distinctions suggest two axes for plotting the local news ventures work-
ing online, depicted in the chart shown here. The vertical axis distinguishes on-
line-only outlets from those that also have traditional print or broadcast assets. 
The horizontal axis arrays organizations according to their editorial footprint: 
single-site, hyperlocal outlets covering a community or neighborhood; sites or 
small site networks covering a cluster of communities; and site networks with a 
regional or national scale.
Landscape of local online news
Local and “hyperlocal” news sites vary both in their coverage footprint and in their 
affiliation with traditional print or broadcast outlets. Many of the success stories in 
online journalism appear in the bottom left quadrant: small, grass-roots ventures 
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The local news sites on the top half the chart are tied to substantial legacy 
operations, whether they are based in one city or spread across a chain of news-
rooms that share back-end resources. These sites enjoy the same advantage in 
serving their local audiences that the New York Times site does in delivering 
national news online: access to the editorial resources of established professional 
newsrooms. But that editorial product published online yields only a tiny frac-
tion of the ad revenue that it does in print or broadcast. The health of these sites 
is effectively wedded to the health of their traditional parents.
The hyperlocal networks in the bottom right quadrant don’t have legacy 
newsrooms to draw on. They must either build an editorial staff from scratch, like 
Patch and Main Street Connect, or cull local information from public sources 
and other sites, as do EveryBlock (now owned by MSNBC) and Outside.in. 
Their key asset lies, potentially, in uniting hundreds or thousands of hyperlocal 
channels with back-end infrastructure for selling and serving advertising.
It is easy to understand the argument that these networks ought to occupy 
the sweet spot for hyperlocal news. Like a stable of trade publications or a chain 
of small newspapers, Patch can pull together a large audience out of many small 
ones. Its size should confer advantages unavailable to local competitors in the 
individual markets where it operates: lower costs, better technology, access to big-
ger advertisers and so on. And as noted above, those markets have been carefully 
selected for their commercial potential.
The bottom left quadrant is the source of the most surprising lessons about 
building commercially viable journalism online. The independent, locally grown 
news sites that populate this quadrant would seem to be at a clear disadvantage. 
They lack the editorial backing from established newsrooms that many competi-
tors enjoy. Their infrastructure costs—bandwidth, content management, ad serv-
ing and so on—are fixed and cannot be shared across a network. They lack what 
has been considered a crucial element of success in the media business: scale.
That several of these grass-roots sites have nevertheless built viable businesses 
raises two questions. The most obvious one is how they have managed to make 
ad revenue align with expenses. But just as important—and perhaps still to be de-
termined—is whether their model can support serious accountability journalism.
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* * *
The city of Batavia, N.Y., is unlikely to show up on AOL’s carefully calculated 
list of promising Patch sites. It is a Rust Belt community of just 16,000 people in 
the western end of the state, about 50 miles from Buffalo. The prison system is 
one of the few growth sectors in what was once a thriving industrial center, and 
Batavia’s downtown merchants have struggled to compete with big-box retailers.
When The Batavian’s website went live in May 2008, the local paper, the 
Batavia Daily News (owned by the Johnson Newspaper Corp.) didn’t have a 
website. (It does now.) Gatehouse Media, which publishes small dailies, weeklies 
and “shoppers” around the country, launched The Batavian as an experiment in 
online-only publishing. In addition to hiring two reporters, who are no longer 
there, Gatehouse provided its in-house digital guru, Howard Owens, who be-
came the new site’s publisher. In early 2009 Gatehouse laid Owens off and he 
assumed ownership of The Batavian, which runs as an independent site with no 
editorial or business ties to other publications.
Three years after going live, The Batavian, according to Owens, is profitable. It 
offers a promising example of local online journalism. The site has grown from 
fewer than 2,000 unique visitors per day in 2008 to roughly 6,000 now, generat-
ing close to 600,000 page views each month. Owens won’t say what it costs to 
run, but The Batavian operates with a skeleton staff: Owens, his wife, and two 
part-time employees, in addition to freelancers who are paid a small sum per 
story. The site posts about five short reported stories per day, and additional bul-
letins or photo pieces.
Most impressively, The Batavian has about 100 advertisers at any time—up 
from just three in 2008—and pulled in between $100,000 and $150,000 in ad 
revenue in 2010, Owens says. He aims to double ad income in 2011 and to hire 
one or two full-time employees. “I don’t really have to sell anymore—they call 
me,” he says of local advertisers. “It’s driven by word of mouth.”
One factor driving that word of mouth is The Batavian’s modest advertising 
rates. The site eschews pricing by traffic completely; instead it charges a flat fee 
of $40 to $260 per month (though one premium package runs as high as $400). 
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Owens estimates that a month’s run on his site would buy just one day’s place-
ment in his print competitor, the Daily News. “I wanted it to be an easy deci-
sion,” he says. “What’s another $200?”
Online, of course, the supply of space available to sell to advertisers increases 
with traffic, because “impressions” are the unit of measurement. A small site like 
The Batavian would be hard-pressed to support 100 advertisers with the top-of-
page banner model used by many large metro dailies. With one major banner per 
page, each sponsor would get just 6,000 impressions per month, or $30 worth at 
a fairly generous $5 cost-per-thousand. (In 2010 comScore found12 that average 
newspaper CPMs were $7 nationwide, though its analysis included the largest 
newspapers and newspaper chains in the country; small local outlets tend to have 
lower rates.) At that rate, the site would earn $36,000 a year. If there were two big 
banners on each page, annual revenue would rise to $72,000.
Instead, Owens runs the site like a “pennysaver”—every advertiser appears on 
each page, in long columns running down both sides of the site. Their positions 
rotate during the day to make sure every merchant spends some time near the 
top. And to encourage scrolling, every article appears in full on the site’s front 
page, with the most recent items at the top. It is possible to absorb all of the day’s 
news without ever clicking beyond the home page. Owens doesn’t have to worry 
about driving traffic to various corners of the site to deliver impressions to dif-
ferent advertisers. He designed this approach based on his experience at three 
newspaper companies, with access to online data for more than 100 local papers. 
“I saw that it’s very hard to get people to move past the home page,” he explains. 
“So I decided to base my business on that.”
A national brand probably would not place its ad alongside 100 others. But 
Batavia’s merchants have the sense that they are sponsoring a popular local re-
source at a reasonable price. Local boosterism makes a difference, Owens insists: 
“Some advertisers just want to support community.” His advertisers rarely ask 
about click-through rates, though Owens says some are pleased to learn that, say, 
a total of 80 people clicked on their ad over the course of a month.
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A useful metric for evaluating this approach is not CPM, but RPM—revenue 
per 1,000 impressions. Assuming The Batavian earned $125,000 in 2010 (the 
middle of the range Owens claims) and averaged 600,000 page views per month, 
it achieved an RPM of $17, an impressive figure for a news site serving a small 
and far-from-affluent community.
* * *
A similar formula applies at Baristanet, one of the most successful local news 
sites in the country. Baristanet has one decisive advantage: its audience of affluent, 
media-savvy professionals in the retail-rich bedroom communities of suburban 
New Jersey, anchored by the towns of Montclair and Maplewood. (The area 
scores well on AOL’s algorithms—six of the seven towns Baristanet serves have 
their own Patch sites.)
Baristanet, launched in 2004, keeps costs radically low. Everyone involved with 
the site has another job—even the two founders, Liz George and Debbie Galant. 
“Everyone’s freelance,” George explains. She and Galant act as top editors, giving 
the final word on every article; one other editor is paid by the month. The rest 
of the site’s dozen or so freelancers—many of whom moonlight from salaried 
jobs—are paid by the piece, usually about $50 each. “We don’t want long ar-
ticles,” George says. “If they spend half the day on a story, that’s too long.”
Then there are people who write for free, submitting opinion pieces, com-
ments, bulletins and photos. Baristanet offers roughly the mix of content that a 
community weekly would; one Friday in March 2011, for instance, some po-
litical news about local budgets was sandwiched between pieces on “weekend 
highlights” for kids and a major markdown at the local cheesemonger. George 
explains that many smaller items require no reporting at all, just a photo and a 
blurb. The combination of paid articles, opinion, aggregation, and “things that 
come in over the transom,” yields more than enough material to keep the site 
fresh, she says.
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Altogether, editorial costs run to $5,000 or $6,000 per month—higher than at 
The Batavian, but still fairly modest for a site that runs about eight longer articles 
per day and, according to George, attracts 80,000 unique visitors monthly. Most 
important, costs are far below the roughly $20,000 in advertising that George 
says Baristanet pulls in each month. For several years, according to George, the 
site’s profits have provided a sizable second income for the two founders and 
their hired editor.
Baristanet also eschews cost-per-thousand pricing in favor of a simple calendar 
model, and, though rates run higher than at the Batavian, an advertiser can get 
on the site quite cheaply. Merchants pay from $150 to $1,600 per month (weekly 
rates are also available) depending on their ad’s size, placement and frequency 
of rotation. George says businesses in the area have no interest in buying by the 
impression or by the click, though Baristanet does report such statistics to them.
Because Baristanet rotates ads across its available inventory, a merchant’s expo-
sure is limited by the amount of traffic the site gets. According to George, con-
sultants have advised against ad rotation, but so far the hospitals, car dealerships, 
real estate agents, restaurants and other businesses that advertise on the site don’t 
seem to mind. Merchants occasionally call wondering where their ad is; George 
advises them to refresh the page a few times until it appears.
As a result, Baristanet achieves an enviable ratio of revenue to traffic. With an 
average monthly volume of about 475,000 page views, the site enjoys an RPM 
in the neighborhood of $42—many times the revenue it would get if it used a 
standard CPM model. Just as The Batavian’s revenue would collapse if merchants 
complained about being stacked together on a single page, Baristanet could not 
do the business it does each month if it had to guarantee a hard number of im-
pressions to each advertiser.
It seems fair to assume that the site’s appeal to advertisers is not tied to such 
narrow statistics. George suggests that merchants are paying relatively little to be a 
part of a one-of-a-kind community resource that enjoys wide recognition in the 
towns it serves. Baristanet claims to have 53 percent household penetration in its 
core market of Montclair and has logged more than 300,000 comments since its 
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inception—roughly one for every other person in all of Essex County(though 
many come from repeat commenters). “It’s been an easy sell,” George says. “Ev-
erybody wants to partner with us.”
* * *
That local online journalism can succeed in such different environments—
prosperous suburban New Jersey and Rust Belt upstate New York—is an indica-
tion that it can be viable elsewhere. A 2010 survey of 66 “promising local news 
sites” around the country, conducted by the Reynolds Journalism Institute at the 
University of Missouri, found that the top objective of these sites was to “pro-
duce original news” and that on average nearly half of their content came from 
paid staff, rather than, for instance, aggregation or reader contributions. 13
Advertising was far and away the most important revenue source for these sites, 
accounting for 45 percent of revenue on average. (Foundation grants came next, 
at 17 percent of revenue, and reader donations followed at 12 percent.) For 28 of 
the sites surveyed, advertising supplied three-fourths or more of annual revenue. 
Fifty-six percent of the sites operated as for-profit ventures, and of these, half 
reported making a profit the previous year. (It is important to remember these 
results are entirely self-reported.)
Clear lessons emerge from the experiences of Baristanet, The Batavian and the 
Alaska Dispatch. First, all three sites have embraced calendar-based advertising 
pricing systems that yield more revenue than they could expect pricing strictly 
by the number of impressions. Low prices, anecdotal successes and a sense of 
community engagement allow local merchants to find value on terms that a 
national advertiser might reject out of hand. The sites have managed to appeal to 
local advertisers by selling in terms that work for them. “A lot of advertisers don’t 
understand CPMs,” says Victor Wong, CEO of PaperG, a company that helps 
publishers attract local ads. “They don’t understand what a page view means, they 
don’t know when the page ran, they don’t trust CPM measurement.”
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But it would be a mistake to see in these examples a formula that any local 
venture could replicate just by asking merchants for a few hundred dollars each 
month. Each of these sites filled a vacuum when it launched and has remained 
popular even as new competitors have appeared. Their real feat is having built 
sizable audiences on the cheap. The same is true of niche or “vertical” sites that 
aim for a particular demographic segment or “community of interest,” rather 
than a geographic area.
Henry Blodget’s Business Insider (reviewed in detail in Chapter 7) offers a 
good example: The financial news site reached break-even last year by building 
a monthly audience of 6 million unique visitors, on a yearly budget of about $5 
million. An even more dramatic example is DailyCandy, the decade-old trend-
surfing email newsletter that occupies roughly the same journalistic space online 
that Lucky magazine does in the print world.
DailyCandy was launched in March 2000 from the kitchen table of Dany Levy, 
then a young editorial-side veteran of New York magazine and Lucky. Levy’s 
venture offered one of the most bare-bones editorial propositions imaginable: a 
short daily email alerting readers to something hot—a new cupcake shop, a shoe 
style—in New York’s (and the Internet’s) fast-changing retail culture.
“One simple thing in your e-mail inbox that told you one thing you needed to 
do that day,” Levy explained to a Harvard Business Review blog in 2009. “It was 
meant to save people time and keep them plugged in. Not everyone can afford to 
eat at Mario Batali’s new place, or some other hot, new restaurant, but this kind 
of knowledge is cultural currency. It’s water-cooler conversation.” 14
That interview came after her company had been bought by Comcast, in the 
summer of 2008, for a reported $125 million. By the time of the sale, Daily-
Candy had grown from a one-person shop to a company with 55 employees, 
running 12 editions across the country and reaching a total audience of 2.5 mil-
lion people—most of them women, and two-thirds of them younger than 35. 
Financial details were scarce, but an internal email from early investor (and vet-
eran of MTV and AOL) Bob Pittman reportedly said the company would reach 
$25 million in revenue in 2008, with profits of $10 million.15 Analysts had been 
speculating eagerly about what the company might be worth since 2006, when 
the Wall Street Journal reported it was on the auction block at $100 million.16
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Those numbers put DailyCandy in a different league financially from the local 
news ventures profiled in this chapter. But the dynamic that makes DailyCandy 
work was visible years earlier, when the newsletter was a grass-roots venture with 
much smaller ambitions. Levy launched her business with $50,000 in savings and 
$250,000 raised from family and friends. The first edition went out to just 700 
people, mostly friends or colleagues of Levy, then readership grew explosively. In 
2001 the newsletter was already paying for itself, with tiny ads in each emailed 
edition as well as separate sponsored emails straight from advertisers.
By 2003 the subscriber list had grown to 285,000—more than 400 times its 
starting audience, a stunning ratio for so-called organic growth achieved with 
minimal outside support. It was on the basis of these numbers that Pittman 
made his initial investment in the business, reported to be “in the single-digit 
millions,” which in turn fueled the newsletter’s expansion into new markets 
and new editions. 17
In a broad sense, the experience of successful local and niche sites bears out 
the received wisdom that media ventures in today’s hypercompetitive landscape 
must “specialize or localize.” But only a fraction of online news outlets that pur-
sue this strategy ultimately succeed. Defining and attracting a desirable audience 
is necessary, of course, but not by itself sufficient; acquiring that audience on a 
tight budget is what sets successful grass-roots ventures apart from the also-rans.
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Chapter 4
The New New Media: Mobile, Video and Other Emerging Platforms
News organizations can be forgiven for feeling that they’re in an endless cycle 
of Whac-A-Mole.
They’ve had 15 years to get onto the Internet, and for much of that time the 
experience was limited largely to words and photos on a Web page, accessed on 
a personal computer. But more recently, journalism has been blessed and bedev-
iled by a stream of follow-on innovations. As a result, most organizations have 
tried to develop new ways to report and distribute stories, and many are making 
substantial investments so their work will appear on attractive new devices. Their 
hope is that these new kinds of digital journalism will enhance companies’ earn-
ings; their fear is that if they don’t adapt, they will lose audiences’ attention and 
the revenue it brings.
It hasn’t been easy. Video has been seen as a great way to get more sustained 
engagement, but many news organizations have found it to be expensive and dif-
ficult to produce. And even though ad rates are three to five times what regular 
display ads bring, video often doesn’t get enough traffic to attract substantial rev-
enue. Mobile devices, meanwhile, provide consumers with greater access to news, 
but the small screen size can be a nightmare for designers and a poor display space 
for advertisers. Tablets—particularly the iPad—have looked like a more immer-
sive experience for readers, and a more likely venue for subscriptions and higher 
ad revenue. But their luster has dimmed as the dominant manufacturer, Apple, has 
insisted on charging high fees and controlling economically valuable information 
about customers. Each new device brings an additional level of complexity and 
expense. Not long ago, “convergence” was the keyword in news production, as 
television, newspaper, magazine and pure online sites all started to look the same. 
Now comes a new “divergence,” in which online journalism organizations must 
distribute news into distinctly different modes of presentation.
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The iPad has been a hit: Expectations are that about 30 million devices will 
have shipped by the end of 2011.1 But while analysts expect the iPad to capture 
more than 90 percent of the tablet market in 2011, competitors are entering 
the fray. Tablet manufacturers have announced that more than 25 brands will be 
available in 2011, at screen sizes ranging from five to 11 inches.2
 Audiences are fragmenting in other ways, too—in their interests and habits. 
The conflict is evident in the behavior of Michael Harwayne, vice president of 
digital strategy and development at Time Inc. Harwayne lives in Manhattan and 
takes the subway to work. He likes to read the Wall Street Journal on his com-
mute, but lately the question has been: Which format works best?
Harwayne likes the Amazon Kindle. When the Journal became available on 
that device in the spring of 2009, he decided to pay an extra $10 per month for 
the convenience, though he was already paying $363 per year for the print and 
web editions. The Kindle price rose to $15 per month a year later.
But there was no connection between his print/online subscription and the 
Kindle edition, and Harwayne found it annoying to be billed separately. Then, 
in May 2010, came the Wall Street Journal iPad app, which he got as part of 
his overall subscription. It’s not that it was “free,” but because he didn’t have 
to pay a separate fee, it felt free. Still, he said, “I didn’t like carrying it and 
reading it on the subway, so I never actually canceled the Kindle until I had a 
lightweight alternative.”
In the fall of 2010, he was introduced to a Samsung tablet. He liked it more 
than the iPad, so he switched to the Journal’s Android version (which is also 
included in his core subscription to the paper) and finally canceled his Kindle 
subscription. But Harwayne wondered, “Why shouldn’t I be able to read the 
paper on any device I have?”
In March 2011, he learned that he’ll eventually have to pay an additional 
$17.29 a month to keep his iPad or Android version of the Wall Street Journal. 
Through it all, the one thing that hasn’t changed is that Harwayne likes to read 
the print version of the Journal after a long day at work. Still, it “seems like a very 
strange consumer strategy,” he says.
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Early data about tablets appeared to show great promise for news organizations. 
A few months after the first iPad went on the market in the spring of 2010, the 
Associated Press reported that Gannett Co. was getting $50 per thousand page 
views for iPad advertisements—or five times the price it was getting on its web-
sites.3 Condé Nast initially said visitors were spending an hour with each of its 
iPad issues—far more than the three or four minutes per visit its websites draw 
and close to the overall print magazine average of 70 minutes.4 David Carey, pres-
ident of Hearst Magazines, said in March 2011 that the company would end the 
year with “several hundred thousand subscriptions in total” sold through digital 
publisher Zinio, Barnes & Noble’s Nook e-reader and Apple’s iPad. He predicted 
that as much as 25 percent of his company’s subscribers will be on tablets “in the 
next five years.” 5
But making predictions based on early and volatile sales is tricky. The data on 
usage of tablets and smartphones come from products—and a competitive envi-
ronment—that are in transition. Many buyers are early adapters to technology, a 
group whose behavior does not reliably predict the greater population who will 
eventually buy the gadgets. (Of the 66 million smartphone users in the U.S., only 
about a third have used the browser or downloaded an app, according to audi-
ence measurement company comScore.6)
Wired, a magazine with a tech-savvy readership, sold 100,000 single copies via 
the iPad in June 2010, but that number dropped to 22,000 by October; in 2011, 
its single-copy iPad sales have averaged 20,000 to 30,000 per issue.7 Wired’s av-
erage monthly circulation of 800,000 still consists mostly of print subscriptions 
and single-copy sales; a small number (27,000) are sold as PDF-based digital 
replicas.8 It’s likely that the high price and one-issue limit of Wired’s iPad version 
have hindered sales; one copy costs $4.99—the same as a copy sold at the news-
stand—while an annual print subscription starts at around $12 a year. And the 
froth has settled throughout the company: In April 2011, a Condé Nast publisher 
told AdAge that the company’s iPad strategy was slowing: “They’re not all doing 
all that well, so why rush to get them all on there?”9
One issue is Apple’s own pricing strategy. The company announced in early 
2011 that it wants a 30 percent cut of any subscriptions paid through the iTunes 
store.10 More important, when the user pays with a credit card stored in iTunes—
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and Apple had about 200 million registered users in 201111—the user’s name and 
address don’t have to be shared with the publisher, unless the customer agrees. 
Without this information, publishers have a handicap: They can’t find out the 
particulars of their subscribers’ reading behavior. Google is pushing an alterna-
tive tool for subscriptions called One Pass, in which the company will charge 
publishers 10 percent of revenue and share subscribers’ names and information. 
Some publishers, such as Time Inc., have built their own payment and collection 
systems for selling their own apps from their own websites so they don’t have to 
share any information or pay any fees.12
For most magazines, neither the replica digital copies nor the iPad versions of 
their magazines count in the “rate base,” which is the number of readers publish-
ers guarantee to deliver to advertisers. So, for now, publishers tout it as “bonus” 
circulation they can’t really charge for.
Some news organizations are optimistic about the economics of mobile devic-
es. In March 2011, Dow Jones announced that it had 200,000 paying subscrib-
ers who access to the Wall Street Journal via some sort of mobile device.13 The 
company did not say how much additional revenue this brought in, so many of 
these readers could be like Michael Harwayne—digital subscribers who signed 
up for mobile access. (The Wall Street Journal’s total reported average daily paid 
circulation is about 2 million copies—1.6 million copies in print and 430,000 
electronic copies.14)
Time Inc. announced plans in February 2011 to give Time, Fortune, People 
and Sports Illustrated subscribers the ability to access those magazines’ content 
on multiple platforms.15 Sports Illustrated has been particularly aggressive in digi-
tal expansion; to introduce its digital package as widely as possible, it has given 
access to all 3.15 million of its current print subscribers. For new customers, it is 
promoting an “All Access” subscription plan, which includes the print magazine, 
plus access via tablet, web and smartphone; in March 2011, the price for All Ac-
cess (including a bonus windbreaker) was $48 per year.16 A digital-only package 
with no magazine and no jacket costs the same. That pricing scheme helps pro-
tect the print edition and provides the biggest possible digital audience.
Some publishers are willing to invest a lot to gamble on an unknown future 
and avoid sitting on the sidelines.
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In February 2011, News Corp. launched The Daily, a tablet-only newspaper. 
First offered on just the iPad, though there are plans to extend it to more tablets, 
The Daily announced a start-up budget of $30 million, which let it hire enough 
journalists, designers and technicians to create 100 pages of content per day. In-
tegrated into the Daily are features that seem to shine on the iPad platform, such 
as social-media links, audio and video. Greg Clayman, publisher of the Daily, said 
hundreds of thousands of users have downloaded the app, but he’s not ready to 
reveal how many use it on a regular basis.17
George Rodrigue, managing editor of the Dallas Morning News, says the iPad 
“may be the thing that helps people read enterprise journalism. We used to say 
you have to be platform agnostic. I don’t think that’s right anymore. You have 
to be platform specific.” But the transition isn’t cheap. “We have to build a staff 
for the iPad—two people plus an assignment editor,” he says. “We’re going to 
handcraft little stories summarizing every story—55 words max. Every reporter 
will write the summary themselves. Every section front will be a summary of the 
news page.” At the Miami Herald, Raul Lopez, the interactive general manager, 
estimates the paper’s total digital page views to be 30 million per month; about 2 
million are mobile, and half of those are via the iPhone.
* * *
Meanwhile, video has become an essential element of the digital experience. 
According to comScore, about 89 million people in the U.S. watched at least one 
online video, or video advertisement, daily by the end of 2010.18
For journalism sites, broadband access has made video distribution more fea-
sible. But persuading users to watch news video isn’t easy. Online video journal-
ism is becoming a world of haves and have-nots. Among the haves, CNN.com 
reigns supreme.
“In any given month, well over half our unique visitors watch video,” says 
K.C. Estenson, senior vice president and general manager of CNN.com. “The 
percentage has gone up every year.” When CNN.com redesigned its site in 2009, 
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the network “anchored it on video,” Estenson says. It isn’t unusual for the website 
to have 15 or more video links on its home page, including at least three or four 
in high-profile featured positions.
CNN.com is different than other video-rich sites because of the size and ex-
pectations of its audience. The company says it delivers between 60 million and 
100 million video streams a month. In contrast to local-broadcast competitors, 
CNN.com can match the costs of substantial technology and newsgathering 
with a massive audience. “If you do not have scale, you do not have a business,” 
says Estenson. CNN.com has also launched a free iPad application in which 
video is integrated into text. And CNN is hungry for more viewers. Estenson 
says CNN can sell “almost every single video impression we create. So we would 
like more video consumption.”
CNN has brought its broadcast expertise onto the Web. “We program by times 
of day,” says Estenson. “The bell curve of visitors to our site peaks between 11 
a.m. and 2 p.m. on regular news days. We’ve noticed that social media links go up 
a lot at night.” Sometimes CNN makes programming decisions based on a mix 
of demographic and editorial priorities. Estenson notes that users under the age 
of 25, who “are disproportionately on social media,” tend to be more interested 
in entertainment and features rather than in hard news. So, while “CNN is all 
about trust and reliability,” Estenson says, “for CNN.com, entertainment is one 
of the biggest sections of the site.”
Estenson sees contrasts between the content on CNN’s cable channel and 
CNN.com. Online, producers have more freedom to experiment and expand, 
and the content can be more daring. “Going online is a private experience, versus 
watching in the living room. When people are online, they seem to gravitate to 
things that are more provocative than they would if they were in a room with 
their friends.”
How profitable is CNN online? According to a presentation the network made 
to analysts in mid-2010, revenue for CNN overall (consisting of the U.S. and in-
ternational divisions, Headline News and digital) was about $500 million; digital 
advertising and content sales accounted for about 10 percent of total revenue.19 
CNN.com’s profit margin isn’t broken out publicly by either its division, Turner 
Broadcasting System Inc., or by the parent company, Time Warner Inc. Estenson 
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does say the digital operations have been profitable for the last seven years—even 
including corporate costs and just under 100 “dedicated digital” people on the 
editorial side. All of CNN benefits from a centralized publishing platform; sales 
and administrative expenses are spread across the three television divisions and 
their online properties.
CNN.com is dependent mostly on ad revenue that is sold directly by a CNN 
sales force. But the digital business also gets some direct corporate support. Esten-
son says a “select portion” of the subscription money that cable and satellite com-
panies pay to carry CNN’s programming is used for research and development 
activities related to new technologies, such as smartphones, tablets and televisions 
connected to the Web. Thus, benefits from CNN’s digital investments flow both 
ways, from the traditional to the digital and back.
Estenson believes the site feeds viewers and value back to the legacy network. 
“Digital platforms are the entry point for the brand. More and more people will 
discover the brand through them,” he says. And he envisions some of the distinc-
tions between the two platforms becoming less relevant, especially as the Internet 
gets a bigger foothold in living rooms.
CNN.com is something of an exception in its success with online video. Most 
local TV stations’ websites have far less traffic and revenue. In interviews with ex-
ecutives at a station based in one of the top five metropolitan areas of the country, 
a more difficult picture emerges. (The station was willing to share metrics on the 
condition it not be identified.) In October 2010, the station’s website attracted 
about 7 million page views. But it delivered only 622,000 video streams that 
month. The station’s general manager said that when video became feasible on 
the Web several years ago, executives believed they would have a natural com-
petitive advantage. “We thought having video was the key to becoming a popular 
website. But only 10 percent of the visitors look at video.” And partly as a result 
of the low video usage online, only 1 percent of the station’s total advertising 
revenue comes from its website.
The general manager has seen statistics that show similarly paltry results at 
other local television stations’ sites. One problem, he says, is that other sites are 
also producing video, so broadcast stations face more competition for views. 
Sports fans appear to be particularly interested in newspaper sites’ video.20 He has 
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thought about doing more consumer research but can’t justify the expense. “No 
one is buying the site, really,” he says, “so it’s not worth spending more money to 
figure it out.”
Somewhere between this station’s frustration and CNN.com’s success is LIN 
Media, a company that owns 32 local television stations in markets ranging 
from Springfield, Mass., to Albuquerque, N.M. LIN delivered 116 million video 
streams in 2010, and has built its business on shared operations and costs, as well 
as long-term investment in branding and marketing.21
LIN is in 17 markets, and the company has multiple stations in several cities. It 
is in small or medium-sized “DMAs”—that is, “designated market areas” that are 
defined and ranked by Nielsen, the audience-rating company. The markets range 
from Indianapolis (25th largest in the country) to Providence, R.I., (53rd) to 
Lafayette, Ind. (191st).22 LIN controls costs by having one building, one staff, and 
one newsroom per market, with costs shared by all its stations in that market. For 
non-local topics such as health, LIN produces stories that serve all of its markets. 
Companywide, LIN has about 200 digital employees in a workforce of 2,000. 
(Four years ago, it had nine digital employees in a workforce of 2,300.) Robb 
Richter, LIN’s senior vice president for new media, says the video the company 
produces for broadcast is its competitive advantage. “We have mounds of video 
we can use”—something most other sites lack.
Print-based media are still building video resources and expertise. Even those 
with successful sites have had a hard time winning a video audience. Michael 
Silberman, general manager of New York Magazine’s popular site, says nymag.
com has tried to integrate video into its editorial content but that the pace of 
video and the commitment to watch it still aren’t working for most visitors. The 
site features videos it produces in-house as well as material from around the Web 
that is “curated” by online editors, based on subject matter, relevance and news 
value. So, for example, nymag.com has a food video page with categories beyond 
news, such as restaurants, chefs and recipes. But it’s hard to build an audience, 
Silberman says, adding, “If your site isn’t about video, people don’t click on it.” 
For nymag.com, less than 10 percent of unique users go to video. At Huffington 
Post, no more than 5 percent of unique visitors clicked on a video throughout 
most of 2010.23
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Lewis DVorkin, chief product officer of Forbes Media, agrees. “Video on the 
web is hard. It’s very stressful,” he says. Since joining Forbes in the spring of 2010, 
DVorkin has been coming up with new ways to create and distribute Forbes 
content. But video has him stumped: “We had a difficult video strategy. It was 
conceived on the broadcast model—produced, highly expensive, and it involved 
lots of people.” He foresees moving to outside contributors more in video, as he 
has done elsewhere on Forbes.com. DVorkin and nymag’s Silberman both say 
that until they unlock the video puzzle, they are losing opportunities for ad rev-
enue. Silberman says, “Our ad demand outstrips our audience demand.”
The Wall Street Journal’s site has drawn significant traffic and revenue to its 
video offerings. The site serves around 8 million streams a month, says Alan Mur-
ray, deputy managing editor and executive editor, online, for the Journal. And the 
ad rates are healthy—$30 to $40 per thousand views (or CPMs). The site features 
live videos before and after the market closes, and they’re often displayed promi-
nently on the home page. Unlike much of the rest of the site, viewing the videos 
doesn’t require a subscription.
The key to making video profitable, Murray says, is controlling costs. WSJ.com 
has about 16 people devoted to video production, and the company has trained 
many of its print reporters in basic video techniques. “If you go to Bahrain and 
need a satellite truck, that’s $25,000,” Murray says. “All we need is a $200 iPhone 
4.” WSJ.com has also managed to get viewers to watch video during work hours, 
something that many other sites have found difficult.
The Miami Herald recently noted that its video traffic grew by 25 percent in 
2010.24 Videos that the Herald produces and hosts on its site get about 200,000 
streams a month, says Lopez, the interactive general manager. That is a relatively 
small number, given that the site gets more than 6 million visitors per month.
The Herald has bolstered its video presence with segments produced by the 
Associated Press and other organizations. It also tried to distinguish itself by pro-
ducing longer videos of newsmakers talking about various topics, but those are a 
tough sell online. “There’s a reason that television does two-minute stories,” the 
Herald’s managing editor, Rick Hirsch, told Poynter.org. “Unless something is 
super compelling, people’s attention span is relatively short, and it’s even shorter 
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on a small screen.” And it’s not easy to make the advertising numbers work. Lo-
pez says Herald-produced videos earn just $4,000 per month—that is, 200,000 
streams a month at $20 per thousand viewers.
Cynthia Carr, senior vice president of sales at the Dallas Morning News, also 
doubts video will become a significant profit driver any time soon. “We’re not 
monetizing video. I don’t see that bringing big revenue,” she says. Dallasnews.
com got an average of 186,000 video streams a month in 2010, clicked on by 2 
percent of the unique visitors coming to the site.
And video traffic is hard to anticipate. Like Hollywood, there are hits and 
flops—as the Detroit Free Press found in January 2011, when it ran a dramatic 
video of a shootout in a local police station.25 It got nearly 714,000 streams, or 
nearly half the total traffic to video on Detroit’s site for a three-month period. 
When it launched, the video was preceded by a short commercial. But within 
seven hours and 70,000 streams, a reader who went by the name “HartlandRun-
ner” posted this comment: “I am glad you are willing to tell this story by showing 
the video, but why the ad beforehand? Brutality brought to us by UnitedHealth 
Care? ... Very, very tacky, even in an online world. … This tape was paid for by 
taxpayers and shows graphic real violence … and you guys put an ad on it. That’s 
unbelievable and I hope you change it.”
Nancy Andrews, Detroit Free Press’s managing editor for digital media, said, “I 
saw the comment and checked with the vice president of advertising. She said 
let’s take the ad off.” So they removed the ad, and forfeited some revenue—but 
kept readers happy. And it did help editors understand even more about how 
news video works on the Internet. “People are interested in the raw video con-
tent,” Andrews says. “Show me what happened. … You don’t necessarily need the 
context in video form, too. … Think of it more like a picture that talks than a 
full story.”
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Chapter 5
Paywalls: Information at a Price
“Information wants to be free. Information also wants to be expensive. In-
formation wants to be free because it has become so cheap to distribute, copy, 
and recombine—too cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive because it can be 
immeasurably valuable to the recipient. That tension will not go away. ... Each 
round of new devices makes the tension worse, not better.”
—Stewart Brand, The Media Lab, 1987 1
“The Internet is the most effective means of giving stuff away for free that 
humanity has ever devised. Actually making money from it is not just hard, it 
may be fundamentally opposed to the character and momentum of the net.”
—John Lanchester, London Review of Books essay, 20102
When the Wall Street Journal decided to charge for its online edition in 1996, 
the company did so without a great deal of deliberation. Rather, as Peter Kann, 
who was then the chief executive officer of the Journal’s parent company, Dow 
Jones, would later recall, “I didn’t know any better. I just thought people should 
pay for content.”3
That was a novel idea at the time—that people should pay for news they got 
on the Web. Today, after years of declining print circulation and disappointing 
online ad revenue, many news organizations have begun pondering whether to 
institute a subscription system for their online sites.
Pondering is still all most companies have done, though increasingly they are 
warming to the idea of charging for at least some of their digital content. Their 
hesitation stems from several concerns. Some are fearful they will lose so much 
Web traffic that their online advertising revenue will fall significantly; others are 
daunted by the technological hurdles involved in getting a new online subscriber 
system to work in tandem with the one that has served print customers for years. 
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Also, subscription revenue has historically been such a small factor in the ad-
driven media business that many news organizations wonder if they would ever 
get much return on the investment.
Publishers usually cite three reasons to charge for online products. One, of 
course, is to increase subscription revenue. Another, less obvious, is to stanch the 
erosion in legacy operations: That is, since their readers now get the content they 
want for free online, why would they pay for a print subscription? If you start 
charging for digital access, shouldn’t that protect your more profitable print busi-
ness? Finally, there is evidence that a paying audience is more valuable to adver-
tisers because it demonstrates deeper commitment by those readers.
A few online-only news organizations have tried pay schemes, usually to 
charge for premium content beyond their free websites. Politico launched its 
“Pro” version in early 2011, charging $2,495 a year for in-depth coverage of such 
topics as energy or health care.4 That puts Politico into competition with older 
publications like Congressional Quarterly, now owned by the Economist Group, 
and newcomers like Bloomberg Government. At a much lower price, ESPN.
com offers access to its “Insider” site, with exclusive blogs, videos and tools, at 
prices ranging from $30 to more than $70 a year. And to ensure there’s a bundle, 
online subscribers also get ESPN The Magazine, a biweekly print publication.
The paywall issue is especially acute for newspaper sites. In the months leading 
up to publication of this report, most of the attention of journalists was directed 
at the New York Times’ new digital subscription service. Before that, though, the 
conversation about paywalls in the U.S. has focused on two staunch believers in 
the digital subscription business: the Wall Street Journal, which began charging 
in 1996 shortly after its website launched, and the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 
which started imposing online subscriptions in 2002.
Walter Hussman, publisher of the Arkansas paper, has portrayed his site’s pay-
wall as a way to protect the more lucrative print edition. The online subscription 
service “does not justify itself as a revenue stream,” Hussman has said.5 Print sub-
scribers get the online edition for free.
Columbia Journalism School | Tow Center for Digital Journalism
 Paywalls: Information at a Price 69
The Wall Street Journal sees it differently and has consistently charged print 
subscribers extra for digital access. And the difference between those strategies 
is manifested in the publications’ number of digital subscribers: WSJ.com has 
around 1.1 million subscribers (including those who also get the print edition), 
or a bit more than half of its print base. The Democrat-Gazette has around 4,400 
subscribers to its “electronic edition”—about 2 percent of its daily circulation 
base. Its print circulation, though, has remained remarkably steady while that of 
other papers has declined precipitously. In 2006, the Democrat-Gazette’s daily 
circulation was 176,910. Daily circulation now is listed at 186,962, though some 
of that strength is due to a merger of operations with some small Arkansas papers 
whose subscribers are now counted in the Democrat-Gazette’s total.6
But how replicable are these two models? The Wall Street Journal provides 
content geared toward financial decision making and reaches a more elite and 
affluent audience than most news organizations. The Arkansas paper is the domi-
nant news organization in its state.
To see how news executives figure out whether to charge online, we exam-
ined the decision-making processes at two large metro newspapers—the Dallas 
Morning News and the Miami Herald. Each thought about the same issues, 
relied on similar data—and then embarked upon completely different strategies.
Both papers have histories as journalistic powerhouses in their home markets. 
The Herald, which has been owned by McClatchy since 2006, has won 20 Pu-
litzer Prizes, on subjects ranging from local election fraud to the Iran-Contra 
scandal. The Morning News has won nine Pulitzers and has dominated the Dal-
las market since its parent company, Belo, bought and closed the rival Times 
Herald in 1991.
But both have experienced significant declines in their print circulation, and 
both had reason to believe that their free websites might be partly to blame.
At the Herald, circulation had been steadily declining for years. The Herald and 
its Spanish-language sibling, El Nuevo Herald, fell from a combined daily circu-
lation of 393,382 in 2005 to 261,657 in 2009. Most of the decline was outside 
the Herald’s “city zone”—its core in Miami-Dade County. The Herald has also 
cut back discounted bulk circulation to schools, hotels and other institutions. 7
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The trend has been similar in Dallas, where the Morning News has dropped 
from 373,586 daily circulation in 2007 to 264,459 in 2010. In part, that is also 
because the paper began to focus on its most loyal print subscribers a few years 
ago. The News trimmed back most of its delivery beyond a 100-mile radius of 
Dallas, though it still circulates in Austin, the state capital, which is 200 miles 
away. “We reduced footprint in the state,” says John Walsh, senior vice president 
for circulation at the Morning News. “Advertisers were saying they’re not inter-
ested outside the core market.” That helped eliminate some extraneous expenses. 
It took so long to get newspapers to Odessa, about 350 miles west of Dallas, that 
the delivery person “had to spend the night in a motel after delivering the paper,” 
Walsh says. “It was like the Pony Express.” The Morning News also eliminated 
much of its single-copy sales effort, removing 9,000 of its 10,000 newspaper 
racks around the metro area.
A few years ago, the News began doing studies about the price sensitivity of 
its subscribers. Executives wanted to know if the remaining readers were now a 
core of the faithful who would be willing to pay much higher prices for home 
delivery. One study indicated that a 40 percent hike in the price of a subscription 
would result in a loss of around 12 percent of its subscribers, says Publisher James 
Moroney. That emboldened executives to raise the price of a monthly subscrip-
tion aggressively, from $21 to $30 in May 2009 and then to $33.95 in 2011—one 
of the highest prices for any metropolitan paper in the country.
In those days, Moroney was convinced that free digital access was the way 
to go. In May 2009, he told a U.S. Senate committee holding hearings on the 
state of the newspaper business that “if The Dallas Morning News today put up 
a paywall over its content, people would go to the Fort Worth Star-Telegram.”8
Within a few months, though, Moroney began reconsidering his aversion to a 
paywall. In remarks in the fall of 2010 to a small group at the Carnegie Corpora-
tion, Moroney provided this analysis: “The Morning News does 40 million page 
views a month. If we could sell out three ad positions on every page every day at 
a $7 CPM, we would yield $10 million” a year.9 That, he noted, would cover less 
than a third of his editorial costs—even as those costs have dropped as newsroom 
staffing has fallen from 660 at its peak to around 400.
Columbia Journalism School | Tow Center for Digital Journalism
 Paywalls: Information at a Price 71
More fundamentally, Moroney had concluded that a focus on volume—either 
in the form of cheap print subscriptions or of Web traffic that generated insuf-
ficient revenue—had damaged the news industry’s economic vitality. “What I 
most fear about this obsession with volume is it underlies the persistent belief 
that if we will just grow sufficiently large audiences online, then eventually we 
will sell enough advertising to be sustainably profitable,” he told the group. He 
added, “There is more supply [of online ads] than there is demand. And the ex-
plosive growth of social media only ensures this imbalance of supply and demand 
will persist for a considerable period of time.”
Others at the Morning News noticed that traffic to the Web site had grown 
as print subscription rates rose. Why pay more for print, some readers seem to 
have reasoned, when you can get the same news free online? “We found when 
we raised the price of the paper, a lot of people migrated to dallasnews.com,” says 
Executive Editor Bob Mong.
The News launched an aggressive pricing scheme for its digital content in 
February 2011. People who don’t subscribe to the paper must pay $16.95 a 
month to get access to the Web, iPad and iPhone versions of the Morning News. 
Print subscribers already paying $33.95 a month get unlimited access to any 
digital edition.
It is a paywall, but not an absolute one. Stories that strike the editors as “com-
modity” journalism—such as breaking news, or weather and traffic updates that 
could easily be found elsewhere—are free to all. More proprietary or exclusive 
journalism requires a subscription. (Currently, about half of the stories on the 
site’s home page have open access.)
When Moroney announced the pay plan, he and his staff were predicting that 
page views would drop by 40 to 50 percent. “I’m not confident we’re going to 
succeed,” he told Nieman Journalism Lab. “But we’ve got to try something.”10 In 
an interview a few weeks before the paywall launched, he portrayed the strategy 
as a way to help return journalism to one of its former, and highly profitable, 
roles as a one-stop storehouse of local news. “At least for a period of time, you 
can restore the bundle,” he said.
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In late April 2011, six weeks after the pay plan launched, the News did see 
traffic declines—though less, so far, than Moroney had predicted. Unique visitors 
were down 17 percent, and page views declined 28 percent, compared to the 
same period in 2010. Mark Medici, director of audience development for the 
News, declined to disclose how many new digital subscribers had signed up, but 
did say that 27 percent of print subscribers had enrolled for digital access.
Traffic declines were also on the minds of Miami Herald executives when they 
debated whether to institute a pay plan.
The Herald did a survey on its site in October 2009 to determine users’ will-
ingness to pay for its content. It was a voluntary and thus unscientific poll; nev-
ertheless, the results didn’t inspire a great deal of confidence. Fifteen percent said 
they’d pay for unlimited access; an additional 23 percent said “maybe.” The dollar 
amounts weren’t meaningful, though; less than 5 percent said they would spend 
more than $10 a month.
Another survey question asked readers if they would make a “voluntary finan-
cial payment” to support the Herald’s site. Nearly a third said they were very or 
somewhat likely to do so, and so a few weeks later, the Herald’s site instituted a 
“tip jar,” attaching this plea to many pages on the site: “If you value The Miami 
Herald’s local news reporting and investigations, but prefer the convenience of 
the Internet, please consider a voluntary payment for the Web news that matters 
to you.” Says Armando Boniche, the Herald’s circulation director: “We got about 
$1,000 to $2,000 total. McClatchy [the Herald’s parent company] had us pull it 
after six weeks.”
Meanwhile, the Herald increased print subscription prices, though not to the 
extent that Dallas did, and stopped discounting the paper in Broward County, just 
north of its home market. And the Herald made a few smaller price-enhancing 
moves, such as charging 50 cents a week for an insert with TV listings and $1 
extra for the ad-filled Thanksgiving Day newspaper. (Still, old habits die hard. In 
January 2011, the Herald was offering six months of seven-day delivery for just 
77 cents a week—a whopping 83 percent discount from its stated price.)
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The Herald also did some paywall calculations, modifying formulas provided 
by the Newspaper Association of America. In 2009, when the study was pre-
pared, Miamiherald.com was attracting around 3.88 million unique visitors and 
25.2 million page views a month. Its advertising mix was typical of many news 
organizations of its size. The Herald’s own ad department sold 42 percent of the 
total space available on the site, at prices averaging slightly over $13 per 1,000 
views. An additional 36 percent of the available advertising space on the site was 
sold as “remnant”—very cheap—ads, under $1 CPMs. And 22 percent of the ad 
inventory on the site went unsold altogether.
The Herald first modeled what would happen if it imposed what Boniche calls 
a “10-foot wall” that would require a 99-cent monthly subscription for anyone 
to read anything on the site. The company predicted page views would fall by 
91 percent, and total revenue from the site would drop by 76 percent. In other 
words, new subscription revenue wouldn’t come close to compensating for the 
ad dollars that would vanish as the audience contracted.
Herald executives mapped out several scenarios in which they could insti-
tute a paywall and match the results they were getting with a free site whose 
income was entirely from advertising. But all of the ideas required substantial 
leaps of faith.
One scenario, charging just 99 cents a month for digital access, would require 
the Herald to attract 335,000 subscribers—about 30 percent more than the com-
bined daily print circulation of the English- and Spanish-language newspapers. 
Another option: The Herald could make do with only 50,000 digital subscribers, 
but it would have to charge them nearly $120 a year—almost as much as a Wall 
Street Journal online subscription. Or, the site could enroll 50,000 subscribers 
at a more reasonable price (99 cents a month), but the paper would have to get 
advertisers to pay an impossible six to ten times its current rates for online ads.
Given how remote any of those possibilities seemed, the Herald analysis sug-
gested that the most sensible approach to a paywall would be a hybrid model 
with 1 percent of users—about 38,000—paying $1.99 a month for unlimited ac-
cess, and nonsubscribers getting a great deal of access as well. That would preserve 
the site’s traffic and advertising. But the revenue boost from digital subscriptions 
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would be less than $1 million a year, and that sum, which represents less than 1 
percent of the company’s overall revenue, didn’t seem worth the investment in 
time, marketing and other costs.
* * *
One publisher whose digital subscription base has grown substantially is the 
Financial Times.
The FT started charging for access in 2001 and had a modest number of online 
subscribers for many years, getting to 126,000 online subscribers in 2009, slightly 
less than a third of its print subscription base.11 Subscriptions leapt to 207,000 
in 2010, or more than half the number of print subscribers. And digital access 
isn’t cheap—the FT charges $259 a year for a standard subscription and $389 for 
premium access to more content deep within the site.12
The growth is tied to a change in strategy. Nonsubscribers used to be able to 
come to FT.com and read 10 free stories without registering; after registering, 
they could get 30 more stories a month before the subscription requirement 
kicked in. (This is similar to the “metered” approach that was put into effect in 
2011 by the New York Times.) The FT toughened its policy in 2007 by prevent-
ing nonsubscribers from getting any stories without registration and limiting 
them to 10 stories a month before the paywall rises.
So, the wall has become less permeable. But Rob Grimshaw, managing director 
of FT.com, says there is a more fundamental change at work: Managers “used to 
approach it as newspaper marketing;” now they realize they “are direct Internet 
retailers.”
That means using behavioral targeting to determine which of the nearly 3 
million nonpaying, registered users are most likely to subscribe and directing ap-
peals to them. “What topics are people reading? We developed a dynamic model 
to determine readers’ propensity to subscribe”—one that is constantly shifting, 
with changes being made “on a daily basis,” Grimshaw says. “We’re spending the 
same amount on marketing as we used to, but we more than doubled our rate 
of acquisition.”
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The FT has also been aggressive about shutting down “leakage,” as Grimshaw 
puts it—that is, unauthorized copying of stories. And when it comes to offering 
free content, “we’re more controlled than WSJ.com,” which offers free access to 
most of its stories via Google News and many stories at no charge on its home 
page.
The FT’s approach is a testament to the possibilities of paid content, but it also 
demonstrates how hard it is even for a premium publisher to extract revenue 
from digital advertising. When the FT’s parent company, Pearson, reported results 
in early 2011, it noted that for the FT Group, 55 percent of its revenue comes 
from “content/subscriptions” while 45 percent comes from advertising.13 A de-
cade ago, the FT earned 74 percent of its revenue from ads, and only 26 percent 
from subscriptions.
“The outlook for the ad business online is quite bleak,” says Grimshaw. “There’s 
just not enough money there.” As a subscription site with a select audience, 
FT.com can charge higher rates for ads than general-interest sites. “We can create 
scarcity in a marketplace that has no scarcity,” he says. “In that light, subscriptions 
and ads are complementary.” But given that FT.com doesn’t use networks to fill 
up unsold ad space at discount prices, Grimshaw says “I’d be surprised if we sell 
50 percent” of the site’s inventory.
* * *
After years of internal debate, the New York Times has entered the realm of 
pay-for-access. If its audacious and complex plan succeeds, that will likely en-
courage many other publishers to follow suit.
This isn’t the first time the company has tried online subscriptions. In 2005, 
the Times launched its TimesSelect service, charging those who didn’t get the 
print edition $49 a year to access opinion pieces. After a fast start, with more than 
120,000 subscribers signing up in two months, the plan stalled, and the Times 
closed it down two years later; executives said the $10 million a year the service 
was generating wasn’t enough to compensate for the lost traffic and ad revenue.14
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So why would the Times take a new gamble to charge for digital access? Part 
of the answer lies in how dramatically the company’s revenue mix has changed 
in recent years.
In 2005, the New York Times Media Group, which is composed primarily of 
the Times’ paper and website, generated nearly $1.9 billion in ad and subscription 
revenue; about a third of that came from circulation. Five years later, ad revenue 
had dropped by nearly $500 million, while circulation revenue had increased 
because of aggressive price hikes for home delivery and newsstand sales. Today, 
circulation revenue for the group almost equals advertising revenue.
The Times’ website is tremendously popular, but digital ads have been growing 
unevenly and don’t come close to making up for the shortfall in print ad sales. 
Indeed, the site, with more than 30 million monthly unique users in the U.S., 
contributes less than 20 percent of the Times’ overall revenue.
New York Times Media Group revenue mix




















The New York Times Media Group includes the Times and the International Herald 
Tribune, print and digital, as well as a few smaller properties. Results are not broken 
out in more detail by the company. 
SOURCE: Based on the New York Times Co. 10-K filings
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So the Times devised a pay scheme that it hoped would be porous enough to 
allow occasional readers (around 85 percent of the total) to browse the site for 
free, but priced aggressively enough to generate significant revenue from its most 
devoted readers.15 It was a difficult plan to execute—requiring more than 14 
months, and reportedly costing tens of millions of dollars.16
When the Times introduced the plan in March 2011, many found it to be 
unnecessarily complex. Users are supposed to be limited to 20 stories a month 
before they hit the wall. But because there are so many exceptions depending 
on how one accesses the site—for example, via Google, Twitter or a blog—even 
some experts are befuddled by the plan. Staci Kramer, editor of paidcontent.org, 
which covers the digital media industry, wrote that “the logistics are far more 
complex than anything should be that doesn’t require a degree in quantum phys-
ics.”17 There are different rates for online, smartphone and tablet access, ranging 
from $195 to $455 a year for the full package. Consumers can’t get annual, or 
even monthly, subscriptions, because everything is priced in four-week incre-
ments. And the price led one commentator to headline his blog post, “The New 
York Times is Delusional.”18
The Times is unusual among big publishers in that it doesn’t require print sub-
scribers to pay anything to access its digital editions. Both WSJ.com and FT.com 
have long charged everyone for online access, on the theory that digital editions 
offer utility, archives and tools that the print edition can’t. The Times is offering 
its print readers a sweet deal: Weekend-only subscribers can pay as little as $327 
a year, and in the bargain get a digital package worth almost a third more. Times 
executives insist this isn’t an effort to prop up the company’s more lucrative 
legacy revenue. “We didn’t make this decision to bolster print,” Janet Robinson, 
the Times’ company CEO, said shortly after the pay plan debuted. “We made 
this decision to create a new revenue stream.”19 But given the way the offer is 
structured, it’s hard to argue that the two aren’t closely tied. The pricing—which 
is higher for tablets than for the Web—also reflects Apple’s decision to take a 30 
percent cut of subscriptions purchased through iTunes.
A few weeks after the Times instituted the pay plan, Robinson reported that 
more than 100,000 people had signed up for digital subscriptions.20 Most of 
those were enrolled for the introductory offer of 99 cents for the first four weeks, 
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according to a person close to the situation, so it isn’t clear how that will play 
out when those subscribers start getting billed up to $35 for every four weeks of 
unlimited access.
In the Times’ own story on its plan, a senior editor called the plan “essentially 
a bet that you can reconstitute to some degree the print economics online.”21 In 
fact, though, it is as much an effort to restore print economics to the print edi-
tion, by providing extra value to subscribers and giving them one less reason to 
forgo the lucrative newspaper for the digital edition.
* * *
And then there is the Newport Daily News, a 12,000-circulation newspaper 
in Rhode Island.
In 2009, the News decided that it was almost impossible to make money 
from digital ads. “The people we hired to sell advertising on the Internet just 
never did very well,” the paper’s then-publisher, Albert “Buck” Sherman, told 
Nieman Journalism Lab.22 So the News took an unusual step: Print subscrip-
tions were priced at $145 a year, print/online combos at $245 and online-only 
access would cost $345.
In other words, by forgoing the paper, a digital subscriber was on the hook for 
an additional $100. And Sherman wasn’t coy about the rationale: “Our goal was 
to get people back into the printed product.”
Some online-only content, such as videos and blogs, is outside the paywall; the 
same goes for columns like “Clergy Corner” and “Advice on Pets.” But anyone 
who wants access to the electronic edition, which reproduces the day’s paper, 
must pay. The company also operates a free site, newportri.com, designed to ap-
peal to tourists and others looking for recreational or entertainment information.
In early 2011, the News dropped the price for print and online to $157, or 
a dollar a month above the print-only fee. But online-only access remains at 
$345—a price that current publisher William Lucey III says, in an interview, “is 
more of a deterrent.” The amount was based on a scenario in which, “if everyone 
wanted only a digital product, this is what it would cost.”
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The paper’s site, newportdailynews.com, gets around 80,000 visitors a month. 
Especially with online ad rates “dropping 20 percent a year,” that’s not enough 
to sustain the operation, which includes a newsroom of 22 people, Lucey says. 
Indeed, online ad revenue accounts for only 2 to 3 percent of total advertising 
for the paper.
After the change was put into effect, “our single-copy sales went up about 300 
a day”—a bit less than 10 percent of overall single-copy sales. As the economy 
improves, “print is coming back. February [2011] was up 35 percent over last 
year” in ad sales.
And even with AOL’s free Patch site moving into town, Lucey says there are 
no regrets. “We found our comfort zone, and we stopped agonizing about it.” 
AOL, which launched the Patch site in Newport in July 2010, is sanguine: “The 
Newport Daily News does great work and has been a staple in Newport County 
for generations,” says spokeswoman Janine Iamunno. “There is room for all of us.”
* * *
So, which approach is best, free or paid?
Pay proponents often put it this way: High-quality journalism costs a great deal 
to produce, so users ought to pay to get it. Pay opponents have a counterargu-
ment: Paywalls cut sites off from “the conversation” online and will deprive them 
of the attention they need from blogs, aggregators and social media.
We prefer to frame it as a business issue—and in that respect, it’s possible that 
neither side has it exactly right. In fact, pay plans may have little immediate im-
pact on sites that are just getting into the business. The reason is that most com-
panies are likely to have only small streams of online circulation revenue, which 
could roughly match advertising declines from lower traffic. Digital subscriptions 
may pay off in the years to come, but only if media companies can persuade con-
sumers using new platforms—like smartphones and tablets—to adopt a pay plan.
Even before the Internet, subscription revenue didn’t amount to much for 
most news organizations. Print publications often underpriced subscriptions be-
cause they believed they could lose money on circulation and make it up on 
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advertising from larger audiences. Broadcast TV and radio were free, and fees 
for cable stations like CNN are buried in bills that make it impossible to discern 
the true costs of content. So in the old world, Americans weren’t used to paying 
much for news; in the digital world, news organizations have spent 15 years train-
ing their consumers to be freeloaders.
As a result, most people are happy to pay nothing at all for news, even as they 
have come to accept paying for other forms of digital content. A 2010 study of 
1,000 adults commissioned by AOL showed that about four in 10 people pay for 
“online content”—but that was a broad definition, including music and video. 23 
Only 4 percent said they pay for online news. A Pew Project for Excellence in 
Journalism survey in January 2010 found little interest in paying: Among “loyal 
news consumers, only a minority (19 percent ) said they would be willing to 
pay for news online, including those who already do so and those who would 
be willing to if asked.”24 Another Pew study in January 2011 showed 23 percent 
of respondents who say they would pay $5 a month to get full access to a local 
newspaper online; that dropped to 18 percent when asked if they would pay $10 
per month.25
Some say such surveys miss the point. Porous pay systems like the New York 
Times’ are being erected precisely so they will capture only the most devoted us-
ers. And a hypothetical question in a poll might not capture true sentiment. “Don’t 
survey based on what people say they would pay,” says Aaron Kushner, an investor 
who is mounting a bid to buy the Boston Globe from the New York Times Co. 
“No one expects to pay for news, so why would they answer differently?”
But even if pay schemes attract users, it’s hard to charge enough to produce a 
great deal of revenue. Kushner argues that most publishers are making the same 
mistake now that they made years ago. “The problem is they’re basing the price 
on cost or history rather than value. Forget pricing on cost,” he says. If anything, 
he says, digital editions should be more valuable because of their archives and 
interactivity. “Figure out what is the value of the product and then price against 
it. Publishers have been undervaluing their product for too long.”
There is, in some publishers’ pay plans, an aura of frustration over the inability 
to convert large online audiences into advertising revenue. Moroney, of Dallas, 
is simply being more candid than most when he notes that much of the News’ 
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online ad space goes unsold, and so a cut in traffic to the site will have little finan-
cial impact. Others, such as Albert Sherman of the Newport Daily News, frame a 
paywall as a way to protect the print edition, but at most papers, some circulation 
has already been lost because of free alternatives.
The best chance to make headway with pay schemes is likely with a device that 
people can hold in their hands. For most mobile phones and tablets, a commerce 
system is already in place, and the transaction is straightforward. Moreover, con-
sumers have shown a willingness to pay for content on mobile devices, whether 
that involves ringtones or sports videos. So, if publishers really hope to expunge 
the “original sin” of giving away content free online, they may be best positioned 
to do so not on the computers where they first gave away their wares, but on 
mobile devices that offer a more welcoming environment.
1  Stewart Brand, The Media Lab (Penguin, 1988), p. 202
2  John Lanchester, “Let Us Pay,” London Review of Books, Dec. 16, 2010. http://bit.ly/h8gIt8 
3  Bill Grueskin, “The Case for Charging to Read WSJ.com,” guest post on Reflections of a 
Newsosaur blog, March 22, 2009. http://bit.ly/f2UB3x 
4  Joel Meares, “Jim VandeHei talks Politico Pro,” Columbia Journalism Review, Nov. 16, 2010, 
http://bit.ly/fSmKZb; see also Jeremy W. Peters, “Politico, Seeing a Market Need, Adds a Paid 
News Service,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 2010. http://nyti.ms/hg1lPA 
5  “Now Pay Up,” The Economist, Aug. 27, 2009. http://econ.st/hJOUsM 
6  David Smith, “Papers in U.S. losing readers; Democrat-Gazette gains subscribers,”  
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April 27, 2010. http://bit.ly/fcoFs7 
7  Information provided by Miami Herald circulation department.
8  “Old and New Media Go to Washington,” from On the Media, NPR, May 8, 2009.  
http://bit.ly/hwsTyu 
9  Transcript of remarks at Carnegie Corporation, provided by James Moroney.
10  Justin Ellis, “Dallas Morning News publisher on paywall plans: ‘This is a big risk,’ ” Nieman 
Journalism Lab, Jan. 6, 2011. http://bit.ly/eg0dSH 
11  “Annual Report and Accounts 2009,” Pearson PLC. http://bit.ly/eO7Yfj 
12  FT’s pricing plan details. http://on.ft.com/gY98fv. The FT’s print circulation in 2011  
was 381,658.
13  “2010 Results Presentation,” Pearson, Feb. 28, 2011. Slide 36, http://bit.ly/gXmf9p 
The Story So Far: What We Know About the Business of Digital Journalism
82
14  Bill Grueskin, “NYTimes.com Pay Scheme has a Great Big Hole,” paidcontent.org,  
March 18, 2011. http://bit.ly/i5hyaZ 
15  The 85 percent figure comes from the Times’ own story: Jeremy W. Peters, “The Times  
Announces Digital Subscription Plan,” March 17, 2011. http://nyti.ms/hBJvt6
16  One estimate says the Times was spending $40 million to $50 million: Brett Pulley, “New  
York Times Fixes Paywall Flaws to Balance Free Versus Paid on the Web” Bloomberg.com,  
Jan. 28, 2011, http://bloom.bg/fyCwLV. Publisher Arthur Sulzberger has said that’s not  
accurate, and another journalist, Staci Kramer at paidcontent.org, put the price at $25 million: 
“New York Times Paywall Cost More Like $25 Million,” http://bit.ly/fE71o2. Meanwhile,  
a former design director for the Times’ site, Khoi Vinh, noted the opportunity cost for the 
Times in his post, “What the NYT Pay Wall Really Costs,” subtraction.com, March 18, 2011,  
http://bit.ly/eHb6F9 
17  Staci D. Kramer, “The NYT Pay Plan’s Most Dangerous Foe: Perception,” paidcontent.org, 
March 27, 2011. http://bit.ly/dO7WdI 
18  Michael DeGusta, “Digital Subscription Prices Visualized (aka The New York Times is  
Delusional),” theunderstatement.com, March 21, 2011. http://bit.ly/hXON9f 
19  Lauren Kirchner, “Don’t Call it a Paywall,” CJR, April 6, 2011. http://bit.ly/f72MEa 
20  Tiernan Ray, “NY Times Sags; 100K Paid Digital Subs, and No Loss to ‘Premium’  
Advertising,” Barrons, April 21,2011. http://bit.ly/fAHfjp 
21  Jonathan Landman, the Times’ former deputy managing editor for digital journalism, quoted in 
Jeremy W. Peters, “The Times’ Online Pay Model Was Years in the Making,” New York Times, 
March 20, 2011. http://nyti.ms/ediOZO 
22  Edward J. Delaney, “Charging (a lot!) for news online: The Newport Daily News’ new  
experiment with paid content,” Nieman Journalism Lab, June 8, 2009. http://bit.ly/gtV5Hn 
23  “The Consumer and Content: Benchmark Study,” AOL, September 2010. Slide 47 et al. 
http://bit.ly/fYAE1T
24  “Economic Attitudes,” State of the News Media 2010, Pew Research Center’s Project for 
Excellence in Journalism. http://bit.ly/eA5DrX 
25  “Survey: Mobile News & Paying Online,” State of the News Media 2011, Pew Research  
Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism. http://bit.ly/fsVAWf 
Columbia Journalism School | Tow Center for Digital Journalism
 Aggregation: ‘Shameless’ – and Essential 83
Chapter 6
Aggregation: ‘Shameless’ – and Essential
A group of middle school students at Brooklyn’s Urban Assembly Academy 
of Arts and Letters got a special treat one March afternoon in 2011. Just five 
weeks after the announcement of the $315 million deal in which AOL acquired 
Huffington Post, AOL’s chief executive, Tim Armstrong, and Arianna Huffington, 
HuffPost’s co-founder, came to the school to teach a class in journalism.
The lesson—or what one could see of it in the short, treacly video account 
that ran on the Huffington Post—may have told more about the future of the 
news business than what either Huffington or Armstrong intended.1 A few mo-
ments after the video begins, an official of the program that arranged the visit 
speaks to the camera: “We are delighted that Arianna Huffington and Tim Arm-
strong are going to be teaching a lesson on journalism.” What the video showed, 
though, wasn’t a lesson in how to cover a city council meeting, or how to write 
on deadline. Instead, the teacher in the classroom told her students, “We’re going 
to give you headlines that we pulled from newspapers all over the place, and you 
guys are going to place them and decide what type of news they are.”
This, then, was a lesson in aggregation—the technique that built Huffington’s 
site up to the point that AOL wanted to buy it.
In just six years, Huffington has built her site from an idea into a real competi-
tor—at least in the size of its audience—with the New York Times. The Huffing-
ton Post has mastered and fine-tuned not just aggregation, but also social media, 
comments from readers, and most of all, a sense of what its public wants. In the 
process, Huffington has helped media companies, new and old, understand the 
appeal of aggregation: its ability to give prominence to otherwise unheard voices 
and to bring together and serve intensely engaged audiences, as well its minimal 
costs compared to what’s incurred in the traditionally laborious task of gathering 
original content.
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HuffPost’s model has provoked sharp criticism from, among others, Bill Keller, 
executive editor of the New York Times, who, like Captain Renault in “Casa-
blanca,” appears shocked that aggregation is going on.2 “Too often it amounts 
to taking words written by other people, packaging them on your own website 
and harvesting revenue that might otherwise be directed to the originators of 
the material,” Keller wrote. “In Somalia this would be called piracy. In the me-
diasphere, it is a respected business model.” He wrote this even as the Times’ own 
site has demonstrated the power of aggregation in many ways, notably in a blog 
called The Lede, which has deftly captured the tempo and texture of such ongo-
ing stories as the protests in Iran and the upheaval in Egypt by blending Times 
reporting with wire reports and original material from outside sources.3
In fact, almost all online news sites practice some form of aggregation, by link-
ing to material that appears elsewhere, or acknowledging stories that were first 
reported in other outlets. An analysis of 199 leading news sites by the Pew Project 
for Excellence in Journalism found that most of them published some combina-
tion of original reporting, aggregation and commentary and that the mix differed 
considerably depending on the management strategy, the site’s history and—to 
be sure—its budget.
Pew categorized 47 of the sites it surveyed as aggregators/commentators and 
152 as primarily producers of original content. In the aggregator/commentary 
group, fourth-fifths of the sites were online-only; of the original-content group, 
four-fifths were connected to traditional media.4 Traffic is highly concentrated at 
the top of the list, with the top 10 sites accruing about 22 percent of total market 
share. Seven of the top 10 sites are “originators.”5
What is surprising is that consumers use these different kinds of sites quite 
similarly. Original-content sites do marginally better at keeping visitors for lon-
ger stretches and leading them to more Web pages, but it is hard to imagine that 
this slightly higher engagement is enough to help cover the costs of original 
production and reporting.
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Huffington often says that aggregation benefits original-content producers as 
much as it does the aggregators.6 The story of a recent blog post on New York 
Magazine’s site makes for a good illustration.
At about the time that Huffington and Armstrong were visiting the school 
in Brooklyn, Gabriel Sherman, a contributing editor to New York Magazine, 
was nailing down a scoop. Under the headline, “Going Rogue on Ailes Could 
Leave Palin on Thin Ice,” Sherman reported that Roger Ailes, the head of Fox 
News, had warned his paid commentator, former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, not to 
go forward with her video accusing the media of “blood libel” in the way they 
portrayed conservatives after the shooting of Arizona Rep. Gabrielle Giffords.7
The story required at least three days of reporting and editing work. The facts 
had to be bulletproof. The post went live on nymag.com’s Daily Intel column at 
7:57 p.m. on March 13.
The next morning, an editor for the Huffington Post spotted the item and wrote 
a rendition of it for that site, publishing at 8:27 a.m.8 Huffington Post played by 
the rules: It credited Sherman by name and gave nymag.com a link at both the 
beginning and the end of the item. What Huffington Post took from Sherman’s 
post—237 words, or about half the original length—would be justifiable under 
almost any definition of copyright.
The power of aggregation soon became clear: The original Sherman post 
drew nearly 53,000 readers on nymag.com, and about 17,500 of them came di-
rectly from the links on Huffington Post. Smaller numbers of readers came from 
Originators and aggregators
Primary Number of top Monthly visits Web pages Monthly time 
content type 199 news sites per person per person per person
    (min:sec) 
Originator 152 3.93 16.00 12:36
Aggregator/
Commentary 47 4.23 15.86 12:06
SOURCE: Based on Nielsen NetView data of top sites, September to November 2009; 
discussed in “The State of the News Media 2010,” Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism
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hotair.com, which is part of a network of conservative websites and publications; 
and from Andrew Sullivan’s popular blog, The Daily Dish. All told, three-fourths 
of the traffic to Sherman’s story came from other sites. The item also drew more 
than more than 130 reader comments on nymag.com, which is far higher than 
what the typical blog post gets.
The real winner, though, was Huffington Post. Its aggregated version of the 
item got more than 2,000 comments. Comments are not a perfect proxy for 
traffic, but it appears that the Huffington Post item got a much bigger audience 
for its post than the original New York Magazine item, for a fraction of the cost.
As this example shows, links from other sites or search engines are among the 
cheapest and most efficient ways to bring in new users. Even the largest news 
suppliers, such as Time.com or CNN.com, appreciate what top billing on You-
Tube9 or Google News can do to increase traffic and advertising revenue. “There 
are ways you can deliver better ad results, but you can’t do it if you focus on your 
own content only and not others,” Scout Analytics Vice President Matt Shanahan 
says. He adds that when sites promote each others’ content, they create more en-
gaged audiences through additional page views and commentary. “The advertiser 
wants the audience,” he says. “And the audience wants the audience.”
* * *
The power of aggregation 
Nymag.com Huffingtonpost.com
Original reporting Aggregated version
Date posted March 13, 2011 March 14, 2011
Time posted 7:57 pm 8:27 am
Word count 463 237
Comments 
(as of April 21, 2011) 138 2,095
SOURCE: Nymag.com, Huffingtonpost.com
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News organizations have always blended material from a variety of sources 
by combining editorial content from staff, news services, and freelancers; add-
ing advertising; and then distributing the package to consumers. In the digital 
world, news aggregation is not so different. It involves taking information from 
multiple sources and displaying it in a readable format in a single place.10 Digi-
tal aggregation businesses can be successful when they provide instant access 
to content from other sources, and they generate value by bringing content to 
consumers efficiently.
The cheapest way to aggregate news is through code and algorithms, with little 
or no human intervention. The way an individual story is displayed throughout 
the day is determined automatically, typically according to how recently the ar-
ticle was published and how popular it becomes. Aggregation is slower and more 
expensive when it becomes “curation,” involving humans in the filtering and 
display processes.
Google News belongs to the most basic aggregation category, called “feed” ag-
gregation, in which an algorithm sorts news by source, topic or story and displays 
the headline, a link and sometimes a few lines from the original story. The costs 
are low.
Yahoo News is an enhanced aggregation feed; it has always had some level of 
editorial management in the selection and placement of stories—though it posts 
up to 8,000 stories a day, so editorial involvement is fairly minimal. Like Google 
News, Yahoo News aggregates from across the Web, but it gives preference to the 
approximately 200 media companies from which it licenses content—such as the 
Associated Press, Reuters and ABC News. In return for the content, Yahoo News 
gives the partners a share of its ad revenue—in addition to sending them traffic.
Traffic to the news sections of Yahoo and Google is relatively small compared 
with the total traffic of these companies’ sites. For example, in one week in April 
2011, Yahoo News represented about 6.5 percent of the total traffic to all Yahoo 
sites as determined by the online audience measurement company Hitwise.11 But 
Google News and Yahoo News are the first stop of the day for significant num-
bers of users, and that is considered a good predictor of multiple visits and cus-
tomer loyalty. Yahoo and Google also let individual users customize their home 
pages by personal preferences—according to topic or news source. In the latest 
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refinements, Yahoo has introduced a recommendation engine for stories called 
LiveStand, while Google introduced “News for You,” which keeps track of what 
stories a user has clicked on and provides related content.12 Large media compa-
nies such as the New York Times and Washington Post and independent compa-
nies like Flipboard are doing much the same thing—developing programs that 
can recommend stories and videos based on a user’s previous choices. Because of 
the wide variety of topics and the enormous volume of stories posted, this is a far 
more difficult problem than creating the algorithms that Amazon or Netflix use 
for recommendations. Some companies are also working on adding friends’ and 
networks’ reading choices to the recommendation engine.13
On the other end of the spectrum, Huffington Post starts with algorithmic 
selections but puts them into the hands of human editors who set priorities for 
sections and then condense, rewrite or bring several organizations’ versions of the 
same story together. HuffPost turbocharges the formula with a mix of social me-
dia, dynamic packaging, and photos and charts. These techniques lead to praise, 
criticism—and parody. Comedy Central’s Stephen Colbert told viewers that, to 
retaliate for HuffPost’s republishing without permission the entire contents of his 
show’s website, he would create “The Colbuffington Repost,” that is, the entire 
Huffington Post, just renamed. Its re-re-packaged content would make him the 
owner of the “Russian nesting dolls of intellectual theft.”14
Newser.com, the aggregation site co-founded by Michael Wolff, represents 
much of what legacy media companies hate about the Web: It has little original 
reporting, and its stories are short rewrites of information from several other sites, 
with a design that emphasizes graphics. Wolff, a media critic who is now editor of 
Adweek, has spent much of his career playing provocateur—and driving people 
in the media business a little crazy. This effort is no different. Andrew Leonard, 
a writer for Salon, wrote a story called “If the Web doesn’t kill journalism, Mi-
chael Wolff will.” Leonard says that Newser displays a “truly precious degree of 
shamelessness. … Even the slide shows are repackaged, rewritten and abbreviated 
versions of content originated by other publications.”15
Newser says out loud in its slogan what many aggregation sites hope their us-
ers will infer: “Read Less, Know More.” Its co-founder and executive chairman, 
Patrick Spain, says the site aims to limit its stories to 120 words. “The most time-
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consuming part of editorial is identifying which stories we are going to carry,” 
he says. “And we have to identify the one, two, or three major sources to use to 
write the story.” Wolff asks, “If you are a consumer, why would you go to a single 
source?” The New York Times, he says, “used to be seen as a broad view of the 
news” but is now regarded as “parochial and limited.” Newser publishes about 60 
stories, or digests of stories, per day, though it has at times published as many as 
100. “Cost is less of a driver than the effect we are looking for,” says Spain. “If you 
have hundreds of articles, it is not an editorial function; it is a fire hose function.”
Newser has business offices in New York and Chicago, but its writers are free-
lancers. They live in the U.S., Europe and Asia, and generally work from home. 
There are four full-time and about 15 part-time staff members who perform 
editorial duties, working at rates of $20 to $40 per hour. Spain says “this is a 
gigantic edit staff compared to Digg” (a site where story placement depends on 
readers’ votes). “They have no editorial people. But this is tiny compared to the 
New York Times.”
For its other functions, Newser has eight full-time employees who work on 
marketing, administration and management, and technology. Its total operating 
costs are about $1.5 million per year, for a site with 2.5 million unique visitors 
a month.16 Spain and Wolff have both said that in 2011, they expect to break 
even—that is, to get to the point where advertising revenue is high enough to 
cover operating costs, though not to start paying back the initial investors.
Nymag.com does original reporting, as in the case of the Ailes/Palin story, but 
since 2007 it has also had a strategy of growing through four blogs that use third-
party content combined with original reporting: Grub Street (on food), Daily 
Intel (political and media news), Vulture (culture) and The Cut (fashion). “These 
niches need editorial authority to be successful,” said Michael Silberman, general 
manager of nymag.com. In a given week, the site publishes only about 35 articles 
from the print magazine but 450 to 500 blog posts and thousands of photos. As a 
result, only 14 percent of the site’s page views are of content from the magazine. 
“Every time we increase the frequency of the blog posts, we can drive up the 
numbers of audience,” Silberman says. And since 2007, nymag.com’s audience 
has grown from 3 million unique users to 9 million.
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The site has been particularly adept at going beyond its local roots. About 30 
percent of the print magazine’s audience comes from outside New York, but 70 
percent of the website’s readers live beyond the home market, which helps the 
site attract attracting national advertising. Its restaurant section, Grub Street, ex-
panded in 2009 and is now in six cities.
The evolution of nymag.com’s cultural news site, Vulture, from a small feature 
to a destination with 2.5 million unique users demonstrates how powerful ag-
gregation strategies can be. When it started in February 2010, Vulture was get-
ting 700 to 800 unique visitors daily. After its official launch in September 2010, 
Silberman found that it “filled an editorial hole in the marketplace.” One of its 
most popular features is “clickables”—a stream of 20 short posts per day, featur-
ing, among other things, viral videos and music albums leaked ahead of official 
release. Vulture now has 10 full-time editorial employees and get lots of support 
from New York Magazine back-office departments in finance, human resources 
and technology. The magazine has decided to spin off Vulture as its own site with 
a separate Web address sometime in 2011—a move that Silberman believes will 
help generate sales of entertainment and other national ads to companies that feel 
that a close tie to New York City can be an impediment.
* * *
There are few secrets on the Internet, and even fewer barriers to entry. Each 
innovation that works instantly attracts imitators and improvers. (LinkedIn, the 
professional networking site, launched LinkedIn Today in March 2011 to curate 
content not just by topic but also by what people in a user’s network or industry 
are reading.17) Because aggregation is so much cheaper than original content, 
it has an automatic economic advantage, but the attractiveness of aggregation 
brings more and more competitors into the field. So merely being an aggregator 
is hardly a guarantee of economic security.
A few publishers have successfully sued sites that steal their content outright. 
That has led others to toy with the idea of getting news sites to unite and deny 
aggregators access to their content. Even if that kind of cooperation were legal—
and it might not be—it would be impossible to sustain or enforce. There are just 
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too many sites producing original content. The economic benefits of aggregation 
and being aggregated are significant, even if they differ widely from one site to 
the next.
1  Video, “Arianna and AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Teach Journalism Class At Brooklyn Middle 
School,” Huffington Post, March 17, 2011. http://huff.to/i4ozzo
2  Bill Keller, “All the Aggregation That’s Fit to Aggregate,” New York Times, March 10, 2011. 
http://nyti.ms/htb7Xk
3  The Lede, New York Times. http://nyti.ms/hNf3xZ
4  The Project for Excellence in Journalism and the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 
“The State of the News Media: Nielsen Analysis.” http://bit.ly/fflY0M “In making these 
categories PEJ looked at the front page of each site and counted the links on the site. 
If two-thirds of the links on the site were original content, the site was labeled an originator. 
If two-thirds of the links were to outside content, the site was categorized as an aggregator. 
Commentary sites are those that do not have original content in terms of original reporting, 
but have content that is mostly commenting or discussing reporting done by others.”
5  Ibid.
6  One such example: Arianna Huffington, “Journalism 2009: Desperate Metaphors, 
Desperate Revenue Models, And The Desperate Need For Better Journalism,” Dec. 1, 2009. 
http://huff.to/fEyZp1
7  Gabriel Sherman, “Going Rogue on Ailes Could Leave Palin on Thin Ice,” nymag.com, 
March 13, 2011. http://bit.ly/hcqWRc
8  Jack Mirkinson, “Roger Ailes Told Palin Not To Make ‘Blood Libel’ Video: NY Mag,” 
Huffington Post, March 14, 2011. http://huff.to/ieYDh9
9  “Tube Mogul Online Video Best Practices,” December 2010. http://bit.ly/f426qV The average 
video featured on the YouTube home page gets 86,000 views per day.
10  Kimberly Isbell, “What’s the law around aggregating news online?” Nieman Journalism 
Lab, Sept. 8, 2010. http://bit.ly/hIXmUc The definition and distinctions among kinds of 
aggregation informed our discussion of these differences.
11  “Top 20 Websites and Engines,” Hitwise, April 16, 2011. http://bit.ly/frLcYt Hitwise is a 
company that measures online audiences using data aggregated from Internet service providers.
12  “About the updates to Google News,” Google News site. http://bit.ly/eh1tZI
13  Erick Schonfeld, “Exclusive: An Early Look At News.me, The New York Times’ Answer To 
The Daily,”TechCrunch, Feb. 1, 2011, http://tcrn.ch/fb2KRw; Russell Adams, “Paper Starts 
New Website; Washington Post’s Trove to Allow Readers to Build Custom Views of Online 
News,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 2011. http://on.wsj.com/gbktyg
The Story So Far: What We Know About the Business of Digital Journalism
92
14  Video, “The Huffington Post Posts About the Colbuffington Re-Post,” Colbertnation.com, 
Feb. 17, 2011. http://bit.ly/fyvimS
15  Andrew Leonard, “If the Web doesn’t kill journalism, Michael Wolff will,” Salon, April 5, 2010. 
http://bit.ly/gwfQXY The author also quotes other like-minded critics of Newser.
16  Traffic figures come from Omniture, which does census-based audience measurement for 
media companies
17  Press Release, “LinkedIn launches LinkedIn Today to deliver the news that matters most for 
professionals,” LinkedIn.com, March 10, 2011. http://bit.ly/dHICXe
Columbia Journalism School | Tow Center for Digital Journalism
 Dollars and Dimes: The New Cost of Doing Business 93
Chapter 7
Dollars and Dimes: The New Cost of Doing Business
Journalism is expensive and good journalism especially so, but the newsroom 
usually is not the costliest part of running a news organization. The Commerce 
Department has estimated that printing and delivery account for up to 40 per-
cent of a newspaper’s costs;1 a 2007 study found that the newsroom accounts for 
only about 15 percent of a newspaper’s expenses.2 (One publisher reports that 
“infrastructure” costs—everything other than editorial and marketing—typically 
make up two-thirds of a newspaper’s expenses.3) Still, editorial production has 
been a major expenditure, with newsroom costs running into the tens of millions 
of dollars even at mid-size news organizations, and far higher at major national 
news outlets. In 2008 the New York Times reported that its newsroom budget 
was more than $200 million per year.4
Such robust newsroom spending has been made possible, of course, by the 
information and advertising dominance that news media traditionally enjoyed. 
Outlets with 20 percent profit margins had the luxury of not having to think 
about the cost of each story produced. For decades, big-city newsrooms provided 
a wealth of resources to support top-tier reporting: newswires, clipping services, 
transcription services, research and library staff, and so on. A major investigative 
series might take months to prepare and cost tens of thousands of dollars, or even 
much more. (A New York Times editor estimated that the paper’s collaboration 
with ProPublica on euthanasia in New Orleans hospitals after Hurricane Katrina 
cost $400,000; he later clarified that’s what it would have cost if the Times had 
undertaken it alone.5) Even in a bare-bones newsroom, serious accountability 
journalism is not cheap, as the new generation of foundation-supported, online-
only newsrooms can attest.
Consider CT Mirror, a nonprofit, online-only newsroom founded in 2010 to 
cover politics and government in Connecticut. It is hard to imagine a more sober 
outlet: CT Mirror focuses squarely on news about such topics as education, the 
economy, human services and the budget, with almost no human interest stories 
or even crime reporting. It is also hard to imagine a lower-cost outlet for serious 
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reporting. CT Mirror is based in a modest Hartford office, and most of the seven-
person editorial staff works from home or on the road. The site has no printing 
or delivery costs, and it has minimal sales or marketing expenses, and a simple, 
straightforward website; fully 75 percent of its foundation-provided budget goes 
to editorial salaries. “There’s no room for fat,” says founder and editor Jim Cutie.
Because CT Mirror is foundation-backed, it makes no secret of its budget. 
In its first 15 months of operation, the newsroom ran on $1.1 million in con-
tributions and produced about 2,400 news stories, for an average cost per story 
of around $450. Similarly, the Gotham Gazette, a foundation-funded, nonprofit 
politics-and-policy news site based in New York City, has four employees and a 
$350,000 annual budget. It produces between four and eight original stories per 
week, for a per-story cost of more than $1,000.
Of course, not every item in a general-interest newspaper requires the same 
level of investment. One print daily, in a mid-size market with a relatively low 
cost of living, recently did an analysis to determine how much various articles 
cost. The newspaper, which shared its numbers on the condition it not be identi-
fied, found that the salary cost of reporting and writing stories ran from $190 
to $430. The most expensive stories came from the opinion section, and the 
cheapest came from features. (The average cost per staff-written story was $227; 
articles by stringers cost $85.) Those figures don’t include editing, production or 
distribution costs, which could easily triple the cost.
Meanwhile grass-roots local news sites such as Baristanet, in suburban New 
Jersey, and The Batavian, in upstate New York, operate on shoestring budgets. 
They keep costs at just thousands of dollars per month with tiny reporting staffs 
and almost no infrastructure. (See Chapter 3.) To replicate their cost structure 
would be difficult for a hard-news site like CT Mirror and all but inconceiv-
able for a traditional, bricks-and-mortar newsroom working online as well as in 
broadcast or print.
This points to a central paradox of the online news economy: In an environ-
ment of sharply constrained ad revenue, the media’s traditional economies of 
scale break down. What look like powerful editorial and business assets for online 
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journalism—like established brands and well-staffed newsrooms—are turning 
out to be liabilities, because they are accompanied by a severe reduction in pric-
ing power for circulation and advertising. The pressure on costs is intense.
One local TV station, interviewed for this report on the condition it not be 
identified, illustrates this paradox well. The station is a successful local broadcaster 
operating in one of the top four U.S. television markets. It has a 150-person news 
staff and is a leading source of local news in its market. For several years it has also 
operated a website, run by three dedicated producers who do original reporting 
as well as post stories and video drawn from newscasts.
On paper, the site has the assets to be a top online outlet for news about its city. 
It can draw on its sizable reporting resources and the promotional power of the 
station’s broadcast operation. And it has free access to a large supply of valuable 
“rich media” assets in the video and audio segments produced by its parent.
The station has built a large online audience over the last several years, growing 
from a monthly average of 550,000 unique visitors in 2008 to about 2.5 million 
at the end of 2010. Still, the station’s general manager has struggled to make the 
site break even. He shaved expenses substantially by outsourcing software and 
site maintenance and by cutting back on reporting from the field; not counting 
salaries, the site now costs roughly $500,000 per year to run. He has also tried a 
number of different sales strategies, including revenue-sharing partnerships and 
small, dedicated sites—“microsites”—custom-built for particular advertisers. Still, 
the site accounts for just 1 percent of the station’s overall revenue. “Forget local 
being the holy grail,” he says. “National sites are making money, but we don’t 
have the scale locally to do so.”
The cost pressure can be even more severe for local newspapers following their 
audiences to the Internet. A newspaper has enviable assets for putting news on 
the Internet—because it produces so much news text every day—and in theory 
it can also achieve enormous savings as it makes the switch to digital distribution, 
which does not require ink, paper and delivery trucks.
John Paton, chief executive officer of the Journal-Register Company, based in 
Yardley, Pa., has made reducing legacy costs the centerpiece of what he calls a 
“Digital First” strategy. The company, which came out of bankruptcy in 2009, 
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owns 18 local dailies and scores of other “multi-platform products” across the 
Northeast and upper Midwest. Since becoming CEO in 2010, Paton has reduced 
expenses by consolidating printing facilities and outsourcing a wide range of 
noneditorial functions, from delivery to advertising design. He promises to have 
reduced infrastructure costs by 50 percent in three years.
Another prong of “Digital First” is to wean the publisher from its dependence 
on print advertising revenue, which Paton calls the “crack cocaine” of the busi-
ness. He predicts that by the end of 2011, more than 15 percent of ad revenue 
will come from the digital side and that most of that will be purely online rev-
enue—not ads sold in print-online package deals.
Paton has been a popular figure on the future-of-journalism circuit, appear-
ing frequently at industry conferences to extol his company’s digital gains. He 
frequently cites growth percentages for the Journal-Register site—for instance, 
he says the company’s “digital audience” grew 75 percent in 2010, reaching 8.8 
million unique visitors in March 2011. He also recently announced bonuses for 
employees and declared the company had made a $41 million annual profit.6 It 
isn’t clear, however, how that profit figure is calculated, because the company 
does not provide data on revenue, costs or other metrics as a publicly traded firm 
would. Paton says his investors don’t want to disclose too much.
But Paton does acknowledge that moving revenue online amounts to “trad-
ing dollars for dimes”—or perhaps, if he’s successful, quarters. The gamble is 
that the Journal-Register Co. will be able to cut costs and increase its online 
audience quickly enough to compensate for the lower revenue that online 
advertising brings.
The notion of “trading dollars for dimes” captures the impact of digital distri-
bution on the economics of the business. Newspapers, magazines and broadcast-
ing are all characterized by high fixed and low variable costs; it’s quite expensive 
to produce the first copy of a newspaper, but it’s far cheaper to produce the 
second copy—or the millionth. A local broadcaster faces much the same set of 
costs whether it reaches 100 viewers or 100,000. Hence the traditional media’s 
profound economies of scale. News outlets that could not build a large enough 
base of readers or viewers to cover their steep fixed costs have tended to collapse 
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in a few years, mired in debt. But those that surpassed that break-even point and 
went on to establish a mass audience could become immensely profitable—and 
those steep fixed costs created a natural barrier to competition.
Online, the equation changes dramatically. Observers sometimes underestimate 
the expense involved in running a high-quality, high-traffic online publication. 
But the barriers to entry are radically lower than in print or in broadcast. While 
a number of aspects of the online ad market have favored advertisers over pub-
lishers, simple audience fragmentation goes a long way toward explaining why 
news outlets have seen their revenue squeezed so tightly. Today, someone want-
ing political news or movie reviews has dozens of alternatives to choose from or 
stumble across.
Thus both revenue and costs are lower online. To be more precise, the cost 
curve has been stretched out. The steep initial investment required to launch 
a media business is gone, and that has opened up opportunities for low-cost 
local or topical sites that aim to build an audience in the thousands or tens of 
A new curve for media costs online
On the Internet, the steep initial investment to launch a media business can 
be much smaller —  but so are the profits (shaded areas) that come with 
increasing scale. An opportunity exists for small news sites with minimal 
costs; large newsrooms need to assemble far wider audiences than they 
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thousands. This is the niche occupied by many moderately successful blogs as 
well as community sites like Baristanet, with modest ad income and even more 
modest expenses.
At the other extreme one finds large-scale media properties that have substan-
tial technology or editorial costs but that amass enough sheer traffic to turn a 
profit. The dominant example here is Google, whose 175 million monthly users 
in the U.S.—generating billions of page views per month—allow it to capture 
more than 40 percent of the entire U.S. online advertising market.7 Even consid-
ering only “display advertising” (that is, excluding search ads), Google accounts 
for 13 percent of ad spending. Yahoo and Facebook, the display ad leaders, each 
claim an additional fifth of the market.
However, most legacy news producers operate in the large and difficult middle 
of the cost curve, with traffic too low to compensate for the fixed expenses 
of news production, despite the savings that come from publishing online. In 
2010, total operating expenses at the New York Times Co. ran to $2.1 billion, 
about two-thirds of the $2.9 billion total for Yahoo Inc.8 Of course, somewhere 
between a third and a half of the newspaper’s expenses would disappear if it no 
longer printed a paper edition. But Yahoo has many times more monthly visi-
tors (roughly five times as many, if one counts traffic only to nytimes.com.). And 
while monthly visitors to all Times properties generate fewer than 2 billion page 
views, Yahoo serves out a staggering 100 billion pages each month.9
Justin Smith, president of Atlantic Media Co., argues that these dynamics ex-
plain both the opportunities the Internet affords and the stark challenge it has 
posed to established news providers. “There is a whole wave of new journalism 
models that have been developed at a fraction of the cost of traditional media,” 
he says. “Traditional media players are way too set in their ways for reducing cost. 
They can’t sustain the revenue to support their costs.”
That is not to say, however, that any online venture that falls between a small 
community blog and Google is doomed to fail. In addition to running the At-
lantic, Smith is a founder of Breaking Media, a collection of sites aimed at spe-
cific—and affluent—professional communities. Its properties cover law (Above 
the Law), Wall Street (Dealbreaker), fashion (Fashionista), green transportation 
(AltTransport) and accounting (Going Concern). Above the Law is the most 
Columbia Journalism School | Tow Center for Digital Journalism
 Dollars and Dimes: The New Cost of Doing Business 99
successful of these sites, with a monthly audience of more than 700,000 unique 
visitors. Smith won’t say when the company might turn a profit, but his formula 
depends on pulling together sizable audiences at minimal cost—each site has just 
two journalists, with ad sales and administration centralized.
Henry Blodget’s Business Insider site is pursuing a similar strategy, on a much 
larger scale. Blodget has disclosed financial details about his media company, re-
produced below, in what was an unusual move for a private firm.10 “We’re a pri-
vate company, and we’ve never disclosed any of that stuff, either. But I’m honestly 
not sure why,” he explained on March 7, 2011. “So we’re going to try an experi-
ment. We’re going to disclose that stuff. Then we’re going to see if something 
horrible happens to us.”
The statistics tell an interesting story. With 45 full-time employees, including 
25 in the editorial department, Business Insider is hardly a grass-roots effort. In 
2010 it cost almost $5 million to run. But unlike many sites of similar size, Busi-
ness Insider managed to turn a tiny profit in 2010—about $2,127, or as Blodget 
put it, about enough to buy a MacBook Pro.
One factor accounting for Business Insider’s survival is that the site targets 
investors and financial professionals rather than a general-interest audience. But 
that also means it must fight for readers and advertisers with the rest of the finan-
cial press, including giants like Bloomberg and Reuters and lower-cost sites like 
paidcontent.org and Breaking Media’s.
Business Insider’s intimate financials
Feb Dec Dec Dec
2011 2010 2009 2008
  Site traffic (in 1000s)
Estimated 
monthly uniques 7,800 6,000 2,600 2,000
  Financials ($, 1000s)
Gross revenue 4,800 2,000 700
Expenses 4,798 2,375 1,300
Operating income (loss) 2 (375) (600)
SOURCE: Business Insider, March 7, 2011, and Henry Blodget
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The biggest difference between Business Insider and a similar site that doesn’t 
break even is traffic: Blodget’s venture managed to pull in 6 million unique visi-
tors a month by the end of 2010, about double its audience of a year earlier. By 
March 2011, Business Insider had almost 8 million visitors, which represents a 30 
percent jump in just three months. If the site becomes truly profitable, it will be 
by virtue of having continued that growth—getting to an audience of 15 million 
to 20 million visitors each month while keeping expenses flat.
The example of Business Insider suggests a provocative comparison with the 
old-media world. In the newspaper industry, a rule of thumb has been that every 
1,000 additional readers justifies an additional newsroom employee. Going by 
Blodget’s numbers, the comparable figure in online news media is closer to one 
person on the editorial staff per 150,000 readers.
As far as costs are concerned, then, the real advantage of digital-only opera-
tions, from The Batavian to Business Insider, is that they don’t have to “trade 
dollars for dimes”—they are natives of the dime economy. By contrast, legacy 
news outlets must navigate a tricky cost transition when they go digital, cutting 
expenses and boosting online revenue while minimizing the damage to the tra-
ditional advertising that still sustains them.
This process begins by learning how to get the most out of their newsrooms 
in each medium. At the Atlantic, Justin Smith says, cost efficiencies depend on 
employees working across the digital/print divide. “There are very few employ-
ees who don’t do both print and digital work,” he says. “Maybe a couple of fact-
checkers and one senior editor who concentrate on long pieces. We have about 
60 people in editorial, and 99 percent of them are completely integrated.” In 
advertising sales, all salespeople sell print and digital.
The Atlantic got a lot of attention in 2010 for having become profitable (“a 
tidy profit of $1.8 million”11) for the first time in decades. But the numbers dis-
closed were for the company as a whole, including print, digital and events. Still, 
Smith insists that the company’s move to profitability depended on containing 
costs on the print side. “We were brutal about shifting resources away from print,” 
he says. The company made layoffs in both the editorial and ad sales departments.
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Does this mean the Atlantic makes money online? The company reported that 
digital advertising revenue rose 70 percent, and print advertising revenue 27 per-
cent.12 “The digital version of the Atlantic is definitely profitable,” Smith says. 
“And it is a source of growing profit.” Smith says this is the case even as the 
company continues to increase staff and resources on the digital side. The New 
York Times’ report on the Atlantic had the magazine’s overall revenue doubling, 
to $32.2 million in 2010, with advertising revenue accounting for about half of 
that. Digital ads supplied 40 percent of ad revenue.
For a large metro newspaper, the calculus of cost-cutting is tougher. Even in 
the face of declining readership and ad revenue, executives often fear that major 
cuts will only accelerate their slide in circulation.
Detroit is an exception. Newspaper executives there met early in 2008 to 
consider their options, none of which was very attractive. The Detroit area was 
on its way to a dead-last rating in a survey of 363 cities’ job growth for the first 
decade of the 21st Century.13 While most U.S. cities had one newspaper, Detroit 
had two—the Free Press and the News—bound in a joint operating agreement 
and dividing diminished circulation and ad revenue. (The agreement means that 
the two newsrooms compete, but their partnership handles both papers’ ads, cir-
culation and printing. The Free Press is owned by Gannett and the News by Me-
diaNews Group; as part of a revised agreement, Gannett must pay MediaNews 
around $45 million over a 20-year period, according to Crain’s.14)
Then-publisher Dave Hunke assembled his team, and they kicked around ideas 
on how to cut costs. The ideas ranged from publishing a pocket-sized newspaper, 
to arming 200 citizen journalists with cameras, to a “dinner in a bag” promotion 
that would give special consideration to readers when they pick up meals at a 
local grocery store. The newspaper executives also considered deep reductions in 
staff or space devoted to news.
In the end, they came up with a radical idea: eliminating home delivery of 
both papers on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Saturday. The reasoning was 
that those four days were responsible for only 23 percent of the papers’ print ad 
revenue. The cutbacks went into effect in March 2009.
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The four non-home-delivery days are now responsible for only 7 percent of 
the papers’ print ad revenue. Those days’ papers are smaller and are still sold as 
single copies in the city; several thousand are picked up by independent contrac-
tors who deliver them to houses, generally in Detroit’s wealthier suburbs. The 
papers also have a same-day edition available by U.S. mail that reaches about 
4,000 subscribers.
In October 2009, the dailies doubled their newsstand weekday price from 50 
cents to $1. The cost of home delivery for Thursday, Friday and Sunday is now 
$13 a month, slightly less than what subscribers used to pay for seven days a week.
As part of the change, the companies launched an electronic edition for sub-
scribers—basically a replica of that day’s papers, available online. It loads slowly, 
though that has been improved since the early going. Access to the papers’ web-
sites remains free.
As a cost-cutting measure, executives say the move to three-days-a-week home 
delivery met their goals and helped stabilize their journalistic efforts. The com-
pany says the delivery change enabled it to trim its overall costs by 15 percent. 
“It ensured our survival,” says Paul Anger, editor and publisher of the Free Press. 
Joyce Jenereaux, executive vice president of the Detroit Media Partnership, adds, 
“If we hadn’t done it, we’d be putting out horrible products.” But the bleeding 
hasn’t entirely stopped. In November 2010, unions representing 900 employees 
got to look at internal financial data for the papers; after doing so, they agreed 
to pay cuts, a two-year wage freeze and increased health insurance payments.15
One thing that isn’t clear is whether the Detroit strategy was successful in 
getting readers to move from print to digital platforms. As executives expected, 
circulation of the Detroit papers declined. In the months before the delivery 
change, the papers’ combined weekday circulation was 436,238; in early 2011, 
that circulation was 230,876. Neither of those figures includes the e-edition, 
which has weekly traffic of more than 100,000. But the weekly e-edition num-
ber doesn’t represent that many individual readers; someone who logs on five 
days in a row would be counted five times. Daily figures show that about 20,000 
people visit the e-edition on each of the four days the paper isn’t delivered, and 
that a third that many use it on days when the paper is delivered.16 Engagement is 
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substantial, as e-edition users spend about 18 minutes per visit. But the e-edition 
doesn’t reach nearly as many people as used to get home delivery on the days 
that have been eliminated.
As for the papers’ websites, they had significant growth in 2008—a year before 
the change in home delivery. That was a big news year which included the collapse 
of the auto industry, the historic Obama election and a scandal involving Mayor 
Kwame Kilpatrick’s affair with his chief of staff. (The Free Press won a Pulitzer 
Prize for its coverage of the mayor’s woes.) The papers grew 31 percent in unique 
users. After the cuts in home delivery, the number of users on the sites continued to 
grow, but more slowly: by 6 percent in 2009 and 10 percent in 2010.
Similarly, the year of big increases in time spent per visit on the Web was 2008, 
when it went from about 8 minutes to more than 13 minutes. Why? One reason, 
executives say, is that 2008 was the year that reader commenting was enabled on 
the site. “There was not a discernible bump when we made the model [delivery] 
change,” says Patricia Kelly, senior vice president at Detroit Media Partnership. 
Kelly also notes that digital ad revenue is up 65 percent since 2005. Print adver-
tising, meanwhile, is down 50 percent in the same period. As a result, digital is 
expected to represent an estimated 19 percent of total ad revenue in 2011.
The changes in the delivery model have affected the culture of the newsrooms 
to some extent. The papers’ news staffs are designed to operate daily, just as be-
fore, without paying much attention to whether they are publishing in print or 
online on a particular day. Anger says, “It’s everyone’s responsibility to be invested 
in digital publication.” But, says another editor, “There’s still a feeling that, if you 
want people to see something, you’re going to shoot for Thursday, Friday or 
Sunday. … We haven’t divorced ourselves from the idea that the big story should 
run on a day we publish a paper.”
The deep cost-cutting measures by Detroit’s dailies illustrate the challenge 
legacy news providers face as they adapt to the economics of online media. The 
strategy worked as a survival mechanism in a tough market; the damage from 
cutting home delivery was checked by the fact that print revenue is falling so 
quickly anyway. But it hasn’t transformed a great number of print readers into 
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new digital users. The sites’ main growth occurred before the delivery change, 
and appears to have been fueled by big, well-covered stories, and improved func-
tionality that got readers more involved.
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Chapter 8
New Users, New Revenue: Alternative Ways to Make Money
“The basic point about the Web is that it is not an advertising medium, the 
Web is not a selling medium, it is a buying medium. It is user-controlled.”
—Jakob Nielsen, Web usability expert, 19981
The journalism business these days often seems like a strange new world. 
As Jack Sweeney, who has been the publisher of the Houston Chronicle since 
2000, puts it, “I thought I knew this business, and I did. But this business-model 
blowup is totally different.” Sweeney has had a long career with newspaper ad-
vertising departments in Washington, D.C., Trenton, N.J., and Boston,2 and he 
could have been talking about a number of the efforts news organizations are 
making to grow—like a Utah TV station’s classified-ad service that has turned 
into a community resource, or a national media company selling ads that never 
appear on its own sites, or his own initiative as a service provider to small busi-
nesses. The tactics differ, but they share a common strategy: News companies 
are developing new businesses, not just propping up the old ones. And in doing 
so, they are challenging some of the orthodoxies that had slowed their transi-
tion to the digital world.
For most of these companies, the revenue from such new initiatives is modest; 
it doesn’t begin to replace the dollars lost in the traditional business. But there 
are encouraging signs. The process of finding new readers and dollars is forcing 
media companies to redefine who they are and what business they are really in.
* * *
Sweeney makes his point with a spreadsheet that shows how much some of 
Houston’s biggest retailers spent in 2010 on ads in the Chronicle. The num-
bers aren’t what they used to be, and he knows they’re not coming back. Even 
though the Chronicle remains the country’s 10th-largest newspaper, its circula-
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tion dropped by more than 10 percent in 2010 over the year before, to 343,952. 
A decade ago, it was nearly 550,000.3 Moreover, online display advertising, which 
was just under $28 million in 2010, won’t make up the difference on its own, as 
it represents 12 percent of total ad revenue.
So the Chronicle, with guidance from its owner, Hearst Corporation, is look-
ing to a sector often ignored by big media—the small fry. “We didn’t used to go 
after mom-and-pop businesses,” Sweeney says. “Houston has 310,000 businesses 
with 10 employees or less. The potential is huge. As department stores have con-
solidated, we needed something new.”
What makes the Chronicle’s approach interesting is that it isn’t based on sell-
ing ads that appear on the pages of the site or in the newspaper. Instead, the 
Chronicle is launching a consulting business—selling a host of Internet services, 
from website design to improving businesses’ rankings on search engines. And 
when the Chronicle does sell ads as part of this outreach, those are just as likely 
to appear on Yahoo or Facebook as on chron.com.
To get started, Sweeney hired about 30 employees, some of whom who knew 
the world of small businesses from having worked at Yellow Pages. The Chronicle 
also retrained some of its own staff. The sales pitch it makes to businesses is this: 
The Chronicle evaluates their websites, improves their rankings on search-results 
pages and helps them write press releases that are posted on the chron.com site 
to give traffic a boost.
The Chronicle charges $500 and up a month for the service, asking its clients 
to sign one-year contracts. As of April 2011, the fourth month of the program, it 
had enrolled nearly 500 businesses and booked more than $2.5 million in con-
tracts. Sweeney’s goal is to reach around $7 million in annual revenue.
Others are also in this business. One firm, ReachLocal Inc., signed up nearly 
17,000 advertisers, booking nearly $300 million in revenue in 2010.4 McClatchy 
has partnered with Webvisible, a California-based Web services firm that says it 
has more than 10,000 clients.
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But even if the effort is as successful as the Chronicle hopes, Sweeney figures it 
would do no more than match the current revenue from one of the paper’s big-
gest advertisers. In other words, it will be a big help but is not, in itself, a replace-
ment for the old business model. “This has become a nickel-and-dime business,” 
he says. “And you need a lot of nickels and dimes.”
* * *
A decade ago, KSL, a local TV station in Salt Lake City, came up with what 
was then a novel idea: It would start its own classified-ads section on KSL.com 
and end its relationship with a company that was already providing that service 
for the site.
“We were making like $300,000 a year [in revenue] on the partnership, which 
back then was a lot of money online,” says Clark Gilbert, president and chief 
executive officer of Deseret Digital Media. But the station, an NBC affiliate, saw 
the change as a way to build traffic to the site. Its classifieds service would also be 
a way to showcase the moral standards of its owner, the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints. Deseret Digital Media runs the online properties for the 
church’s TV station and its newspaper, the Deseret News, along with sites more 
obviously of the church, MormonTimes.com and DeseretBook.com.
Today, KSL.com is a powerhouse on the Web. The site has more than 4 million 
unique users and generates an astounding 250 million page views a month, says 
Gilbert. (KSL’s sister property, the Deseret News, has a more typical audience of 
about 2.5 million unique users and 30 million page views; the website of a com-
peting newspaper, the Salt Lake Tribune, has roughly the same size audience.) In 
a recent study of Web traffic data in major markets, a company called Internet 
Broadcasting found that KSL.com reaches 48.8 percent of its local market. That 
is more than any local media outlet in the survey but one, the Minneapolis Star 
Tribune’s site. And it is far beyond the Web footprint of the top local TV stations, 
which average under 20 percent market share.5
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Still, all that traffic didn’t keep Deseret Digital Media from announcing lay-
offs last year at the Deseret News6 that, despite the sunny headline that an-
nounced the news (“Deseret News set to lead, innovate”), resulted in a cutback 
of 43 percent of the newspaper’s workforce and consolidation of some news-
gathering operations with KSL-TV.7 (The Salt Lake Tribune announced the 
layoffs with some competitive schadenfreude: “Tribune to press ahead in face 
of News changes.”8)
KSL.com’s strategy relies partly on its worldwide audience of church members, 
but it also offers useful lessons for news organizations seeking untraditional ways 
to build a digital audience.
The classifieds themselves are mostly free, though advertisers can pay up to $10 
a day to get prominent placement. The classifieds pages also host other ads, and 
more importantly, they are responsible for about 70 percent of KSL.com’s total 
traffic, so they provide tremendous benefits to the rest of the site. The pages carry 
prominent links to news stories and videos on KSL.com, which helps to gener-
ate 70 million to 80 million page views a month for content that isn’t classified 
ads. “The main route to the site is still the news page,” Gilbert said. “We haven’t 
tried to make ‘KSL.com/classifieds’ our bookmark. That made the [KSL] news 
site bigger than any other news site in the market.”
Gilbert adds that there is another benefit: “Here’s something hard for old-me-
dia people to accept. … Our news content gave a level of trust to the classifieds, 
and classifieds drove relevance back to the news.” Or, put another way, the fact 
that readers have come to rely on the classifieds under the KSL brand helped to 
build relevance and credibility in the news as well.
KSL.com had some important advantages. First, it started early, shortly before 
Craigslist came to Salt Lake City. And because it was a TV station’s website, it 
wasn’t perceived as competitive by its existing staff; there was no classified-ads 
manager to complain about giving away a lucrative revenue stream. “KSL didn’t 
have legacy products that were competing with this service,” says Chris Lee, 
general manager of DeseretNews.com. “If they wanted to do cars, there wasn’t 
someone saying, ‘But we’re already doing cars!’”
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The site also demonstrated a keen sense of its audience—which shouldn’t be 
a surprise, given the church ownership. Managers tried to be especially vigilant 
about keeping the site clean (“no way were we going to allow prostitute or mas-
sage ads,” Gilbert says) and detecting fraud.
KSL.com also committed to “letting our users develop the product with us,” 
Gilbert said. For instance, in the spring of 2011, KSL.com asked its readers what 
kinds of firearms they thought the site should allow to be sold. It also asked them, 
“How often do you believe people are using the KSL Classifieds Firearms and 
Hunting section to circumvent firearm laws?”9 Users help police the site for bad 
actors. Anonymity isn’t allowed: “Sellers had to have an identity,” Gilbert said.
The classifieds give KSL.com an unusually high level of engagement. Accord-
ing to Mike Petroff, vice president of new media sales, the site gets around 10 
million page views from 250,000 users on an average weekday, for a stunning 
daily rate of 40 page views per visitor. (The ads don’t appear on the newspaper’s 
site; the Deseret News shares business, but not newsgathering, operations with 
the Salt Lake Tribune, owned by MediaNews Group.)
Most ads expire after 30 days. Even with such a short lifespan, there were more 
than 206,000 listings on a typical day in March 2011, in categories ranging from 
goats to muzzleloaders, from paintball equipment to bands seeking members.
Gilbert came to Salt Lake City in late 2009 after a career that included a pro-
fessorship at Harvard Business School, where he worked closely with Clayton 
Christensen, author of “The Innovator’s Dilemma,” a well-known book about 
disruptive change.10 The two of them collaborated on the “Newspaper Next” 
project, a 2006 study sponsored by the American Press Institute to encourage 
innovation.11 Gilbert was hired by Deseret Management Corp.’s president and 
chief executive officer, Mark Willes, who had a troubled reign as CEO of Times 
Mirror (1995-2000) and publisher of the Los Angeles Times (1997-1999).12
One of Gilbert’s main goals was reflective of a tenet of Christensen’s phi-
losophy: “Business units don’t evolve; corporations do.”13 So Gilbert separated 
the digital sales force to enable it to take more risks. He said that KSL.com had 
been “run through the mainline channel—the TV. The [ad] sellers would have 
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an afterthought to also sell Web. They’d throw it in if you also bought TV.” The 
new company “created a profit-sharing relationship with the legacy organization. 
They’d benefit from our growth—but they didn’t control it.”
KSL.com’s revenue grew 75 percent from 2009 to 2010, executives say, though 
they don’t spell out numbers.14 Gilbert says his company will continue to push 
on both the cost and the revenue sides of the equation: “News is expensive,” he 
says, and audience loyalty is key. “You can’t get two clicks and expect to pay off 
on that investment.”
* * *
For decades, there has been a connection between the journalism that news 
organizations provide and the advertisements that generate most of their revenue. 
Whether it’s a glossy spread that runs before the table of contents in a fashion 
magazine, or the anchorman’s “more after this message” assurance on the local 
Eyewitness News, ads and content have always been closely linked in the stream 
that appears before the consumer.
That linkage is breaking down, and news organizations are scrambling to re-
place it with something else. That may mean selling ads on sites they don’t own 
or control. “Creating content doesn’t ensure a well-sized audience,” says Chris 
Hendricks, vice president of interactive media at newspaper chain McClatchy 
Co. “We’re accepting of the fact that the two may be disengaged.” He then adds 
something one wouldn’t have heard a few years ago from a media executive: 
“The longstanding premise of content and advertising being inextricably linked 
has clearly fallen apart.”
McClatchy and other companies are turning toward selling advertising space on 
other sites, including Facebook and Yahoo. “It’s almost like we are a sales and dis-
tribution company that decided we’re going to fund journalism,” says Hendricks.
Salespeople at McClatchy’s 30 daily newspapers, as well as those at many other 
news organizations, sell ads on Yahoo as part of their pitch to local advertisers. 
For a worldwide company like Yahoo, “it’s very difficult and expensive to set 
up a local sales force of size,” Hendricks says. In the 1990s, Microsoft tried and 
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failed to crack the market with a venture called Sidewalk, which was designed 
to produce city guides and sell local ads. Hendricks notes that Yahoo’s rates for 
local ads tend to be higher than for national ads—but Yahoo needed people who 
knew the communities and businesses. “So we became their local sales force sell-
ing their inventory.”
Because Yahoo has such broad reach, the relationship opens a big market for lo-
cal news organizations. “The typical paper has 15 percent penetration in the local 
market,” Hendricks says, speaking of online operations. “When we partner with 
Yahoo, it takes us up to 80 percent.” And because many Yahoo ads are “behavior-
ally targeted”—meaning they are more closely geared to readers’ interests, based 
on Web usage habits, geography or demographics—the rates are much higher. 
But those ads need a lot of viewers to ensure that the subsections of the audience 
are big enough to interest advertisers. “It’s almost impossible to sell behaviorally 
targeted ads with 15 percent penetration,” Hendricks says. “With Yahoo’s scale 
you can.” McClatchy averages an $18 cost per thousand views for targeted ads, 
Hendricks says. That’s about twice the average for its usual display ads, though it 
has to share the proceeds with Yahoo.
 There are longstanding examples of moves to sell inventory beyond a com-
pany’s sites, including careerbuilder.com, an employment-classified site that Mc-
Clatchy jointly operates with Gannett and Tribune companies.15 But there can 
be difficulties. It isn’t easy to persuade traditional ad departments to sell inventory 
that is not their own. “The gravitational pull of print is very strong. As soon as 
you get away from distribution and content adjacency, the harder it gets,” Hen-
dricks says. And ad sales on other sites represent only a small revenue stream 
so far. Hendricks says McClatchy sold about $15 million of Yahoo ads in 2010 
and expects to increase that to as much as $19 million in 2011. To put that into 
perspective, as dismal as 2010 was for McClatchy, the company still sold a billion 
dollars of advertising that year.16
* * *
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One of the issues in selling others’ ad space is that a publisher must adjust to a 
variety of pricing schemes. For example, the Houston Chronicle tells advertis-
ers that it can help them reach, say, local men between the ages of 25 to 64 on 
Facebook. But Facebook users would need to see an ad 2,500 times before the 
advertiser could be assured it would generate a single click, according to the 
Chronicle. That’s a key reason that the price of ads on Facebook is low: $1,500 
for 1.875 million impressions on Houston’s rate card, or a CPM of just 80 cents, 
less than a tenth of what most news sites get. Others have calculated Facebook’s 
effective CPMs as even lower, below 20 cents.17 By comparison, for targeted ads 
on Yahoo Sports or Finance, the Chronicle expects to charge up to $4,400 per 
200,000 impressions, for a CPM of $22.
Actual ad costs often vary from what appears on a rate card as a result of bar-
gaining between buyer and seller. Nevertheless, it’s noteworthy that the Chronicle 
charges nearly 28 times as much for ads on Yahoo as on Facebook. The price dif-
ference is a result of several factors, including the more prominent display space 
on Yahoo and the problems that social-media sites like Facebook have getting 
users to see or click on ads. In November 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported 
that 24 percent of all online display ads in the U.S. now appear on Facebook, but 
that they are responsible for less than 10 percent of total display-ad revenue.18
Why do Facebook ads get such low rates? And what does that mean for the rest 
of the market? It could be that the standard ways of valuing advertising—that is, 
by whether it will impel a consumer to buy a product, visit a store or feel bet-
ter about a brand—simply don’t work very well in a world where people using 
social media aren’t looking to be sold something.
In a prescient 2008 AdAge column, Matthew Creamer summed up an issue 
that runs throughout this discussion: “The Internet is too often viewed as inven-
tory, as a place where brands pay for the privilege of being adjacent to content. 
... The presumed power of that adjacency has provided the groundwork for the 
media industry for decades.”19 Companies today have faster and cheaper access 
to consumers. “The marketer, once at the mercy of a locked-up media landscape, 
can now be a player in it,” he adds.
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Inevitably, as Creamer notes, the discussion becomes one of how marketing is 
shifting to “earned” media rather than paid. One analyst defines the distinction 
this way: “‘Earned media’ is an old PR term that essentially meant getting your 
brand into free media rather than having to pay for it through advertising,” writes 
Sean Corcoran of Forrester Research. “The term has evolved into the … word-
of-mouth that is being created through social media.”20
If marketers believe they can reduce their advertising costs by engaging con-
sumers directly, that almost certainly cuts revenue for news organizations. Al-
though some firms are trying to capitalize on the trend by assisting advertisers 
with their social-media strategies, that is a labor-intensive business that is outside 
the expertise of many media companies.
And there are journalistic problems that go beyond the economic loss repre-
sented by the decline of old-fashioned advertising relationships. A Florida com-
pany, Izea, explicitly sets up arrangements so people who blog or tweet favorably 
about a company can get compensated in cash, travel or in other ways. The 
company insists that its writers adhere to Federal Trade Commission guidelines, 
enacted in 2009, requiring disclosure of “ ‘material connections’ (sometimes pay-
ments or free products) between advertisers and endorsers.”21
But a 2010 study by Izea found that many people engaged in this “social media 
sponsorship” weren’t aware of the FTC guidelines or had been offered compen-
sation without a requirement to disclose it. The survey respondents also priced a 
“sponsored tweet” from a personal Twitter account at an average of $124 and a 
“sponsored blog post” at $179—around the same amount a small news organiza-
tion will pay for a story and far more than an average blog post would ever get 
from display ads.22
* * *
None of these ventures comes close in potential payoff to the online coupon 
craze, pioneered most successfully by Groupon. The company was launched in 
Chicago in November 2008, offering its customers daily discount deals on ser-
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vices ranging from nail salons to restaurant meals. For the deals to kick in, a 
minimum number of users must sign up; the system encourages users to spread 
the word and to take advantage of social media.
In a little over two years, the company expanded to more than 500 markets in 
44 countries and turned down a $6 billion takeover offer from Google. Forbes 
called it “the fastest-growing company in Web history.”23
The company’s model is a repudiation of much of what has driven online rev-
enue for media companies. “Banner ads seem such a relic of the 19th century,” 
Groupon founder Andrew Mason told Wired.com. “If God created man and the 
Internet on the same day, we would see more stuff like Groupon.”24
The company has drawn complaints, particularly from retailers like some Chi-
cago restaurant owners who said many Groupon customers either came only for 
the discount and didn’t return, or gamed the system by copying coupons and 
using them repeatedly.25 Groupon has also spawned a host of competitors.26 And 
media companies have wavered between joining with Groupon or competing 
with it.
The Minneapolis Star Tribune launched a coupon service, called STeals. 
Cox Media has started DealSwarm. McClatchy is trying to have it both ways: 
It announced a deal with Groupon in July 2010.27 Less than a year later, Mc-
Clatchy said it would launch its own deal service, while continuing to work 
with Groupon. As AdAge noted, “McClatchy gets 15% of revenue from Grou-
pon deals ... on its own, McClatchy could collect as much as 50% from deals 
it sells and distributes.”28
But it may be too late for news organizations to get substantial revenue from 
this business. Groupon is reported to be considering an initial public offering 
that could raise as much as $15 billion.29 With so much capital, Groupon could 
compete on price and breadth in ways that would overwhelm ordinary competi-
tors. And Groupon has its own challenges. It is possible that so many competitors’ 
coupons will flood the market that consumers and businesses will begin to tune 
them out, which would diminish the value of the idea.
Columbia Journalism School | Tow Center for Digital Journalism
 New Users, New Revenue: Alternative Ways to Make Money 115
* * *
Many media companies are trying to raise revenue through more untraditional 
means. Wired Magazine opened a physical “Wired Pop Up Store” in New York 
City during the winter holidays, where it holds events like a “Geek Dad Family 
Party.”30 The store sells gadgets and paraphernalia. New York Magazine sponsors a 
wedding showcase event every year, selling tickets to the public, and sponsorships 
to national fashion brands; it also caters to local disc jockeys, dress stores, bakeries 
and other enterprises in the wedding business.
Such events may be good for branding, but tend not to bring in a great deal of 
new revenue. The Atlantic is different. It is involved in running about 75 events 
a year, the most ambitious of which is the Aspen Ideas Festival. “Most maga-
zines do events for advertisers,” says Justin Smith, president of the Atlantic Media 
Group. “We use the Atlantic brand and editorial prowess for attracting people.” 
The business, called Atlantic LIVE, also runs events with such names as the Green 
Intelligence Forum and the Food Summit. They usually include partnerships 
with organizations tied to the topic. Coverage of the event may appear on the 
Atlantic’s site or in the pages of the magazine.
Atlantic LIVE is run separately from the magazine and website and has its own 
sales group and editors who run the events. It has become a significant source of 
income for the company. Of the $32 million reported as revenue by the company 
in recent publicity, as much as $6 million comes from these events.
* * *
If the old formula of “adjacency”—selling ads and commercials alongside con-
tent—is fading, what will replace it? There are many possibilities, but few are 
likely, on their own, to provide the stream of dollars that advertising and circula-
tion once did.
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It may be most useful to resist the temptation to think about digital journal-
ism economics in terms of moving an old business model to a new realm. The 
common thread in the strategies described in this chapter is that they dem-
onstrate an embrace of the Internet, rather than an attempt to subjugate it to 
legacy business models.
When viewed that way, the Internet isn’t a friend or an enemy. It’s reality.
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Chapter 9
Managing Digital: Audience, Data and Dollars
Although all digital news organizations live in a brutally competitive envi-
ronment, some companies do much better than others because their managers 
respond more deftly to opportunities.
Arianna Huffington is in that category, and the Huffington Post’s growth in 
audience1 and influence2 is an example of a sustained idea and management at-
tention. The venture capitalist Eric Hippeau was an early investor and was CEO 
of the site for several years, until its sale to AOL in February 2011. He was struck 
by the conviction of the founders—Huffington and Ken Lerer, a corporate com-
munications executive turned venture capitalist—that much of U.S. society had 
lost trust in authority and in journalism. When Huffington Post launched in 
2005, blogs were resonating with consumers. “They didn’t have to go through 
gatekeepers—journalists,” Hippeau said. “Blogs could democratize news.” Logi-
cally flowing from this idea was a focus on encouraging reader commentary, and 
HuffPost hired people to help ensure that the conversation would be democratic 
and open.3 “It is expensive to moderate,” Hippeau said. “We have 25 full-time 
in-house moderators.”
What HuffPost’s founders didn’t know at the beginning was how rapidly social 
media were going to grow. After all, in 2005, YouTube was just getting started and 
Facebook was still confined to colleges and universities. But HuffPost’s manage-
ment quickly realized that the social media trend fit with their original convic-
tions. “As the audience embraced social media, we followed, ” said Hippeau. And 
that attention to engaging readers—who now contribute 4 million comments a 
month on the site—led them to spend more on technology and less on content.
Huffington Post also developed an ability to respond quickly to the data that it 
was getting on traffic and usage—something that is a crucial component of suc-
cess in digital journalism. Indeed, data analysis has moved from being a required 
skill in media companies’ finance departments to being an essential part of the 
résumé for editors, writers and designers.
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At CNNMoney.com, “Everyone on the staff has access to page-view and traf-
fic data,” says Executive Editor Christopher Peacock. The staff gets daily emails 
listing the top 50 stories by section as well as by the entire site. And, he says, “We 
have real-time metrics. We have a proprietary system to tell us how engaging our 
headlines and home page are.”
LIN Media, with its 32 local TV broadcast stations, has an integrated con-
tent-management system that distributes content (and allocates costs) across all 
its markets and platforms. Its daily report on the previous day’s metrics is sent 
around to business and editorial departments each morning. “Sometimes this 
report affects broadcast TV decisions as well,” says Robb Richter, senior vice 
president for new media. “It’s like having a great focus group all day long.”
Forbes Chief Product Officer Lewis DVorkin writes a blog about the com-
pany’s evolving business practices, often noting the integration of previously in-
dependent departments, functions and platforms at the company. DVorkin sees 
this integration as essential to Forbes’ digital growth. “The Web and social me-
dia turned everything upside down. Knowledgeable content creators, audience 
members and marketers, too, now possess tools to independently produce and 
distribute text.”4 Expanding readership, once the job of circulation experts, is 
now done by business and editorial employees who develop “audience growth 
strategies,” which shape coverage. When they decide which topics (say, college 
tuition) are likely to attract more readers, or different readers, that affects the re-
cruitment of bloggers, and the efforts of staff and contributors to find followers 
and fans.
Forbes also encourages its largest advertisers to contribute content directly 
to the magazine and the site as part of their advertising buy. The companies are 
given tools to publish content—text, video and photos—on their own page 
on the site. This might startle journalists who expect strict separation between 
the editorial and business sides, but DVorkin sees this effort as a logical way to 
bring in advertisers who know they can create digital content elsewhere, through 
websites and email. Labeling the material as coming from advertisers helps in-
oculate the company from violating the church-state divide, DVorkin says, add-
ing that Forbes’ approach allows marketers not to be confined in the “ghetto” 
of freelance-written advertorial. The advertisers’ material is not edited by Forbes 
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and appears online and in the magazine as “Forbes AdVoice.”5 (If it’s for the print 
edition, Dvorkin reads it for tone, but says he does no more than that.) The print 
AdVoice column—limited to one per issue—appears in the table of contents 
and may run next to a related story. An online column is featured near relevant 
editorial content.
Giving advertisers direct access to an audience without previously approving 
the message is a big departure for media companies. The American Society of 
Magazine Editors’ standards, revised in January 2011, are strict about separating 
ad content visually from editorial content, but they are silent on the access issue.6
Eric Hippeau, who has gone back to being a venture capitalist, calls this ap-
proach “turning your customers into publishers.” Advertisers, he says, will not 
only create content that will increase traffic, but this will represent “a great diver-
sification of revenues” away from advertising sold by the page view. Before Hip-
peau left the HuffPost, the company had just launched a program that charged 
flat fees and gave advertisers the opportunity to “have a conversation” with the 
site’s audience through posts and responses. He believes that once companies start 
interacting with the audience in this environment, they will be hooked. “Once a 
brand starts that process, they are not going to stop. This is a great benefit to the 
media companies.”7
Managing digital journalism properties often means stepping away from roles 
and job descriptions that were found in traditional operations. At AOL, execu-
tives have decided that content areas such as business or technology should be-
come their own business units, or “towns” in the AOL patois.8 And editors are 
increasingly responsible for determining the revenue potential of stories.
An explicit rendition of AOL’s strategy can be found in a 57-page internal 
PowerPoint called “The AOL Way,” which was leaked to Business Insider in Feb-
ruary 2011. The handbook outlines AOL’s plans to lower the cost of creating 
content while increasing revenue, with explicit targets; it was written a few weeks 
before AOL announced its deal to buy the Huffington Post.9
The company’s rule of thumb is that the cost of acquiring a story should be 
no more than half the amount of ad revenue expected to come from that story.10 
An editor who wants to pay for a premium freelancer must also estimate the size 
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of the audience for the assignment—in other words, the editor must cost-justify 
every story.11 In the chart below, the company shows average costs and revenue 
by story type. The first column lists the department or source of the story, and 
the next column states the average cost of these stories. These figures are then 
matched with the “eCPM”—or effective cost (to advertisers) per thousand page 
views—and from that, AOL estimates the number of page views needed to break 
even on that story.12
One method of building traffic is to hop onto hot topics, the document advis-
es. “Use editorial insight and judgment to determine production,” the document 
says, offering as an example that if “Macaulay Culkin and Mila Kunis are trending 
because they broke up,” someone should “write a story about Macaulay Culkin 
and Mila Kunis.” And editors are told to always keep expenses in mind. The cost 
of content can run from $25 for a freelance article that needs 7,000 page views 
to break even, to a $5,000 video that will require a half-million streams to recover 
Which AOL way for content?
SEED Network Article $25 Base Cost $5 eCPM 7,000 PVs to Break Even
StudioNow Video $340 Base Cost $20 eCPM 34,000 PVs to Break Even
“High Gloss” Content $100 Base Cost $9 eCPM 16,000 PVs to Break Even
Photo Gallery $50 Base Cost $5 eCPM 14,000 PVs to Break Even
Premium Article $250 Base Cost $9 eCPM 40,000 PVs to Break Even
Premium Video $5,000 Base Cost $20 eCPM 500,000 PVs to Break Even
Example:  $100 Base Cost x 2 = Break-Even Revenue Target
($200 Target ÷ $9 eCPM x 1,000 = 22,222 Impressions Needed
22,222 Impressions ÷ 1.4 Impressions/PV ≈ 16,000 PVs Needed
Note: Video is priced per view, so do not divide by 1.4.
PV Targets By Content Type – Rules of Thumb
DEFINITIONS: PV = page views; eCPM = effective cost per thousand page views.
SOURCE: Reproduced from leaked AOL document, “The AOL Way,” January 2011, page 17
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its costs.13 Catchy headlines, such as “Lady Gaga Goes Pantless in Paris” (from 
AOL site StyleList.com) are important to entice readers from search.14 Similarly, 
an article headlined “Benadryl for Dogs” should cost $15, because its revenue 
potential is around $26.15 “We are heavily invested in analytics as this is the way 
to empower our editors and journalists,” Neel Chopdekar, vice president at AOL 
Media, said in an interview shortly before “The AOL Way” was made public. He 
calls this “bionic journalism—the best of man and machine.”
Paying freelancers by performance is not as unusual a practice as paying edito-
rial staff that way. About.com, the general information website founded in 1995 
and now owned by the New York Times, pays its expert writers, or “guides,” by 
performance.16 USA Today announced in early April that it is considering paying 
bonuses to writers based on page views.17
Digital companies, which lean heavily on part-time contributors or unpaid 
commenters, are constantly on the lookout for cheap labor. And mainstream 
news companies have long offered psychic, rather than financial, rewards to its 
reporters and editors.
Forbes’ DVorkin is experimenting with pay schemes for blogging “contribu-
tors,” whom Forbes compensates with a flat monthly fee. On top of that, Forbes 
pays a bonus if a writer reaches a certain target of unique visitors. (DVorkin de-
clined to give details about pay at Forbes, but he did say that at True/Slant—the 
Web company he owned before coming to Forbes—contributors would typi-
cally earn about $200 per month, and some would get twice that much, counting 
their bonuses. A “few” earned several thousand dollars a month.) DVorkin said 
he’d like to add more metrics to the calculations—for example, Twitter followers 
or repeat visitors.
“In the newsroom, we are trying to develop different currencies to value suc-
cess, “ says CNNMoney.com’s Peacock. Journalists typically feel rewarded when 
their stories run on the front of a print publication, or lead the evening news. 
“We are trying to develop different kinds of ‘front page’ experiences for the 
journalists,” Peacock says. But the new standards, such as the number of page 
views or comments, are often beyond an editor’s control and are just as likely to 
be determined by readers, aggregators or bloggers.
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Digital executives also must constantly decide when to deploy staff to work 
on new or experimental products that don’t meet the new productivity tests. 
Tumblr, the social media microblogging platform, gets billions of monthly page 
views overall, but its value to most media companies is still negligible. Some 
journalists are fascinated with what it might become in terms of driving traffic 
or buzz—and their employers let them spend time with the platform, if only to 
be sure they don’t miss out on something that might turn into the next Twitter. 
For example, GQ has a Tumblr site with just 12,000 followers—a tiny fraction of 
the print magazine’s monthly circulation of 800,000. GQ’s senior editor, Devin 
Gordon, says “Tumblr is a side project, but I care a lot about it.” He and an 
editorial assistant limit themselves to no more than two hours per week posting 
Tumblr content.
Managers of digital operations must also deal with journalists who are able to 
establish a following on the basis of their own talents rather than the prestige or 
reach of the news organization. Andrew Sullivan’s Daily Dish was responsible 
for 1 million monthly unique visitors, or about 20 percent of the traffic, at the 
Atlantic’s site. But it was Sullivan’s audience, not the Atlantic’s; the blogger owned 
the brand equity. So when he moved to The Daily Beast in April 2011, he took 
his unique users with him. This phenomenon isn’t entirely new, of course. Col-
umnists like Walter Winchell would change employers in the glory days of the 
1920s tabloid wars.18 But in digital journalism, audiences can follow stars with 
great ease, and conceivably journalists with big individual followings could begin 
to keep, and try to make money from, data about their readers, rather than leaving 
that to their employers.
DVorkin says he is changing the way he judges the quality of a reporter. “It 
used to be a question of how they develop their sources. Now it’s how they de-
velop their sources and their audience.” He expects Forbes journalists not just to 
cover news, but to be “maestros” of comments and of followers. And they have to 
be recruiters. “When we used to hire a reporter, we’d say, ‘Show me some clips.’ 
Now I say, ‘Who is in your orbit? Who are your sources? Who do you know? 
Who can you convince to contribute?’ ”
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The brutally competitive nature of digital journalism also extends to adver-
tising sales, and many traditional media companies have a hard time justifying 
a large commitment to the effort simply because the returns, at least initially, 
can be so small. Consider the case of a company that publishes family-oriented 
magazines and a website. The company (which asked for confidentiality in re-
turn for providing its data) runs a profitable monthly print magazine, with free 
distribution of 400,000 copies within a top-five metro area. But its attempts to 
replicate its success on the Web haven’t worked out. The site associated with the 
publication gets 200,000 unique users and 1.5 million page views per month. 
The expenses associated with the site amount to only around $181,000 per year, 
but that isn’t quite covered by its ad revenue. Indeed, digital advertising accounts 
for just under 4 percent of the company’s $4.68 million in annual ad revenue.19 
Of the company’s 1,500 ad clients, 100 are online, and of those, only about 10 
advertisers are exclusively digital
LIN Media sells an estimated $30 million in advertising from its Web and mo-
bile efforts; that represents about 7 percent of total revenue, or a significantly larg-
er percentage than many other local broadcasters claim.20 But to put that figure 
into perspective, compare it to automobile advertising, which typically accounts 
for about 20 to 25 percent of total ad revenue for local broadcast companies.
These companies face an ongoing dilemma. If they didn’t make an effort to 
sell digital advertising, they wouldn’t lose much income—for now. But they be-
lieve that digital delivery of their content is bound to grow over time, so they 
are investing in working out pricing and customer relations even though the im-
mediate return doesn’t justify the effort. Whether they can play out these digital 
advertising calculations successfully depends on the quality of their management.
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Details of family-oriented magazine’s website financials
Estimated 2010 
Total revenue print + digital $ 4,684,000
Total revenue digital $ 176,124
% digital 3.8%
Allocated cost of one in-house Web staffer $ 42,000
Tech support $ 48,000
Sales commissions $ 35,225
Edit staff expense $ 50,000
Site administration $ 6,000
Estimated total expenses $ 181,225
NET $ (5,101)
SOURCE: Internal company documents. 
The firm asked not to be identified in this report.
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Conclusion
“Here’s the problem: Journalists just don’t understand their business.”
That’s the diagnosis from Randall Rothenberg, a former New York Times me-
dia reporter who heads the Interactive Advertising Bureau, a trade group repre-
senting publishers and marketers.
Whether or not you agree with his sweeping characterization, it’s clear that 
many sectors of the traditional news industry have been slow to embrace changes 
brought on by digital technology. They also have been flummoxed by competi-
tors who invest minimally in producing original content but have siphoned off 
some of the most profitable parts of the business.
At the same time, digital journalism has created significant opportunities for 
news organizations to rethink the way they cover their communities. And in 
several organizations, old and new, we see promising signs that a transformed 
industry can emerge from the digital transition—one that is leaner, quicker and, 
yes, profitable.
We do not believe that legacy platforms should be disregarded or disbanded. 
It simply is not reasonable to assume that any company would cast aside the part 
of its business that generates 80 to 90 percent of its revenue. But we do think 
that companies ought to regard digital platforms and their audiences as being in 
a state of constant transformation, one that demands a faster and more consistent 
pace of innovation and investment.
To that end, we offer these recommendations:
	 •	 	Digital	platforms	have	been	treated	too	often	by	traditional	news	organiza-
tions as just another opportunity to publish existing content. Many sites are 
filled with “shovelware”—content that amounts to little more than elec-
tronic editions of words and pictures from traditional platforms. But, as we 
have seen, publishers can build economic success by creating high-value, 
less-commoditized content designed for digital media. New York Magazine’s 
successful site gets little traffic from print-edition stories; KSL.com’s class-
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fied ads are not part of its broadcast program; and the Dallas Morning News 
provides online football coverage that would be impossible to replicate in its 
sports section.
	 •	 	Media	 companies	 should	 redefine	 the	 relationship	between	 audience	 and	
advertising. They have spent a great deal of time and resources building 
masses of lightly engaged readers. And the industry has turned online ads 
into what Rothenberg calls low-value “direct-response advertising—a.k.a., 
junk mail.” That kind of advertising is dependent on volume—a game pub-
lishers will never win when competing with behemoths like Facebook and 
Google. This is not a goal that can be accomplished just by the business side. 
Journalists must make a fuller commitment to understanding the audiences 
they have and the ones they want, and to revamping their digital offerings to 
ensure deeper loyalty.
	 •	 	Media	companies	ought	to	rethink	their	relationships	with	advertisers.	This	
doesn’t mean allowing them to dictate coverage or news priorities. It does 
mean understanding that advertisers now have many more ways to reach 
customers than they used to and that some of these methods, such as so-
cial media, can be cheap and effective. News organizations have their own 
strengths: They produce journalism that is geared to their communities, and 
they employ sales forces who know their markets—both of which should 
give them a competitive advantage. They can act as guides to the digital era, 
helping companies produce new-media ads, place them online for maxi-
mum impact and learn such digital fundamentals as getting better position-
ing on search engines.
	 •	 	News	and	marketing	companies	should	develop	alternatives	to	the	impres-
sion-based pricing system (that is, pricing by CPM, or cost per thousand) 
that dominates online advertising. Small publishers have been successful 
selling ads by the week or month rather than by volume. Many large ad-
vertisers and ad agencies will insist on paying by the impression, but news 
organizations need to build upon their current pricing schemes by com-
bining digital ads more effectively with broadcast or print, social-media 
outreach and other methods. Moreover, media companies must come up 
with ways to build content value into digital display ads; as others have also 
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noted, too many of them are relics of a decade ago—boxes on a page that 
convey little of the information or appeal that historically made advertising 
valuable to consumers.
	 •	 	News	organizations	must	be	vigilant	about	outright	theft	of	their	content,	
but they should also realize that most aggregators operate within the bounds 
of copyright law and are generating value for readers. This means news sites 
must do more than simply insert links (most of which are never clicked) 
within stories, and instead develop a thoughtful approach to understanding 
what topics best lend themselves to aggregation and how best to engage 
their readers in the effort.
	 •	 	It	is	asking	a	lot	to	expect	a	legacy	division—in	news	or	ad	sales—to	em-
brace such a radically different world as digital. Retraining gets you only so 
far. Small, traditional news organizations may find it impossible to set up sep-
arate divisions. But bigger companies should analyze the potential in creating 
separate digital staffs, particularly on the business side. We did find successful 
companies with integrated digital and legacy departments, but others have 
demonstrated that they can compete more effectively by deploying commit-
ted digital-only teams that adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.
	 •	 	Journalists	must	be	prepared	for	continued	pressure	on	editorial	costs.	There’s	
an old rule of thumb in the newspaper world, that every 1,000 readers sup-
ports one newsroom staffer. That kind of thinking isn’t going to hold in the 
digital world. We are likely to see a world of more, and smaller, news organi-
zations, the most successful of which will leverage their staffs and audience 
by using aggregation, curation and partnerships with audiences to provide 
content of genuine value.
	 •	 	Mobile	digital	devices	represent	a	special	challenge	for	news	companies;	for	
every successful new product or new platform, there will be others the com-
pany tried that didn’t work. If a company can place small bets on many ven-
tures, the probability increases that one will win.
	 •	 	Any	news	site	that	adopts	a	pay	scheme	now	should	have	very	limited	expec-
tations for its success—at least on the Web. In the case of a print publication, 
requiring digital readers to pay may help to slow circulation losses, but that 
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is hardly a long-term solution. A pay plan merged with an ambitious strategy 
to improve users’ experience on mobile platforms has a much better chance 
to succeed.
We restate the bias we offered at the beginning of this report: We believe 
the public needs independent journalists who seek out facts, explain complex 
issues and present their work in compelling ways. We also believe that while 
philanthropic or government support can help, it is ultimately up to the com-
mercial market to provide the economic basis for journalism. The industry has 
realized many of the losses from the digital era. It is time to start reaping some 
of the benefits.
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Executive Summary
Chapter 1
News From Everywhere: The Economics of Digital Journalism
Large-scale competitive and economic forces are confronting news organiza-
tions, old and new. This chapter identifies 16 features of the digital world that 
are transforming the business of news, including changes in audience, aggregation, 
distribution, customer experience, cost structure, innovation cycles and advertising.
Chapter 2
The Trouble with Traffic: Why Big Audiences Aren’t Always Profitable
Digital audiences often far outnumber those for broadcast or print news out-
lets, but online ad revenue is usually a fraction of what’s earned in traditional 
news media. One reason is the difficulty sites have keeping readers’ attention. 
The most loyal users typically make up a small part of the audience but look at 
the most pages per visit. Some news organizations are retooling their approach 
to derive more revenue from those users.
	 •	 	Companies	discussed:	New	York	Times,	Houston	Chronicle,	 
Los Angeles Times, Scout Analytics, Gawker Media, PBS, Dallas Morning 
News, Examiner.com, The Atlantic, Tumblr, New York Magazine,  
Newser, Mashable
Chapter 3
Local and Niche Sites: The Advantages of Being Small
Despite the general distress in the news industry, some community sites have 
succeeded. The economics of local and niche news providers are much different 
than those of large sites, and they capture some benefits by operating at such a 
small scale: low costs, local ties and creative online ad sales strategies. Networks 
such as Patch are attempting to be local to their audiences but national in their 
technology and ad sales, with uncertain success so far.
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	 •	 	Companies	discussed:	TBD,	Main	Street	Connect,	Patch,	Baristanet,	 
Alaska Dispatch, Batavian, Daily Candy
Chapter 4
The New New Media: Mobile, Video and Other Emerging Platforms
Journalism companies are grappling with a stream of innovations in digital 
media. Most organizations have tried to develop new ways to report and distrib-
ute stories, and many are making substantial investments to enable their work to 
appear on attractive new devices. Companies must constantly evaluate where to 
invest and how much. Video has been a special challenge. Publishers know that 
advertisers will pay a premium for video, but the video audience remains small 
at many news sites.
	 •	 	Companies	discussed:	Wall	Street	Journal,	The	Daily,	Wired,	Sports	 
Illustrated, Miami Herald, Dallas Morning News, CNN, New York  
Magazine, LIN Media, Forbes, Detroit Free Press
Chapter 5
Paywalls: Information at a Price
Publishers cite several reasons to charge for news online. One is to increase 
subscription revenue, another is to slow erosion in print audiences. Even before 
the Internet, subscription revenue didn’t amount to much; Americans are used to 
paying little for their news. With few exceptions, digital pay plans have not been 
able to make up for declining advertising revenue offline. Digital subscriptions 
may pay off in the years to come, but only if media companies can persuade con-
sumers to use, and pay for, mobile platforms like smartphones and tablets.
	 •	 	Companies	discussed:	Wall	Street	Journal,	Arkansas	Democrat-Gazette,	 
Dallas Morning News, Miami Herald, Financial Times, Newport Daily 
News, New York Times
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Chapter 6
Aggregation: ‘Shameless’ – and Essential
The arguments about companies like Huffington Post mask the reality that ag-
gregation has long been a feature of the journalism business, and one that almost 
every news provider engages in today in some fashion. It makes economic sense 
to create and enrich content by linking to material that appears elsewhere, and 
aggregation is among the cheapest and most efficient ways to get users.
	 •	 	Companies	 discussed:	 Huffington	 Post,	 AOL,	 Google,	Yahoo,	 New	York	
Magazine, Newser
Chapter 7
Dollars and Dimes: The New Costs of Doing Business
The notion of “trading dollars for dimes” captures the impact of digital distri-
bution on the economics of the news business. Without having to make the steep 
investment that used to be required to launch a media business, low-cost local or 
topical sites have found it easier to build audiences. Legacy news producers face 
a trickier challenge: to cut costs and boost online revenue while trying to protect 
traditional advertising sources.
	 •	 	Companies	discussed:	CT	Mirror,	Journal-Register,	Breaking	Media,	 
Business Insider, The Atlantic, Detroit Free Press, Detroit News
Chapter 8
New Users, New Revenue: Alternative Ways to Make Money
Media companies that successfully make the transition to the digital world are 
developing new businesses and twists on old ones. These include selling market-
ing services to advertisers, beating Craigslist at its own game and broadening 
their sales beyond their own sites.
	 •	 	Companies	discussed:	Houston	Chronicle,	KSL.com/Deseret	News,	 
McClatchy, Izea, Groupon, The Atlantic, Facebook
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Chapter 9
Managing Digital: Audience, Data and Dollars
Every digital news organization faces relentless competition; some do better 
than others through high-quality management. Because digital news prod-
ucts are in a state of flux, it is critical for news companies to understand data 
and respond quickly. Hiring and compensation of journalists have been made 
more complicated as metrics have entered the picture. Some media companies 
are developing programs to encourage advertisers and marketers to contribute 
content directly in ways that wouldn’t have been countenanced in the past.
	 •	 	Companies	 discussed:	 Huffington	 Post,	 AOL,	 CNNMoney,	 LIN	 Media,	
Forbes, Tumblr, GQ
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